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Abstract
Recent years have seen the emergence of impact bonds, which are a striking case
of both the post-crisis ‘social turn’ of finance and the financialisation of social and
development policy. In an impact bond, investors pre-finance new social interventions
for marginalised target groups. If such a programme can demonstrate positive effects
on the lives of the target group, investors are compensated by a public or charitable
institution. This thesis offers an in-depth examination of the wider rationalities
through which actors ‘make sense’ of and authorise such vehicles—and what political
consequences this has. Using a Foucault-inspired analytics of governmentality
framework, I develop three case studies of impact bonds that address homelessness
and long-term health conditions in the UK, and the gender gap in educational
attainment in India, respectively. My investigation is based on document analysis, 32
semi-structured interviews with project stakeholders, and participant observation at
project sites and conferences. It demonstrates that, rather than simply reproducing a
financial ‘script’, these programmes configure scientific, ethical, managerial, financial,
and socio-political rationalities into a programmatic form that employs a fact-based
approach to addressing social ills. I unpack how the focus on evidenced results both
reassures individuals that they are not mistaken about what it means to invest for
good and immunises projects against political confrontation. These considerations
lead me to make three interventions to emphasise the ambiguity of impact bonds:
(i) outcome measurement is more provisional than commonly suggested, (ii) impact
bonds not only finance experimental projects but become a normalised contracting
model, and (iii) their focus on ‘victims’ obscures broader socio-economic causes
of the social problems addressed. At the same time, however, impact bonds also
rework exclusionary constellations ‘from within’ and enable the operation of new
(if imperfect) projects and everyday face-to-face interactions. They thus constitute
contingent ethical moments that require ongoing engagement.
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1. Introduction
From the vantage point of post-crisis, austerity politics, and widespread popular
acknowledgement of the limits of neoliberalism, recent years have seen an increasing
normative critique of unfettered financial capitalism (Jessop, 2013). This has given
rise to a range of alternative practices that seek to inflect finance with ethical
discourses of poverty reduction, inclusion, humanitarianism, and social equity. For
instance, such practices include gender-lens investing (Quinlan & VanderBrug, 2016),
racial equity investing (Cambridge Associates, 2018) or investments to achieve the
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (OECD, 2019). In contrast
to studies that locate contemporary finance as a key producer of social inequities
(e.g. Piketty, 2017; Sayer, 2015), various practitioners (e.g. Dear et al., 2016) and
academics (e.g. Shiller, 2013) now suggest that finance may be used to reduce
inequities and help address societal challenges. As increased public indebtedness has
led to moves to cap both social spending and development aid, it is often argued
that—in addition to philanthropy—ethical investments are needed to fill a public
‘funding gap’, especially in view of the multiplicity of contemporary issues such as
climate change, increasing income inequality or international migration (Salamon,
2014, p. 80; Tett, 2019).
From the Burning Man festival (Steiner & Emerson, 2016) to the World Economic
Forum (Smiles, Haefele, Carter, Donovan, &Koester, 2017), advocates now promote a
new type of finance that challenges an economistic contractual worldview—according
to which social and environmental problems only arise as a consequence of negative
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external effects—and seeks to re-describe investment in people-centred terms. Even
Pope Francis called Christians to rediscover ‘this precious and primordial unity
between profit and solidarity’ (cited in The Economist, 2017a, p. 64). But when
former hedge fund managers and private equity professionals enter the stage in
Davos or at the Aspen Institute to explain how they are going to improve health,
education, and basic welfare for the downtrodden, the propositions presented are
full of glaring contrasts. While an ethics of altruism may inform what (financial)
actors set out to do with such vehicles, the rhetoric and actions involved in this kind
of do-gooding are about generating financial returns. The financial sector and its
ways of ‘doing things’ increasingly pervade voluntary and non-profit organisations,
schools, and hospitals—and arguably alter the inner workings of such organisations
and democratic societies in general.
International political economy (IPE) as a discipline and field of enquiry has long
been marked out by a set of central analytical concerns that resonate with this current
conjuncture. It has analysed the ‘remoralization’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 430) of
capitalism in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Aitken, 2010a; Campbell-Verduyn,
2017; Mader, 2015). As Brassett, Rethel, and Watson (2010, p. 2) point out:
The question of responding to the subprime crisis [. . . ] moves beyond
technical fixes to improve the allocative efficiency of the banking sector
and is bound up with deeper political and ethical commitments to how
finance should be organised and in whose interests that organisation
should take place.
Beyond new institutional blueprints for regulatory reform (cf. Baker, 2013), the
field has begun to also cover debates about the scope and ends of finance. For
instance, scholars have analysed practices of ethical investing such as socially
responsible investing (SRI) (Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2010a), gender lens investing
(GLI) (Roberts, 2016), and practices of microfinance (Mader, 2015). Moreover,
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contributions have discussed the question of how finance has come to affect
welfare systems, particularly under the zeitgeist of austerity (Hay, 2013). Such
analyses have focused on the expansion of asset-based welfare systems (Finlayson,
2009) or the promotion of educational loans among low-income students and
their families (Soederberg, 2014, Ch. 5). This literature emphasises that the
re-imagination of finance is not only about ‘helping people’. On one hand, the
actions and rhetoric involved in such helping weave financial rationalities into the
fabric of citizens’ everyday life and identities. On the other hand, such schemes
run the risk of being turned into highly profitable asset streams, with the social
purpose becoming a secondary priority. Indeed, this dichotomy between social
purposes and private property is influential in the critical IPE literature on the subject.1
Beyond the ‘social turn’ of finance—or rather in addition to it—scholars have recently
diagnosed a second shift. Increasingly, we see a tendency to integrate finance directly
into development aid and welfare arrangements (Brooks, 2015; Karwowski, 2019),
evidenced for instance in the financialisation of education and health (Bayliss, 2016;
Languille, 2017), the conflation of digital money and welfare payments (Bantock,
2018) or the emerging development finance regime (Mawdsley, 2018a). Instead of an
abdication of responsibilities by the collective, we witness the increased hardwiring
of finance into the management of social issues; not a handing over of social issues
to financial markets, actors and logics, but an integration of finance into social
and development policy; not a retreat of public institutions, but their financialised
reconfiguration (Lavinas, 2018). It is a shift from finance as welfare/development to
financialised social and development policy.
1This dichotomy is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.
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1.1 Impact Bonds and the Financialisation of Policy
This thesis looks at social impact bonds and development impact bonds. It is argued
that they are a striking case of both the post-crisis ‘social turn’ of finance and the
financialisation of social and development policy. Impact bonds are public-private
partnerships that finance social interventions such as family therapy, outreach work for
rough sleepers or programmes for marginalised indigenous people (Dear et al., 2016,
pp. 80–88). Public institutions (or other organisations on whose behalf a programme
is delivered) reimburse and compensate investors if programmes meet agreed-upon
social outcomes targets, such as improved emotional wellbeing of service users
or successful labour market integration (cf. Dear et al., 2016; Gustafsson-Wright,
Gardiner, & Putcha, 2015). In the US, impact bonds are therefore referred to as
‘pay-for-success’ contracts (Albertson & Fox, 2018).
The world’s first social impact bond (SIB) was launched in September 2010 in the
UK, designed to reduce reoffending by short-sentenced prisoners released from Her
Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough in Cambridgeshire. An amount of £5 million
was raised from 17 different social investors (mostly foundations and charitable trusts)
and geared towards financing a range of mentoring, education, and social support
services for 3,000 male prisoners both inside the prison and after their release. Since
the much-heralded launch of this ‘granddaddy of all social impact bond-financed
projects’ (Bank, 2015, para. 3), the mechanism has gained traction. To date, over 100
social impact bonds (SIBs) have been contracted in a social policy and health context,
predominantly in Anglo-Saxon countries. More recently, so-called development
impact bonds (DIBs) have been introduced to achieve improved social outcomes in
developing countries (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2019). In 2017, the first ‘humanitarian
impact bond’ (HIB) was launched by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), geared towards providing physical rehabilitation services for disabled people
in countries affected by violence and conflict (Maurer, 2016). This development has
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been accompanied by the emergence of new actors that invest (including trusts and
foundations), as well as intermediary and advisory organisations and fund managers
who bring actors together and advise on the structuring of such projects (Williams,
2018).2
The ‘market’ for these vehicles is still estimated to be relatively small, at around
$514 million in contract size and $210 million of investment in 2017 according to
Floyd (2017, p. 3).3 While the the macroeconomic importance of impact bonds
is limited, ‘significant hopes and political capital have been invested in them and
their potential implications for future economic and social policy are considerable’
(Sinclair, McHugh, & Roy, 2019, p. 2). Recent years have seen the launch of
numerous initiatives to promote and conduct research into impact bonds, such as the
G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce, Big Society Capital (a social investment
wholesale institution set up by the UK government with a particular emphasis on
impact bonds), and the Impact Bonds Working Group, a group of public and private
sector donor organisations seeking to scale up impact bonds in service of delivering
the SDGs (Impact Bonds Working Group, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2018).
According to Spiess-Knafl and Scheck (2017), impact bonds are now ‘the most
popular approach to fund initiatives in the social sector’ (p. 90).
A growing number of IPE scholars have looked at the phenomenon of impact bonds
through the lens of financialisation, that is, as part of a global transformation process
of capitalism that entails the capture of various resources by finance through an
expansion into mundane territories (Dowling, 2017; Schram, 2015). These analyses
have typically focused on the formal features of the impact bond model, arguing
2Throughout the thesis, I refer to the model as ‘impact bond’ as this term captures the various types
of financing models and interventions realised under this mechanism in social policy, international
development as well as humanitarian interventions (cf. section 4.2).
3See also Chiapello (forthcoming); Arena, Bengo, Calderini, and Chiodo (2016) show that impact
bonds’ ‘rate of adoption is still relatively modest and the diffusion curve is far from ramping-up’
(p. 928).
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that it allows financial capitalism to transform public assets into a new source of
exploitation by converting social services into collateral that can be leveraged to
extract value through speculative activities (e.g. Ogman, 2018). Importantly, this
research opens up questions of power and subjectivity—in contrast to the mainstream
(business) literature, which commonly only focuses on impact bonds’ benefits and
disadvantages in terms of process and outcome effects (cf. Albertson & Fox, 2018;
Fraser, Tan, Lagarde, & Mays, 2018; Jackson, 2013a). In particular, the IPE literature
on impact bonds highlights the potential for the regressive re-distribution of wealth
that impact bonds bring about (Harvie & Ogman, 2019). Scholars typically argue
that through the emergence of impact bonds, market-based rationales have come to
pervade the social and crowd out the social values which should inform the provision
of social services and development programmes. The emergence of impact bonds
is assumed to form part of a linear financialisation process that performs a type of
‘responsible capitalism’, but ultimately subordinates social and moral values (that
otherwise inform the operation of voluntary and non-profit organisations) to market
rationality.
Recent interventions by Guter-Sandu (2018) and other scholars (Barman, 2015, 2016;
Chiapello & Godefroy, 2017; Langley, 2018) have challenged this understanding of
impact bonds, and impact investing more broadly. Building from the ‘social studies
of finance’ (SSF) and the valuation literature, these authors argue that the emergence
of impact bonds is based on socio-technical devices (or infrastructures) that do not
simply crowd out or absorb social purposes, but actively attribute worth to them. On
this view, analytical focus should be oriented towards the ways in which the market
and the social are inextricably combined in this form of marketisation. As Langley
(2018) emphasises, the social is remade in such marketisation processes, ‘shown
to be an array of thoroughly liberal associations and subjectivities that are, at once,
pluralist, ethical and entrepreneurial’ (p. 4). This second literature strand provides us
with insightful analyses of the hybrid modality through which vehicles such as impact
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bonds advance. This thesis seeks to extend these accounts by looking at what emerges
exactly from these new modalities. How do the heterogenous actors involved—public
sector commissioners, charitable foundations, bankers, social service providers,
consultants—call forth and operationalise ideas of poverty alleviation or collective
responsibility? How are wider questions of realising social values combined with
the performance of such novel financial mechanisms? In order to develop answers to
these questions, I make the case for examining impact bonds and their particular socio-
technical infrastructures as they are deployed in multiple institutions, relationships,
and networks.
1.2 Research Question and Method: Case Studies of
Governmentallty
This thesis seeks to provide an in-depth and critical inquiry into the ways in which
actors ‘make sense’ of and authorise impact bonds. It interrogates impact bonds
in relation to their formation and concrete everyday operation to diagnose the
rationalities and techniques that ‘make them up’, and the consequences they have.
Building on Guter-Sandu (2018) and Langley (2018), the focus is on retaining
analytical sensitivity to the specific hybrid modality of the emergence of impact
bonds—rather than treating the market sphere as an arena on which social purposes
merely impinge. This is not to naïvely celebrate the co-existence of value (in an
economic sense) and values (in a socio-political sense), but to advance a nuanced
understanding of power relationships and the logics that constitute this form of
financialisation.
To generate conceptual tools capable of advancing such a critical analysis, this
thesis uses a Foucault-inspired analytics of governmentality framework (Bröckling,
Krasmann, & Lemke, 2010; Collier, 2009). This approach reflects Foucault’s
working hypothesis that ‘things’ must be constituted as a certain object of thought—a
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problematisation—so that they can become knowable and available for interventions
that govern populations. Governmentality ‘as we know it’ has been accused of
constructing a single neoliberal apparatus, employing an ‘often sterile cookie-cutter
approach or the application of a template, a method, or a few catchwords’
(Donzelot & Gordon, 2009; Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde, 2006).4 Recent studies
of governmentality, however, have returned to Foucault’s late work that theorises
multiple forms of power that operate simultaneously (Collier, 2009)—an idea that
has also been adopted by the literature on the study of modern subjectivities of
finance (Brassett & Clarke, 2012; Langley, 2008, 2010a; Langley & Leyshon, 2012).5
Studies of governmentality that build from this conception of power typically seek
to avoid deterministic accounts of social transformation. Instead, they foreground
careful analysis of the processes through which problematisations are constituted
(Walters, 2012).
With regard to the issue of impact bonds to finance social projects, this literature can
proffer important understandings as to how different rationalities (liberal, non-liberal,
etc.) are configured into a programmatic form. Moreover, this approach allows
for closer attention to the question of how the lives of ‘vulnerable populations’
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 14) are governed through such interventions.
Therefore, this thesis investigates questions around the political rationalities and
practices that animate the formation of impact bonds, understood as ‘composite results’
(Lai, Rethel, & Steiner, 2017, p. 963) that inextricably combine social purposes
and market logics. Rather than conceptualising impact bonds as something that is
imposed on actors, the focus is on the politics of the emergence of impact bonds,
the ways in which different logics and practices are brought together to form them.
Against this backdrop, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question:
4By governmentality ‘as we know it’ I refer to studies that build from the seminal article ‘Governing
Economic Life’ by Miller and Rose (1990) and the notion of ‘governing at a distance’. I provide an
appraisal of this literature in Section 3.1.
5On this view, power is not to be understood as a commodity which actors can possess but
‘something that circulates (. . . ) and (. . . ) is exercised through networks’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 29).
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Research question one: How do impact bonds connect questions of
improving the lives and destinies of vulnerable populations with the
operation of a financial mechanism?
As I have sketched out, impact bond-financed programmes are geared towards
generating health, education, and basic welfare improvements for people in need
through micro-interventions at the local level. While this finance-based approach
is implicated in a liberal milieu, it seeks to facilitate social purposes. The focus of
research question one is upon how these disparate logics, and associated techniques
and institutions, are put together in the form of impact bonds to help vulnerable
populations. Two specific sub-questions follow on from this main research question:
Research question two: Are there any inconsistencies, contradictions
and gaps within impact bonds’ logic of government?
With research question two, I seek to investigate whether there are certain gaps,
fractures and competing ideas within impact bonds’ logic of government, and what
they consist in. The second sub-question I seek to answer is:
Research question three: What are the political consequences of the
forms of government adopted through impact bonds?
Research question three places the answers to the two previous research questions
in a broader political context, which might inform analysis of ethical investing
more broadly conceived and the ways in which it is integrated into contemporary
transformations of social and development policy.
Governmentality studies have flourished over the past two decades and have become
a ‘broad church’ working with different Foucauldian ‘raw materials’ and different
methods of data collection. To answer the research questions outlined above, three
Foucauldian concepts are introduced to frame the research: (i) topologies of power
(Collier, 2009), (ii) two distinct processes of subjectification (May, 2014b), and (iii)
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the ‘politics of life’ (Fassin, 2009, 2010a). In what follows, I first provide a brief
overview of these three concepts, to then elucidate the fieldwork approach and the
case study projects analysed.
Topologies of Power and the Politics of Life
In his seminal article on ‘topologies of power’, Collier (2009) argues that
governmentality scholarship ‘as we know it’ often misses the descriptive
analyses that Michel Foucault undertook in the late 1970s. Rather than using
governmentality as a master concept, Collier (2009) suggests that Foucault moved
to a ‘topological analysis’, geared towards studying specific constellations of both
liberal and non-liberal rationalities and techniques that have to be analysed in
context. This concept echos Paul Langley’s call for ‘a topological understanding
of how the marketization processes of social finance take place’ (Langley, 2018, p. 3).6
The focus of topological analyses should be on forms of thinking that reconfigure
existing mentalities and practices of government, and bring a new constellation into
being. Collier (2009) proposes to understand thinking as a ‘situated practice of
critical reflection’ (p. 80) through which prevalent governmental forms are reflected
upon, reworked, and deployed (see also Collier, 2011, p. 19). On this view, analysis
can never focus on discourses alone, it also needs to capture ‘the moments in which
people’s lives are molded by the practices in which they are engaged’ (May, 2014b, p.
500). Analysing constellations of liberal and non-liberal rationalities in this way
suggests links to ‘complex processes of subjectification that do not involve simple
self-domination’ (Brady, 2014, p. 24).
6Langley (2018), however, has located his article within the study of cultural economy studies on
marketisation processes (cf. Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Muniesa, Doganova, & Ortiz, 2017). Mitchell
(2017a, pp. 115–116) has explicitly endorsed Collier’s approach as a useful framework for the analysis
of impact investing and similar practices.
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Second, I therefore ‘zoom in’ onMichel Foucault’s theoretical work on subjectification
as this allows for an engagement with the sub-institutional power-relationships and
social practices within and through which subject positions are called forth, take hold,
and get reproduced (Langley & Leyshon, 2012). I develop a distinction between (i)
subjectification through social practices and (ii) self-formation within and through
social practices. In this view, ‘truth’ is not understood as a category that is imposed
on individuals, but rather as something that emerges from obligatory discourses on
the self (Kelly, 2013; May, 2014b; Veyne, 2010). While the self is an effect of the
social power/knowledge nexus, it is also an effect that interacts with the nexus. To
my mind, this implies not to give too much agency to the concept of impact bonds
(and the calculative practices entailed), but to try to understand how actors make up
impact bonds.
Third, the research is framed by the work of Didier Fassin (2007, 2009, 2010b)
who suggests that Foucault’s shift from a stable and coherent conception of
power to a constellation of different rationalities also involved ‘a shift from life to
populations’ (Fassin, 2010b, p. 197). This shift is important to interrogate the issue
of impact bonds to finance social programmes as it stresses that social issues are
not automatically a question of biopolitics. What is at stake is not just ‘governing
life’, but rather the ways in which meaning is ascribed to specific populations, which
then become targeted (and calculated) by interventions—while other existences are
excluded (Fassin, 2010b, p. 197; cf. Rabinow & Rose, 2006). This notion goes
beyond Foucault’s initial analysis of biopolitics, which made more totalising and
epochal claims about power in modernity (cf. Foucault, 2003, pp. 245–246).
Linking the ‘politics of life’ to the work of Collier (2009), I propose to focus on the
question of how ‘life’ (or a specific population) gets problematised in a ‘space in
which diverse topologies of power may be observed’ (p. 80). This makes it possible,
then, to reflect on the kind of ‘precariousness’ that gets administered by impact bonds,
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by whom, and how actors make sense of such interventions. Having summarised the
Foucauldian concepts that inform my research, I will now elucidate the method.
An Experimental Investigation of Case Studies
In terms of method, I build upon Collier (2011) and Lippert (2005) who combine
analytics of governmentality with fieldwork to scrutinise political rationalities and
technologies that animate particular historical formations (cf. Brady, 2014, 2016). If
one adopts the theoretical framework outlined above, the research focus is on the
‘concrete practices’ (Foucault, 2010, p. 3), ‘bottom-up’ operations as well as the
‘micro-physics of power’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 26; Pasquino, 1993). In this thesis, I
develop three case study projects that are geared towards tackling: (i) homelessness
in London (UK), (ii) socioeconomically patterned health conditions in Newcastle
upon Tyne (UK), and (iii) the gender gap in education in the Bhilwara district of
Rajasthan (India). This allows me to cover a wide and diverse range of perspectives
while still working on the notion individuals construct of impact bonds in different
contexts (cf. Patton, 2014). In what follows, I provide a brief overview of the three
programmes examined in this thesis.
The first case study project is the London Homelessness SIB. This project was the
second SIB ever developed and the first one to address homelessness. Operational
from 2012 to 2015, the SIB sought to support over 800 long-term homeless persons
in London, many of whom suffered from complex issues around drug and alcohol use
and mental or physical illness, and ‘whose needs were not being met by existing
services’ (Mason, Lloyd, & Nash, 2017b, p. 1). Consisting of two different
sub-programmes, the SIB provided individuals with a dedicated key-worker to
advocate for them and help them off the streets of London.
The second case study looks at Ways to Wellness, the first SIB in health. This
programme focuses on patients with long-term conditions (LTCs) such as chronic
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obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), heart disease or epilepsy. The SIB was
initiated in July 2015 with a project duration of seven years.7 The programme uses
so-called social prescribing, geared towards supporting 11,000 patients through
non-medical approaches outside the general practitioner (GP) surgery to improve
beneficiaries’ self-care and wellbeing through sustained lifestyle changes (Ronicle &
Stanworth, 2015). This is done through the work of dedicated ‘link workers’.
To showcase and unpack how the impact bond mechanism wanders and travels from a
social policy context to international development, the third case study investigates
the world’s first-ever DIB in education, called Educate Girls. This programme was
geared towards increasing school enrolment of girls in Rajasthan, India, as well as
improving educational outcomes for both girls and boys in Hindi, English, and basic
numeracy. The intervention trained a team of volunteers to conduct door-to-door
visits to talk to families and encourage school enrolment of girls. Moreover, the
scheme delivered a child-centric curriculum to boys and girls in grades three to five.
Operational from 2015 to 2017, the DIB served 15,000 service users.
I employed three different methods of data collection. The first consists of document
analysis. I systematically collected both textual and visual representations of the
case study projects, mostly academic, policy and industry-based reports, but also
newspaper articles, YouTube films, recordings of management seminars, podcasts,
and even actual impact bond contracts—all forms of documented information that
can serve as a source for explaining human thought, feeling, and action (Glynos &
Howarth, 2007; Mayring, 2000).8
While analyses of governmentality are often only based on archival methods (cf.
Foucault, 2000, p. 233), I used fieldwork to also gain access to discourses and
7Although it is not yet completed at the time of writing, it provides an interesting empirical case
with regard to the research questions posed.
8A more detailed description of the methods and sources is provided in Section 3.3
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problems that are otherwise not available (Collier, 2013; Lippert, 2005), and to
capture the way thinking subjects act as ‘discursive practitioners’ (Brassett, 2016;
Wetherell & Edley, 1999).9 Moreover, as Tracy (2010, p. 843) emphasises, method
triangulation is a recommended strategy for contextualising and cross-checking
qualitative findings. Thus, the second method consisted of semi-structured interviews
with actors involved in both the contracting and operation of impact bonds (cf.
Longhurst, 2010; Meuser & Nagel, 2009). Using a semi-structured interview guide,
27 interviews were conducted with stakeholders of the case study projects as well as
five additional interviews with external professionals to contrast the perspectives
recorded.10
Building upon Bryman (2001) and Crang and Cook (2007), the third method followed
an ethnographic approach. Whenever I was present at the project sites and offices,
I recorded subjective and momentary perceptions of infrastructure, locality, and
‘moods’ in an observational protocol to make social practices visible ‘from the
“inside”’ (Cook, 2013, p. 167). Moreover, I used participant observation in the
context of industry-based and academic conferences on impact bonds, as scholars
increasingly conceive of conferences as spaces where actors make claims about,
contest, and also authorise new concepts and market forms (cf. Garud, 2008; Rethel,
2019).
To systematically and efficiently filter out, compare and structure statements from
the data collected, I employed qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000; Schreier,
2013). My empirical material—documents, interview transcripts, and observational
protocols—was subject to an interpretative process that started from the theoretical
considerations elucidated above and, based on the empirical data, established a fully
fledged operational list to explain how the operation of a financial mechanism is
9As I will elucidate in Section 3.3, the idea of using governmentality together with interviews and
observations is not universally accepted (cf. Dean, 2015, p. 359; Rose, 1999, p. 19).
10A full list of the interviews can be found in appendix 7.
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connected to the provision of individualised social services for people who have been
relegated to the fringes of society (research question one) and to map out relevant
gaps and inconsistencies (research question two). In a second step, the findings were
placed in a broader context to discuss the (wider) political consequences of the forms
of government adopted through impact bonds (research question three).
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1.3 Central Argument: The Ambiguous Politics of
Factivist Finance
My central argument is that impact bonds give rise to a calculative mode of reasoning
that is not divorced from ethics, but circumscribes the ‘place’ of ethics, and what
ethics requires, in a very particular way. It is an aspirational logic, one of at once
maximising social outcomes and financial gain through a results-oriented structure.
The role of private financial risk-taking in this logic consists in facilitating testing
grounds for trying out new preventative approaches to address issues of poverty. Such
new, untested approaches are believed to otherwise not obtain public funding. The
operation of these testing grounds is marked by an outcomes-oriented culture that
combines financial techniques (such as due diligence procedures), scientific methods
(such as randomised control trials) and management practices (such as performance
management) to find out if a given social intervention approach ‘works’, i.e. has
positive causal effects compared to the status quo. Financial gains, in turn, are made
contingent upon empirical evidence of the results measured, they are not generated
by a financial instrument in the abstract. The goal of these programmes is ‘to solve
problems rather than just alleviate suffering’ (Husain, n.d., para. 5).
I claim that the mode of reasoning that can be delineated in relation to the three
impact bonds analysed is not so much ‘an ethos about the way money is used’
(Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008, p. 2), nor simply a profiteering calculus. I claim
that it is an aspirational ethics that does not so much rely on moral virtue or
emotionally compelling stories about socially distant sufferers (the prevalent mode
of humanitarian reasoning and ‘feel-good investing’), but one that is predicated on
scientific methods and near real-time data. Based on the neologism ‘factivism’—a
mash-up of ‘fact’ and ‘activism’—I develop a new concept to frame this conflation
of benevolent advocacy, cold hard facts and financial risk-taking under the rubric
of ‘factivist finance’. The strict outcomes culture reassures investors that monetary
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returns are not produced by a financial instrument in the abstract, that people’s lives
are demonstrably improved. By aligning performance measurement, experimental
methods (such as randomised control trials) and financial investments in this way,
impact bonds almost articulate a ‘responsibility to profit’ (Andreu, 2018, p. 720).
I emphasise that beyond the utilisation of financial tools and logics, factivist finance
is connected to wider discourses of finding evidence of ‘what works’ in the context of
social policy and international development. The pay-for-success model sketches out
a particular repertoire for public action: either there are evidenced results that the
lives and circumstances of vulnerable groups have been demonstrably improved, or
else impact investors pay the bill. The empirical evidence created immunises the
transactions against the interferences of political confrontation.
To render this model operable, impact bonds need to constantly generate numerical
output, relying on sophisticated IT systems to track, manage and report data. I
showcase how these systems are built, managed, and used to make decisions on
how to proceed with the interventions and deal with individual service users. The
thesis reflects how this outcome-orientated structure enacts a particular ‘logic of
the everyday’, infiltrating social work at the level of subjects who have to spend
more time on data collection, reporting activities, and meetings with investors to
discuss results. Moreover, the mechanism also reveals a very particular kind of
investor involvement. Financial actors are not just seen as a passive source of capital,
their role also consists in facilitating and conceptualising such new schemes, attend
board meetings, and support and challenge service provider staff to deliver better
outcomes. This involvement goes beyond only compiling an ethical investment
portfolio—financial actors become involved in complex and experimental social
interventions.
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These considerations lead me to make four interventions to emphasise the conceptual
and political ambiguities as well as the contradictions of factivist finance. First,
I argue that outcome measurement is much more complex and provisional than
commonly suggested. Impact metrics create a frame for reading and classifying the
behaviour of individuals. Defining these metrics is a process of abstraction and
simplification that transforms complex issues like homelessness or LTCs into a stable
list of actions and social outcomes. I show how these performative lists are always
the result of contingent negotiation processes where different logics compete, and
where certain metrics and methods of data collection ‘win’ over other methods that
will never produce the ‘facts’ of impact bonds. The assumptions, compromises and
priorities that underpin a projects’ metrics are obscured in an everyday logic centred
upon near real-time data and the requirement to ‘stay on track’.
Beyond the politics of defining metrics, measurement is often inaccurate and prone
to errors as it is, simply, very complicated to measure changes in the knowledge,
wellbeing, and behaviour of individuals. By way of example, sometimes outcome data
is not available altogether, sometimes service users just ‘walk away’ (and actors do not
know what effects programmes had on their lives); sometimes desired positive impact
is achieved, but the metrics do not account for it. In addition to that, measurement
can also pose a problem to the actors involved in that it just demonstrates the failure
of programmes. Actors therefore take various steps to protect impact bonds against
excessive external scrutiny, for instance by awarding contracts to service provider
organisations that had already been part of the consultation prior to the tendering
process, lowering evidencing requirements during the programme, and, critically, by
carefully orchestrating the production and circulation of project information. Thus,
rather than only measuring the effects of interventions, programmes are also shown to
take certain steps towards protecting their outcomes culture against too much external
scrutiny.
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Second, I problematise the experimental nature of impact bonds. I show that even if
impact bonds’ experiments succeed in demonstrating social impact, the interventions
are repeated as impact bonds—although actors know they ‘work’. This relativises
the idea of ‘seed funding’ that is needed to try out innovative approaches that have
uncertain outcomes and therefore necessitate private financial risk-taking. The impact
bond discourse shifts and increasingly revolves around ‘scaling up’ interventions,
and not so much around testing anymore. This modified logic perpetuates the
involvement of factivist finance as guarantor of proper performance management and
social impact creation. I argue that this idea of ‘large-scale system change’ (Dear et
al., 2016, p. 63) entails a particular (narrow) conception of a public that happily
compensates investors as long as they can demonstrate that, compared to the status
quo, interventions significantly improve the lives of people in need.
Third, I suggest that despite their almost scientific problem-solving appeal, the
programmes ultimately combine a rational ‘outcomes culture’ with an affective
response, directing attention to the ‘victims’ who have fallen through the cracks of
existing services, but who are not ‘lost’ yet. This shifts the focus away from the
broader socio-economic causes of the problems the impact bonds endeavour to solve
and directs attention to a humanitarian ‘politics of life’ (Fassin, 2007). I claim that
impact bonds do not only perform a relation of evidence-based assistance but also
a relation of inequality, incapable of operating beyond the artificial, particularistic
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, that is, between benefactors and sufferers.
Co-constituting positive social outcomes and financial returns ultimately means
constructing social problems that can be solved through monetary investment.
In a fourth and last step, I unpack how impact bonds also forge productive elements
by enabling the operation of new (if imperfect) social interventions—proliferative
of local negotiations and everyday face-to-face interactions. Instead of directly
challenging structural violence and communal issues, factivist investors seek to
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interrupt the effects of exclusionary constellations ‘from within’. Precisely by virtue
of their technical appeal, impact bonds manage to lock in government funding,
bypass a dysfunctional government, and implement interventions at the local level
to help those in extreme difficulties. In doing so, actors may think and do certain
things ‘without realizing it’ (Veyne, 2010, p. 29): investors might egotistically
pursue ‘good’ impact investing, while social workers might be mechanically guided
by the pre-defined outcome targets. I argue that only because impact investors do
not profoundly transform the social and political ‘order’, they do not necessarily
fail to recognise that issues like homelessness or socioeconomically patterned
health conditions, are, first and foremost, political problems. Rather than being
non-reflective instruments of capitalist interests, the actors involved ‘seek to work
through the problems that are specific to their time and place’ (Mitchell, 2017a,
p. 123), similar to the Physiocrats identified by Foucault (2007, 2010; Collier, 2009.
While impact bonds can be seen as a topological space where monetary returns may
indeed guide actors i.e. as a technology of power with an orienting telos, ‘it does not
saturate all power relations’ (Collier, 2009, p. 89, emphasis added). Projects are
marked by long negotiations about social goals at various levels, between actors with
different social positions, material interests, and moral values. I argue that the logics
of these programmes do not unfold in a successive or linear manner. Impact bonds
are indeed a ‘topological space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 96): it is not as if an ethical cause
was simply (and unproblematically) added to a background market structure. The
heterogeneity and specificity within and through which such ethical finance unfolds
needs to be made visible. More critically, arguing that a market logic saturates all
power relations ultimately means to buy into a politics of categorically defining what
ethics is, and what it is not.
Overall, this permits me to make an intervention in the study of financialisation.
The critical literature tends to read the emergence of impact bonds as a process
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in which ‘the social’ gets subordinated to ‘the market’, resulting in an increased
presence of private capital in welfare and development arrangements, a shift towards
profit maximisation, the adoption of performance management practices etc. My
case studies demonstrate a specific ‘pattern of correlation’ (Collier, 2009, p. 80) in
which heterogeneous elements—such as social and development policy, philanthropic
logics, financial tools, ethical discourses, and project management practices—are
configured into a programmatic form. To paraphrase (Foucault, 2010), ‘[d]ifferent
events and practices (. . . ) are apparently organized around something that is supposed
to be’ (p. 3) an impact bond. I argue that such calculative reasoning is not divorced
from ethics. This instance of financialisation is not a technology of power that can
be straightforwardly attributed to market rationality; it is one that is predicated on
evidence-based solutions to complex social problems and issues of poverty. It is a
programmatic form of financialisation that organises financial and socio-political
elements and practices in a very particular way.
1.4 Thesis Structure: Chapter Outline
The argument is made over six chapters. In Chapter 2, I review three different
IPE literatures. First, the chapter touches on the question of how IPE scholarship
approaches the practices of ethical finance, such as SRI, GLI, and practices of
microfinance or ‘financial inclusion’. Second, it discusses how financial tools have
come to provide (formerly) public goods and services in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis and subsequent recessions. Third, I explain how the existing IPE
literature sees impact bonds as a striking case of both the post-crisis ‘social turn’ of
finance and the financialisation of social policy. I argue that the existing literature
either explains the emergence of impact bonds in terms of the logic of the expansion
of financial markets into the social sector (and struggles to make ‘ethics’ visible in
analytical terms) or revolves around questions of calculation, commensurability,
exchangeability, etc. (and forgoes analyses of power and the lived effects of impact
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bonds). The chapter concludes by making the case for a more integrative perspective
to study the power relationships within and through which impact bonds are called
forth and reproduced as well as the ‘lived effects’ they have (and for whom).
Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical framework of the thesis,
seeking to overcome the limitations identified in the review of the literature. It builds
upon the Foucault-inspired literature on governmentalities (Brady, 2016; Bröckling
et al., 2010). Three Foucauldian ‘concepts’ are introduced to frame the research:
(i) topologies of power (Collier, 2009), (ii) processes of subjectification (May,
2014b), and (iii) the ‘politics of life’ (Fassin, 2007). I discuss what implications
these concepts have for the study of impact bonds. In a second step, I explain
how I conducted fieldwork based on these understandings and introduce three case
study projects. I also elucidate how I used qualitative content analysis to filter out,
structure, and compare statements from the material collected to develop answers to
my research questions.
Chapter 4 ‘sets the scene’ by elucidating the impact bond mechanism in detail and
the roles of the different social actors engaged in the impact bond industry. In this
context, I briefly discuss the events and practices that led to the formation of the first
impact bond at Peterborough prison in 2010, and how this intervention has been
annexed by a more global discourse around ‘growing the impact bond market’, and
‘impact investing’ more generally. The chapter then focuses on the development of
the three impact bond case study projects, the specific actors, and their work in
relation to the formation of the programmes.
Having elucidated the emergence of the three case study projects, Chapter 5 then
‘zooms in’ on the structure and operation of these programmes. I argue that the
conflation of evidence-based practices and benevolent finance gives rise to a distinct
mode of reasoning—what I term ‘factivist finance’. I elucidate in the chapter how
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measurement practices reassure investors that they do not ‘buy’ into a feel-good
device, but into a project that improves outcomes for people in need. Second, the
chapter reflects how this outcome-orientated structure enacts a particular ‘logic of the
everyday’ marked, for instance, by IT-supported data collection activities and regular
meetings with investors to discuss the results thus measured.
In Chapter 6, I first evince the instability of impact bonds’ frames of calculation.
I argue that outcome measurement is much more complex and provisional than
practitioners commonly suggest and that it also incites efforts to suppress external
scrutiny and contestation. In many respects, factivist investors’ claim for greater
transparency and the pursuit of blended value thus becomes more and more symbolic.
In a second step, I problematise the experimental nature of impact bonds in the
chapter by arguing that successfully completed experiments do not lead to public
provision (or traditional charitable funding), but to the implementation of additional
impact bonds. Thus, rather than being a testing ground for novel intervention
approaches, impact bonds re-imagine the commissioning of social and development
interventions as based on ‘evidence’ and outsourced financial risk.
Chapter 7 argues that—despite their problem-solving appeal—impact bonds
ultimately articulate an emotional response to social issues. By focusing on highly
vulnerable individuals, the schemes direct attention to the trope of suffering—and
away from the structural conditions that perpetuate the broader socio-economic
causes of the social problems they endeavour to address. The schemes give specific
value and meaning to human life in that they make a statistical selection of vulnerable
existences that are supported (and existences to be excluded). But while the scope
of such intervention is limited as elucidated above, social actors do not necessarily
fail to recognise that issues such as the gender gap in education in Rajasthan are,
first and foremost, political problems. Yet instead of directly challenging structural
violence and communal issues, actors seek to interrupt the effects of exclusionary
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constellations ‘from within’. Against this backdrop, I argue that impact bonds do
not only reproduce structural conditions that perpetuate poverty but also employ
and mobilise these conditions to articulate alternative (if imperfect) responses. I
emphasise the importance of foregrounding these dynamics in IPE analyses.
Chapter 8 restates the argument and explains how the findings are relevant to the
research questions and themes outlined at the beginning of this introductory chapter.
It reflects upon the central contributions and the implications for IPE scholarship
and wider interdisciplinary debates. Moreover, it elucidates how the arguments and
findings can inform future research agendas and formulates closing comments.
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2. The Social Turn of Finance and the
Financialisation of Social Policy
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, there was a hope that ‘[t]he “casino capitalism”
of the past [would] be tamed, restrained and made more people-friendly by injections
of morality, ethical standards and a sense of social responsibility’ (J. Clarke, 2010,
p. 388). Finance and its morality was marked by a ‘loss of faith’ (Riles, 2013, p.
556), which led to a re-emphasis on ‘benevolent’ financial tools, such as socially
responsible and sustainable investing or practices of microfinance. In the context
of this period of financial reformism, there has been a related rise of social impact
investing—‘impact investing’ for short—a relatively new umbrella term that groups
together various initiatives and tools which aim to integrate the creation of positive
social or environmental impact with financial return on capital (Höchstädter &
Scheck, 2015).11 The impact bond model is, according to Davies (2014), ‘[a]rguably
the best known form of social impact investment’ (p. 3).
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recessions have not only brought about a
re-moralisation of finance but also led to the formation of new austerity discourses
that capped the expansion of social spending as part of the welfare state (Blyth, 2013;
Gamble, 2016). As a consequence, costs in the areas of education, childcare, medical
care or old-age care have increasingly been shifted onto citizens. This opened up a
space for the financial sector to target families, low-income students, and pensioners
11I provide a detailed description of impact investing in Section 4.3.
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in the Global North through the provision of certain (formerly) ‘public’ goods and
services through credit-as-welfare schemes. The existing IPE literature argues that
impact bonds are a striking case of both the post-crisis ‘social turn’ of finance and the
financialisation of social policy (Dowling, 2017; Ogman, 2018). In order to frame my
research on the issue of impact bonds to finance social projects, I review the literature
on both developments, that is, the post-crisis revived interest in benevolent finance
and the financialisation of welfare. Before going into the substance, I provide a brief
overview of the different literature strands, and a discussion of the implications for
the study of impact bonds.
While the now prevalent term ‘impact investing’ was only coined in 2007 (Burand,
2015; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015; Nicholls, 2011), various practices that are
grouped together under that umbrella have been around for a longer period of time.
Critical IPE studies have covered such precursors of impact investing and I review
them in this chapter. Scholars of IPE have looked at practices of socially responsible
investing (SRI) (Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2010a) and ‘gender lens investing’ (GLI)
(Roberts, 2016). The former is geared towards screening out ‘sin stocks’ (e.g.
alcohol, tobacco, arms, oil etc.) from investment portfolios. The latter focuses
on a host of initiatives and tools that seek to tackle gender-based inequalities in finance.
Scholars have argued that both GLI and SRI challenge the limited value frameworks
of finance by raising questions about the role of values in the global economy.
However, the way in which these investment practices contest the mainstream
world of Wall Street is limited to (technical) questions around selecting appropriate
investment opportunities, sidelining more fundamental question about the role of
finance and the broader societal and economic reasons that create inequalities in the
first place. Although there has been a long-standing concern for the remoralisation
of capitalism in IPE, the analyses by Aitken (2007), Langley (2010a) and Roberts
(2016) are, somewhat strangely, isolated occurrences. Scholars have paid far more
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attention to the ever growing popularity of practices of ‘financial inclusion’ through
microfinance and related practices (e.g. Aitken, 2010a, 2013; Mader, 2015, 2018;
Rankin, 2001; Soederberg, 2014).12 Dating back to the mid-1970s, the narrative
of microfinance originally foregrounded the reduction of poverty in developing
countries. As I elucidate in this chapter, this discourse is changing and increasingly,
such practices are framed in terms of providing ‘access to finance for poor people’
(Hummels & Leede, 2014, p. 104), further integrating these vehicles into global
macro and micro capital flows (Mader, 2018).
In a second step, I review the literature that analyses how finance has been mobilised
as a strategic response to the budgetary limits that are set to public sector spending
under fiscal austerity (Lavinas, 2018). I typify this phenomenon as ‘financialisation
as welfare’. The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recessions have not only revived
the interest in social and responsible finance but also exacerbated issues of inequality
and poverty. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the financial sector has started
to target low-income students, families, and pensioners in the Global North, taking
over the role of providing certain (formerly) ‘public’ goods and services (Soederberg,
2014). This has brought about an increased presence of financial instruments and
intermediaries in the context of welfare arrangements as well as the creation of new
financial markets of consumer finance, mortgages, and pensions (Schelkle, 2012). Not
only has this development woven financial rationalities into the fabric of everyday life
of citizens but it has also led to an endorsement of financial tools as a mitigation of the
public expenditure impasse in policy discourses (Montgomerie&Büdenbender, 2015).
Recent years have seen a tendency to integrate finance directly into public policy and
welfare arrangements (Lavinas, 2018). I describe this as a shift from financialisation
as welfare/development to financialised social policy, opening a field for private
12Another ethically framed approach to finance that gained renewed purchase after the 2008 financial
crisis is Islamic finance (Rethel, 2018, 2019; Rudnyckyj, 2017).
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investments in social projects delivered on behalf of public institutions (Karwowski,
2019). It has been argued that impact bonds are a paradigmatic case of this shift
(Dowling, 2017). Existing IPE accounts of impact bonds argue that this mechanism
allows financial capitalism to transform public assets into a new source of exploitation,
converting social service delivery into a collateral on which speculation can be built
to extract value through speculative activities (Harvie & Ogman, 2019; Schram,
2015). As I elucidate in this chapter, this literature strand commonly explains the
emergence of impact bonds in terms of a logic of expansion of financial markets. In
this process, social and moral values (that inform the operation of voluntary and
non-profit organisations) are subordinated to market rationality.
Conversely, recent interventions have argued that impact bonds emerge precisely by
virtue of their capacity to ascribe worth to social purposes, rather than erasing them
(Guter-Sandu, 2018; Langley, 2018). On this view, the analytical focus needs to be
on the ways in which the social is remade through such market-based practices to
understand and explain how this form of financialisation functions. Building from
this more integrative perspective, I propose an in-depth case study of the political
rationalities and techniques through which impact bonds are mobilised and taken up.
Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 will propose a theoretical framework that manages
to address questions of power and subjectivity as well as the de-differentiation of
social and market spaces.
In order to make this point, this chapter is split into four sections. The first section
touches upon the question of how IPE scholarship has approached practices of ethical
finance. The second section discusses how financial tools have come to provide
(formerly) public goods and services in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and
subsequent recessions. The third section then argues that, increasingly, scholars
diagnose an impetus to directly integrate financial tools and actors into welfare
arrangements. The fourth section discusses the existing critical literature on impact
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bonds, which either explains the emergence of impact bonds in terms of the logic
of the expansion of financial markets into the social sector (and struggles to make
‘the social’ visible in analytical terms) or revolves around the question of calculation
(and forgoes analyses of power and the lived effects of these schemes). The chapter
concludes by making the case for a more integrative perspective to study the politics
of the emergence and operation of impact bonds.
2.1 Analyses of Ethical Investing in IPE
A growing body of IPE literature looks at interest-bearing monetary investments
that aim to produce a positive social impact. Scholars have looked at practices of
SRI where not only financial but also social criteria are applied to the selection
of securities (Aitken, 2007; Langley, 2010a). This practice emerged in the early
1970s and typically screens out ‘sin stocks’ such as alcohol, tobacco, arms, and oil
from investment portfolios. It re-imagined ownership of corporate stocks within
the political lexicon of the civil rights struggle in particular, and other social
movements emerging at the time (Aitken, 2007, pp. 141–142). While largely a
practice that emerged through the activities of institutional investors (such as public
and multiemployer funds), it also gave rise to individual ‘ethical investors’.
Investing is thus not only seen as a self-oriented pursuit of financial gain (e.g. for
one’s retirement) but also as an ethical commitment to take social and environmental
issues into account. As Aitken (2007) and Langley (2010a) highlight, these practices
require investors to reflect on investment opportunities from an ethical standpoint and
engage a range of social forces that are decidedly wider than any narrow conception
of ‘financial actors’ would suggest. The social domain is thus ‘not a bounded space
separate from the economic, but exists as the basis of economic conduct and practice
itself’ (Aitken, 2007, p. 170).
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The IPE literature on ‘financial subjects’ and ‘ethical investors’ (Aitken, 2007, pp.
145–146; Langley, 2010a, pp. 224–225) has drawn upon the work in Foucault’s last
decade to argue that the process in which individuals codify and uncover individual
ethical principles in SRI has lines of affinity with what Foucault termed the ‘ethics of
the concern of the self as a practice of freedom’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 281). ‘Concern’
is synonymous with ‘care’ of the self (le souci de soi in French); it is ‘a way of
relating to oneself in order to elaborate and intensify one’s ethical subjectivity’
(Jenkins, 2014, p. 58). Moreover, according to Aitken (2007, pp- 167–168), SRI
challenges the binary opposition between the institutional/international (‘higher
activities’) and the bottom level (i.e. the ‘everyday’) by (i) complicating the notion of
capital as an entity centred around one set of specific social forces and institutions
(Wall Street), (ii) evincing a form of everyday agency that is not external to or
separate from capital, and (iii) preserving space for ‘the social’ although implicated
in neoliberal government’s webs of power.
However, the way in which SRI contests the mainstream world of Wall Street
is arguably limited to (technical) questions of selecting appropriate investment
opportunities. Aitken (2007) and Langley (2010a) have both demonstrated how the
ethical investor in SRI simultaneously contests (unethical) mainstream investing, yet
reconciles ‘the personal and the political (. . . ) from within mutual fund networks
and through individual value choices alone’ (Langley, 2010a, p. 224). The ethical
investor thus both questions and enacts the (political) limits and possibilities of
finance. In a sense, traditional finance’s core remains untouched—ethical action
is reduced to a question of individual monetary investments that does not engage
reflexively with deeper political questions and thus forecloses a more reflexive
engagement (Langley, 2010a).
Roberts (2016) has looked at practices of so-called gender lens investing, which
include various initiatives and tools that seek to focus on women and reduce
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gender-based inequalities in finance. She has suggested that, on the one hand, the
aims of such initiatives are fairly limited and, on the other hand, ‘that they work to
reproduce particular assumptions about the commensurability of gender equality and
finance-led neoliberalism’ (Roberts, 2016, p. 69). Importantly, the focus on reducing
gender inequality through greater access to financial markets directs the focus away
from more pressing problems of gender-based inequalities. It thus considerably
reduces the scope to support change in relation to gender-based inequalities in
the value attributed to (unpaid and paid) labour as well as broader conceptions of
participation.
Beyond the practices of SRI and GLI, scholars of IPE have analysed the ever growing
popularity of microfinance and (other) practices of ‘financial inclusion’ (e.g. Aitken,
2013; Bernards, 2016; Mader, 2018; Soederberg, 2013). As Rankin (2001) has
demonstrated in her seminal paper on microfinance, investors seek to empower
entrepreneurial subjects, primarily women, ‘with cultural propensities to invest wisely
and look after their families and communities’ (p. 20) .While proponents have praised
such investments arguing that they have ‘shown how well-honed business models
that combine profit and purpose can reach millions of poor people’ (Bugg-Levine &
Emerson, 2011, p. 55), critical analyses have highlighted the ethical tensions that
have arisen, referencing an increasing amount of credit issued for ‘consumption
smoothing’ (M. Taylor, 2012, p. 603) and respective ‘predatory lending practices’
(Mader, 2015), as well as the ways in which microfinance is reassembled into a
highly profitable asset stream with the social purpose becoming a secondary priority
(Aitken, 2010a).
Over time, the narrative of microfinance has gradually changed from a focus on
poverty reduction to a narrative of ‘financial inclusion’ after the 2008 financial
crisis (Mader, 2018; Soederberg, 2013). Rather than foregrounding the idea of
unleashing entrepreneurial activities by facilitating access to credit, the financial
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inclusion agenda understands access to financial services as a fundamental need and
right. Respective practices seek to provide access to banking services to the poor in
low-income economies, people who were previously often excluded from financial
services (because they lack the necessary collateral), do not have stable employment
or a credit history, or simply have no access to banks. As Mader (2015, p. 19)
succinctly puts it:
the emergent doctrine of financial inclusion shifts the goalposts of
microfinance, or almost removes them altogether, in that the process of
expanding microfinance becomes the end in itself. Microfinance may
once have been about gender empowerment, entrepreneurship or poverty
reduction, but now it is about finance itself.
Under the banner of ‘financial inclusion’, recent years have also seen a shift from
credit to a ‘poverty payment’ (B. Maurer, 2015, p. 128) agenda, pursued through
new digital technologies governing the behaviour of ‘risky populations’ (Gabor &
Brooks, 2017, p. 425). Through this shift, the practices are also further integrated
into global capital flows, dynamically intertwining global macro and micro capital
flows, institutions, and logics (Mader, 2018; Young, 2010).
2.2 Financialisation as Welfare
Authors such as Pierson (1998, 2001), Scharpf (1991) or Stephens, Huber, and Ray
(1999) have long noted the context of pre-crisis ‘permanent fiscal austerity’, observed
in various, predominantly Western, welfare states with ageing populations and a
slowdown of accumulation. In light of stagnant tax revenues, the fiscal scope for
launching new programmes to tackle social problems was increasingly restricted.
This complex situation was further complicated by the 2008 financial crisis, which
prompted a dramatic fall in incomes and, subsequently, continuously decreasing
amounts in tax revenue (Blyth, 2013; Gamble, 2016). In addition to that, bank
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bailouts and fiscal stimuli (which numerous governments provided to stave off
recessions) significantly increased public debt.13 The burgeoning public debt as well
as the troubles to refinance these debts led to an ‘austerity consensus’ (Farnsworth &
Irving, 2012) that resulted in efforts to move towards a quantitatively smaller welfare
state in many countries and, subsequently, to cuts to welfare budgets (Blyth, 2013;
Edmiston, 2014; Hay, 2011).14 Given this emerging public services expenditure gap,
policymakers started to look for new ways to render the implementation of social
programmes compatible with budgetary constraints.
One consequence of this development was that welfare costs were shifted onto
‘beneficiaries’, for example in the areas of education, childcare, medical care, and
old-age care (Kersbergen & Hemerijck, 2012, p. 481). Households struggling with
these changes had increasingly been targeted by the financial sector, creating some
sort of ‘debt safety’ (Montgomerie, 2013) that came to replace welfare safety (cf.
Hay, 2013; Roberts, 2013). Moreover, states increasingly promote debtor-lender
relationships between the financial sector and low-income students, families, and
pensioners. As Doling and Ronald (2010) have noted, ‘rather than relying on state-
managed social transfers to counter the risks of poverty, individuals accept greater
responsibility for their own welfare needs by investing in financial products’ (p. 165).
This phenomenon has been typified under the rubric of ‘privatised Keynesianism’
(Crouch, 2009) and the ‘Anglo-liberal growth model’ (Hay, 2013) and has, for
instance, led to the expansion of educational loans (and other forms of credit) among
low-income students and their families (McGettigan, 2013; Soederberg, 2014, Ch. 5).
Moreover, so-called asset-based welfare systems have been promoted and facilitated,
for instance in the form of private pension insurances or debt-financed housing
13In advanced economies, public debt increased from 70% of GDP in 2007 to about 100% in 2011,
the highest level in over 50 years (L. Ball, Furceri, Leigh, & Loungani, 2013, p. 3).
14Especially in Europe, macroeconomic adjustment had clearly taken lexical priority over issues of
social welfare, sometimes giving the Troika veto power over national fiscal policy (Pavolini, León,
Guillén, & Ascoli, 2015; Theodoropoulou, 2015). By way of illustration, only seven countries had
legally anchored spending ceilings combined with debt targets or sanctions in 1990. By early 2009,
the number of such countries had increased to 80 (IMF, 2009).
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(Mertens, 2017; Watson, 2009). Such systems incentivise households to accumulate
assets to be able to tackle social risks. However, housing-based welfare strategies
makes households more susceptible to changes in house prices and financial markets,
which often intensifies household indebtedness (Montgomerie & Büdenbender,
2015). Moreover, by definition, it excludes thosewho simply cannot accumulate assets.
Increasingly, financial inclusion is promoted by businesses and state-led programmes
as part of a political consensus. For instance, the expansion of practices of
microcredits for the unemployed is being endorsed in the Global North to further
self-entrepreneurship and the establishment of small enterprises (Soederberg, 2014;
cf. Bruhn-Leon, Eriksson, & Kraemer-Eis, 2013). The expansion of credit provision
is sometimes presented as the agreement over a ‘growth model’ (Gamble, 2009) ‘in
which certain financial services, in particular providers of credit, are deemed to be
part of the basic “infrastructures” of contemporary societies’ (C. Clarke, 2019, p.
4). The decline of decent paying labour and social welfare has also given rise to
‘violent’ (Hembruff & Soederberg, 2019) financial inclusion practices in the Global
North, such as payday lending (Aitken, 2010b; Langley, Anderson, Ash, & Gordon,
2019). As Aitken (2015) notes, ‘[p]ayday lending, (. . . ) although not delineated
within formal financial inclusion discourse, is often framed by its advocates as a
form of inclusion, a way of absorbing populations not well served by formal financial
institutions’ (p. 165). In summary, as these analyses make plain, there is political
backing to make credit available to wider populations (increasingly through platform
lending).
Throughout this literature, it is often argued that, in order to continuously expand,
financial capitalism must constantly look out for new mundane objects that can be
turned into collateral (Jessop, 2013, p. 83; Leyshon & Thrift, 2007, p. 98; Mader,
Mertens, & van der Zwan, forthcoming). An impetus can be observed to trace new,
stable sources of income/value on which more speculation can be built. This logic
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of expansion necessitates a creative exploration of unknown (i.e. non-financial)
territories and their ‘conversion’ into collateral through complex mechanisms (such as
securitisation), which allow for transforming mundane objects into new asset streams
(Aitken, 2015, pp. 38–42;Montgomerie, 2008; cf. Rolnik, 2013; Pryke&Allen, 2000).
At the same time, all of these responses to entrenched social problems under austerity
politics have also furthered the financialisation of everyday life (Chima & Langley,
2012; Mader et al., forthcoming; cf. R. Martin, 2002), whereby particular social
groups are increasingly connected to (global) financial markets. This connectivity,
and the practices of risk-taking and self-management entailed, both affect and are
enacted by everyday market life. Ironically, the assistance that these vehicles provide
to marginalised existences typically consists of even more financialisation, in other
words, the rationales and techniques that caused many precarious situations in the
first place (Dowling & Harvie, 2014).
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2.3 Impact Bonds: Absorbing or Reconfiguring the
Social?
Although entailing an emphasis on the provision of (formerly) public goods and
services (Hay, 2013), the vehicles elucidated above operate within the boundaries of
the formal ‘market economy’. Increasingly, however, we see a tendency to integrate
finance directly into welfare arrangements (Lavinas, 2018). It has been argued that
impact bonds are a striking example of this shift (Dowling, 2017; Schram, 2015).15
Instead of an abdication of responsibilities by the collective, we witness an increased
hardwiring of finance directly into the management of social issues. What can be
observed is a shift from finance as welfare to financialised social policy (Karwowski,
2019).
In this process, social issues are not ‘handed over’ to financial markets, actors and
logics, but finance is integrated into social policy; not a retreat of public institutions,
but their financialised reconfiguration (Berndt & Wirth, 2018). This inflection of
financialisation, however, is not about turning everyday populations into borrowers or
investors. Rather, private investors come to pre-finance social interventions for poor
and underserved populations. In turn, investors are offered the possibility of earning
a financial return if programmes achieve positive, measurable social outcomes. So,
in a way, the emergence of impact bonds brings the two literature strands I have
been reviewing in this chapter (closer) together, linking financialised social policy to
the post-crisis revived interest in a ‘return to the “social” or solidary commitments
of finance’ (B. Maurer, 2012, p. 418; Campbell-Verduyn, 2017, pp.138–139). As
Dowling (2017) has put it, ‘[i]n recent years, finance’s “social turn” has also become
relevant for public policy and the welfare state’ (p. 294). From this point of view, I
now focus on the IPE literature on impact bonds.
15This shift is for instance also evidenced by the financialisation of health (Bayliss, Fine, & Robertson,
2017) or the conflation of digital money and welfare payments (Bantock, 2018).
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The Financialisation of Welfare
In an impact bond, a public institution, a social service provider organisation and
private investors enter into a contract about the provision of individualised support
for a vulnerable and marginalised target group. For instance, such support can be
geared towards ex-offenders, homeless persons, chronically ill people, marginalised
indigenous people, or youths deemed at risk from early deprivation, poverty, and
abuse (Williams, 2019). Private investors supply the upfront capital to pay for the
project (in part or in full), and also periodically consult with the other stakeholders
about the status of the project and possible measures for improvement. In return,
investors are offered the possibility of earning a financial return if the intervention
succeeds in achieving specified social outcomes (Dowling, 2017; Ogman, 2018).
This logic is justified by a ‘value-for-money case’ (Barclay & Symons, 2013, p. 18)
according to which the public purse only compensates investors if such programmes
generate significant social value, which will curb welfare dependency in the long run
and generate ‘cashable savings’. In order to determine whether the social outcomes
of an intervention have been attained, impact bonds use complex measurement
and reporting practices to determine the effects of interventions on service users’
wellbeing, knowledge, behaviour, and circumstances. If an intervention fails to
demonstrate success, the investors will have to bear the costs, that is, they will
lose some or all of the principal sum and make no (or little) profit. As Leventhal
(2012) puts it, impact bonds ‘allow governments to support prevention without the
fear that they will pay the cost and not reap the reward’ (p. 525).16 How has this
phenomenon been addressed by IPE scholars? According to Schram (2015), ‘SIBs
represent nothing less than the financialization of the welfare state’ (p. 153). On
this view, public policy has come to support the expansion of financial markets
into the social sector, and rather than meeting social needs, it subordinates those
16A more detailed explanation of impact bonds will be provided in section 4.2.
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needs to the interests of the financial sector. Through the techniques of social
outcomes measurement employed, impact bonds make it possible to link the formerly
unmarketed everyday lives of migrants, rough sleepers, and ‘at-risk’ children to
speculative financial activity to extract value (Lake, 2015, p. 14). On this view,
finance captures new resources through an expansion of financial markets into social
service delivery, giving rise to a form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey,
2004), as investors’ profits are ultimately paid with public funds, and investors often
receive (partial) tax exemption as incentive on top (Dowling, 2017, pp. 302–303;
Ogman, 2018, pp. 154–156). Thus, not only is the welfare state dismantled in
times of austere politics but the public purse also comes to pay financial returns for
purportedly benevolent impact investors.
Moreover, impact bond projects typically build upon charitable labour for social
purposes (which is often voluntary work, i.e. unpaid). From this perspective, the
voluntary and nonprofit organisations are turned into (social) enterprises, governed
as a form of business of profit maximisation, concealing and compromising the
raison raison d’être of such organisations (Harvie & Ogman, 2019; Lake, 2015).
As Schram (2015) emphasises, impact bonds are ‘a public policymaking Trojan
Horse for private investors’ (p. 170). In the public discourse, however, the actions of
impact bonds are not framed as regressive wealth redistribution, but as a benevolent
version of financial capitalism, internalising the post-crisis normative critique of
unfettered global capitalism by re-describing investment in ethical terms—ultimately
‘ethical capitalism’ (Ogman, 2019) that responds to the legitimacy crisis of both
finance and austerity. This literature understands impact bonds as a ‘social neoliberal’
(Ogman, 2016) or ‘progressive neoliberal’ compromise (Ogman, 2019), promoting a
(hegemonic) culture of ‘responsible capitalism’ to win consent (cf. Sum & Jessop,
2013).
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In the context of such responsible capitalism, an ‘entrepreneurial theory of social
change’ (Dowling, 2017, p. 303) is promoted according to which social justice
and the alleviation of poverty do not so much rely on the democratic society, nor
on traditional charity, but on the ‘social investor’ who emerges in the form of
high-net-worth individuals, charitable foundations, and associated ideas of private
risk-taking. While such financialised social policy interventions symbolise ‘a
progressive turn’ (Dowling, 2017, p. 305), the schemes are about a regressive
re-distribution of wealth. Building upon Gramsci (1971), Ogman (2019) invokes
the idea of a ‘passive revolution’, that is, ‘the selective incorporation of elements of
an opposition, which for the most part has restored the market order more than it
has reformed or changed it’ (p. 18). Overall then, it can be said that the existing
IPE literature on impact bonds understands impact bonds as a flawed alternative
to the liberal economism of recent years, mainly responding to finance’s issues of
legitimacy after the financial crisis and subsequent recessions. At the same time, the
implementation of impact bonds gives control over social policy to financial interests.
Another, yet related, issue highlighted in the literature is that the interventions
promoted through impact bonds often seek to stimulate labour market participation in
the long run to curb welfare dependency and generate ‘cashable savings’ (Dowling,
2017; Ogman, 2018, p. 270). This aspect of the operation of impact bonds has been
linked to the literature on ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell,
2002), or a ‘flanking mechanism’ (Graefe, 2006), which has discussed the idea of
‘early intervention’ and ‘active prevention’, as articulated in The Third Way (Giddens,
2013) and its political adoption from the mid-1990s onwards through European social
democrats such as Gerhard Schröder, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Tony Blair and Wim
Kok.17 Central to these policies was the idea of ‘activation’ and ‘capacity building’,
17However, others diagnose a significant paradigm shift in policy logics and argue that something
‘after neoliberalism’ (Larner & Craig, 2005, p. 419) is (or was) under construction. See Jenson (cf.
2012, pp. 63–65) for an overview of these academic disagreements. As more recent reviews make
plain (e.g. Peck, 2013), even the literature on neoliberalism is somewhat divided across different
positions (see also Graefe, 2006, pp. 71–73).
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to replace the social security (or ‘passive benefits’) systems inherited from the 1960s
by a ‘social investment state’. According to this approach, social investments today
will stimulate labour market participation in the long run and thus lead to more future
taxpayers, who are also more productive and socially included (cf. Jenson, 2010;
Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012).
As Dowling (2017) succinctly puts it, impact bonds mark a ‘shift from a social
investment state (. . . ) to a social investment market’ (p. 300, italics in the original)
where practices of ‘early intervention’ and ‘active prevention’—and the specific
emphasis on identifying and supporting vulnerable risk groups early on—are now
pre-financed by private investors who are offered the possibility of earnings monetary
returns. Impact bonds thus call upon the self-managing, entrepreneurial subjects
of neoliberal governmentality, extract surplus through speculative activities, and
simultaneously dismantle the welfare state (Dowling, 2017; Rosenman, 2019).
Other scholars, however, have argued that the actions of impact bonds are not so
much geared towards regulating the lives of service users, but pursue different
aims. As argued by Cooper, Graham, and Himick (2016), who have conducted
an empirical study on the London Homeless SIB (which is also one of my case
studies), the service users are understood to be ‘“failed entrepreneurs” who become
securitized into the potential future cash flows of investors’ (p. 63). This has
been read as the securitisation of social policy (cf. Bryan & Rafferty, 2014;
Mitropoulos & Bryan, 2015). Securitisation allows for transforming subjects that
are otherwise considered to be ‘valueless’ into laudable investment opportunities
and sources of income—rather than really helping them by challenging structural
violence and communal issues. Kish and Leroy (2015) have argued that this
practice recalls the way that debt was raised to finance the Atlantic slave trade,
linking the formerly un-marketed lives of service users to speculative financial activity.
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In contrast to the mainstream (business) literature which commonly only focuses on
impact bonds’ benefits and disadvantages in terms of process and outcome effects (cf.
Albertson& Fox, 2018; Fraser et al., 2018; Jackson, 2013a), the reviewed IPE literature
does an excellent job of opening up questions of power and subjectivity.18 It extends
the literature on financialisation by showcasing how this vehicle of impact investing
is integrated into the contemporary transformation of public welfare provision by the
state. As I have elucidated, the literature unpacks how impact bonds allow financial
capitalism to convert outsourced social services into collateral which can be leveraged
to extract surplus through speculative activities. While this process is allegedly
animated by benevolent motives, it regulates the subjects according to neoliberal
theories of poverty alleviation and extracts value.
A ‘Hybrid Modality’ of Marketisation
Recent interventions by Guter-Sandu (2018) and scholars from other fields, such
as Barman (2015), Chiapello and Godefroy (2017), and Langley (2018), have
problematised—albeit in different ways—the assumption that market-based logics
and practices pervade the social and become the orientation of action. They argue
that existing critical analyses may lose analytical sensitivity to the way in which
impact bonds ‘financialise’ as their emergence cannot (simply) be explained by
virtue of a logic of accumulation and the expansion of financial capitalism. Instead,
the authors make the case for retaining analytical sensitivity to social aspects of
impact bonds, since this transformation of capitalism precisely unfolds through the
facilitation of social purposes. As Langley (2018) puts it, ‘what is lacking from the
critical literature is an analysis of how the marketization processes of social finance
rearticulate “the social”’ (Langley, 2018, p. 2).
18The critical studies in IPE have been complemented by analyses from other fields such as critical
accounting studies (Cooper et al., 2016), geography (Berndt & Wirth, 2018; Rosenman, 2019),
sociology (Chiapello, 2015; Golka, 2019; Neyland, 2018) and critical policy studies (McHugh, Sinclair,
Roy, Huckfield, & Donaldson, 2013; Sinclair, McHugh, Donaldson, Roy, & Huckfield, 2014; Sinclair
et al., 2019).
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It is argued that the process of ‘market building’ which can be observed in the
context of impact bonds is not one of (simply) turning a non-market good into an
exchangeable (and thus expand the market sphere). Rather, it is a two-step processes.
In a first step, valuation is performed, in other words, social problems as well as
possible actions and expected outcomes are selected and a framework for estimating
‘worth’, that is, the valuation of social impact, is chosen. It is only through this
operation that the quantification of social value becomes possible (Chiapello &
Godefroy, 2017; cf. Roscoe & Townley, 2016). Guter-Sandu (2018) emphasises that
even though the (valuation) practices present in the field of impact bonds support
financialisation, ‘this does not mean they are created in the same flesh’ (p. 69). He
argues that financialisation in the realm of social policy does not so much unfold
through an absorption of the social into a financial logic, but rather ‘through the
“proliferation” of non-financial spaces of valuation’ (Guter-Sandu, 2018, p. 247).
On this view, a novel socio-technical infrastructure gauges social value which is
‘connected to but ultimately distinct from financial value’ (Guter-Sandu, 2018, p.
247). In conclusion, Guter-Sandu (2018) argues that ‘capital accumulation can
indeed advance in non-financial domains, but only whilst being concomitant and in
an intimate relation with particular types and degrees of social value creation (e.g.
reduction in ex-prisoner re-offending, increased employment, improved educational
attainment, bettering of health status, reduction in homelessness)’ (p. 17).
Impact bonds thus conceived connect wider questions of realising social purposes
with the performance of a novel financial mechanism; ‘the mechanisms behind the
encroachment of finance in the field of social policy’ (Guter-Sandu, 2018, p. 66) have
been demonstrated to work towards the de-differentiation of the boundaries between
market and social spaces. The dynamics entailed in such ‘hybrid deals’ (Nicholls,
2010, p. 76) is analytically troubling, as the topographical accounts of cultural
economy studies on marketisation processes can only conceptualise marketisation as
an extension of the border between the market and the non-market, that is, as a line
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of division. Against this backdrop, Langley (2018) proposes a topological reading
to make visible ‘the relational twisting and turning’ (p. 11), the entanglements
and transformations that can be observed in this space. He introduces the concept
of ‘the fold’ by Gilles Deleuze (1993) to overcome the binaries of topographical
accounts. The ‘[t]opological folding of relations’ (Langley, 2018, p. 3) does not
absorb the social, but ‘remakes “the social” as markets are made’ (Langley, 2018, p. 3).
These analyses are important contributions as they unpack the heterogeneity and
specificity of processes of financialisation in the context of impact bonds. They
sketch out how the valuation practices used in impact investing, and impact bonds
specifically, bring a range of heterogeneous problems and objects into a particular
frame of calculation which is social and economic. Also, they link back to the
analyses of SRI by Aitken (2007) and Langley (2010a), cited at the beginning of the
chapter, which foreground the rise of new subjectivities which are not ‘either/or’, but
‘both/and’ (see also B. Maurer, 2012). According to Langley (2018), the social that is
mobilised as these markets are made up ‘is an array of thoroughly liberal associations
and subjectivities that are, at once, pluralist, ethical and entrepreneurial’ (p. 10).
However, by only focusing on modalities of worth attribution through the
socio-technical devices of impact bonds, this literature tends not to foreground
the wider social practices, and accompanying knowledges, through which impact
bonds are mobilised and taken up. Related, the question of what impact bonds
‘do’ once they are constituted, remains unanswered. Do they behave like they are
supposed to (according to their outcomes-oriented structure) or are they maybe ‘less
well-behaved’? If we want to study this ‘new, hybridised value form’ (Guter-Sandu,
2018, p. 242) and its effects more closely, we cannot only ‘theorise at a distance’
(Mitchell, 2017b, p. 271) but also have to explore the interconnectedness between
impact investing and performances within everyday life (cf. Christophers, 2011;
Corpataux & Crevoisier, 2016). I make the case for an empirical investigation of the
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hybrid modality of impact bonds adopted and experienced in concrete settings, and
how people take up this hybrid modality. This aspect links back to the point raised by
Aitken (2007) in the context of SRI, in other words, the diversity of actors we find in
this space might disrupt the dichotomy between the institutional/international level
and the ‘everyday’ (see also M. Davies, 2016, p. 27) as different rationalities operate
simultaneously.
In the next chapter, I establish the theoretical framework of the thesis, seeking to
overcome the limitations identified in the review of the literature. I will build upon
the Foucault-inspired literature on governmentalities, which can proffer important
understandings as to how multiple forms of power operate simultaneously, configuring
different rationalities (liberal, non-liberal, etc.) into a programmatic form that comes
to govern not only investing activities but also the lives of ‘vulnerable populations’
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 14) that are targeted by impact bonds.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
To locate my research on the politics of the emergence and operation of impact
bonds, this chapter has reviewed the IPE literature on interest-bearing monetary
investments, typically in the form of debt or private equity, that seek to integrate the
facilitation of social purposes with financial return. I have discussed analyses of SRI
(which is a practice that typically minimises negative social consequences), GLI
which seeks to promote gender equity and address gender-based issues, and practices
of financial inclusion that reveal a shift from investments geared towards poverty
reduction to the mere provision of access to banking services for the poor. All of
these practices go beyond an understanding of investments as a purely self-oriented
pursuit of financial gain, and pursue a dual objective addressing social needs and
generating financial return. This concept challenges the assumption that, in a zero
sum equation, achieving greater social or environmental impact inevitably minimises
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financial returns to capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, there have been
growing calls for finance to ‘benefit society’ (Shiller, 2013, p. 25).
As I elucidated, the existing IPE literature discusses how such practices allow
financial subjects to fashion themselves as a certain kind of subject, that is not
only capable of increasing its own economic security and welfare but also socially
and environmentally conscious and acting in the name of the collective. Against
this backdrop, it has been argued that such practices invoke a Foucauldian notion
of an ‘ethics of “the self by the self”’ (Aitken, 2007, p. 146). This opens a
space for an everyday agency operating within financial spaces that perform
‘the social’. Financial constellations are thus not the province of a single social
group or institution. This raises interesting questions about the dichotomy we
often find in IPE studies between the institutional/international level and the ‘everyday’.
The existing literature argues that by seeing and promoting investing as the appropriate
model of action, the scope of practices such as SRI, GLI, and microfinance is
decidedly limited. Rather than challenging mainstream finance (e.g. by displacing
it), the core of finance is re-affirmed through such investments. This re-affirmation,
on the one hand, immunises such transactions against the interferences of political
confrontation and, on the other hand, directs attention away from strategies for
emancipatory change. Moreover, this literature has documented quite a few
instances of significant ‘mission drift’ where practices such as microfinance have
been reassembled into highly profitable asset streams, with the social purpose
becoming a secondary priority, sometimes even authorising reckless lending practices.
While such ‘financialization of poverty’ (Schwittay, 2014, p. 8) through financial
inclusion typically operated in low-income economies, the last decade has also seen
the emergence of the financialisation of poverty in the Global North through different
credit-as-welfare schemes that are increasingly promoted and facilitated. In this
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context, I shone a light on ‘financialisation as welfare’ in the post-crisis welfare state
(cf. Gamble, 2016), where the decline of decent paying labour and social welfare has
paved the way for the financialised provision of formerly public goods and services.
In this respect, I reviewed literature on asset-based welfare systems, educational
loans, and, again, the changing discourse of ‘financial inclusion’.
The existing IPE literature on impact bonds argues that the mechanism is a striking
case of both the post-crisis ‘social turn’ of finance and the financialisation of social
policy (Dowling, 2017). Authors have argued that the impact bond model allows
financial capitalism to transform public assets into a new source of exploitation by
converting outsourced social services into collateral which can be leveraged to extract
surplus through speculative activities. In this literature, impact bonds are understood
as a flawed alternative to the liberal economism of recent years, mainly responding to
finance’s issues of legitimacy after the financial crisis and subsequent recessions,
selectively incorporating ‘elements of an opposition, which for the most part has
restored the market order more than it has reformed or changed it’ (Ogman, 2019,
p. 18).
In this literature, I argued, there is a tendency to frame the integration of finance
into the social as a rationalised, teleological, and smooth process to which social
purposes are (simply) being ‘added-on’, and ultimately undermined and erased.
A second literature strand challenges this appraisal of the relationship between
social and financial value. This second perspective holds that ‘the social’ is
not crowded out by the operation of impact bonds (and certain other impact
investing vehicles). The way in which this type of financialisation advances is
precisely through the de-differentiation of market and social logics. Thus, rather
than assuming (and therefore critiquing according to) a pervasion of capitalist
imperatives into the social domain, the analytical focus should be on how the
social is reconfigured by the marketisation processes of impact investing (Langley,
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2018, p. 2; Chiapello & Godefroy, 2017). This second perspective holds that
the social and market domain are not mutually exclusive and call for further
studies of how this hybrid modality is made up (Guter-Sandu, 2018). This
literature provides us with insightful analyses of the hybrid modality through
which vehicles such as impact bonds advance. Yet, it revolves around questions
of infrastructures and calculation, and therefore risks losing analytical sensitivity
to the study of power relationships as well as the wider political rationalities
and techniques at play. How do the heterogenous actors engaged in this nascent
field—public sector commissioners, charitable foundations, banks, social service
providers, consultants, academics, etc.—‘make sense’ of and authorise such vehicles?
And how do the vehicles re-imagine the vulnerable groups that the programmes target?
I propose to shift the focus from valuation to looking at what happens as such ‘hybrid
deals’ are enacted. I will propose to build on the idea of governmentality (Foucault,
1979, 2007, 2010) as a form of analysis to develop the theoretical framework for
my study. As I will explain, the governmentality literature can proffer important
understandings of how heterogenous rationalities get reconfigured into programmatic
forms that come to govern the lives of populations. The theoretical framework for the
study will be developed in the next chapter.
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3. From Technologies of Power to
Cases: A Governmentality Method
The previos chapter used two different IPE literatures to frame the research: the studies
on the ‘social turn’ of finance and assessments of the post-crisis ‘financialisation
of poverty’ through practices such as debt-financed housing and credit-as-welfare
schemes. In the existing IPE literature, the emergence of impact bonds is classified as
a convergence of these two developments, in that benevolent investors now come
to address the public social spending gap by pre-financing programmes to improve
health, education, and basic welfare for poor populations. Thus, this new instance of
financialisation is not geared towards turning everyday populations into borrowers or
investors (i.e. not a call for more ‘financial inclusion’), but at a re-configuration of
(outsourced) social service provision that renders those services investible.
Building on the existing IPE literature, I referred to this phenomenon as an instance
of the financialisation of social policy and elucidated how this literature opens up
questions of structural power, mapping out how the social sector is leveraged by a form
of ‘responsible capitalism’ that extracts value through speculative activities. However,
I argued that this literature has a tendency to assume (rather than empirically study)
that the pursuit of financial gain crowds out sociopolitical values (such as distributive
justice or collective responsibility) which should inform welfare arrangements—a
market logic is contrasted to a ‘mission logic’ of the social sector (cf. Barman, 2016,
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p. 14). The following quote by Sinclair et al. (2014, p. 131) summarises the view
that many IPE scholars seem to hold:
SlBs imply that, for example, the rehabilitation of offenders is no longer
prompted by moral motivations but is incentivised by the prospect of
profit, and this changes its normative nature.
I have demonstrated that this understanding has been problematised by scholars
such as Guter-Sandu (2018) and Langley (2018), who argue that practices of impact
investing, and impact bonds in particular, attribute worth to the pursuit of the social
good, and it is precisely though this hybrid modality that financialisation advances;
the socio-technical infrastructures of impact bonds go beyond mere financial value
creation.
These contributions foreground the de-differentiation of the boundaries between
market and social spaces, which is an intriguing line of argument. I argued,
however, that beyond the modalities of valuation and the frameworks for estimating
‘worth’, research also needs to focus on how impact bonds are made up as policy
arrangements within and through wider social practices and knowledges. Moreover,
research should also focus on what impact bonds ‘do’ once they have been made up
(beyond increasing the presence of finance in the social sector). I made the case
for a theoretical framework capable of addressing these questions—in line with the
research questions outlined at the beginning of the thesis.
To develop the framework for the thesis, this chapter draws on the Foucault-inspired
analyses of governmentalities (Brady, 2016; Bröckling et al., 2010) and proposes
an ‘experimental investigation’ (Bröckling et al., 2010, p. 15) of impact bonds
through fieldwork. Governmentality is a form of analysis, or methodology, that
reflects Foucault’s working hypothesis of the intertwining of knowledge and power:
‘things’ must be rendered into discourse in certain ways, so that they can become
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knowable and available for intervention, to govern populations in a certain way. I
suggest that the governmentality literature can proffer important understandings of
how heterogenous rationalities get re-configured into programmatic forms that govern
populations. This can inform my research in important ways. It shifts attention from
the role of socio-technical infrastructures in qualifying market objects to the political
rationalities and techniques on which impact bonds are predicated.
Moreover, as I will explain, it can allow for going beyond a theorisation of a single
neoliberal apparatus that governs at a distance and for theorising multiple forms
of power that operate simultaneously through social policy, philanthropic logics,
financial tools, ethical discourses, management practices, etc. (cf. Collier, 2009;
Elden, 2016). Analysis of governmentality is therefore an approach that is well suited
for addressing questions of how impact bonds are made up by heterogenous social
practices and accompanying knowledges, and how they govern the lives of service
users. Moreover, as I demonstrate in the chapter, it is also a framework that is capable
of investigating the ‘lived effects’ of impact bonds—rather than assuming that they
behave like the mechanisms inscribed in finance/policy. In this chapter, I map out
three ‘pillars’ that will inform my study of the emergence and operation of impact
bonds.
First, I draw upon the work of Collier (2009) who suggests that Michel Foucault’s
work of the late 1970s moved away from governmentality as a master concept to a
‘topological analysis’. Collier (2009) proposes to study ‘“patterns of correlation” in
which heterogeneous elements—techniques, material forms, institutional structures
and technologies of power—are configured, as well as the “redeployments” and
“recombinations” through which these patterns are transformed’ (p. 80). On this
view, the point of Foucault’s late research is not the analysis of a single neoliberalism
apparatus, but rather the study of forms of thinking that seek to reconfigure existing
mentalities and practices of government which have become problematic (Collier,
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2009, p. 100). I explain how such a ‘topological analysis’ can inform my analysis of
how actors, practices and techniques make it possible for impact bonds to take hold,
and get reproduced.
Second, I focus on Michel Foucault’s theoretical work on subjectification, and the
respective Foucauldian-inspired literature, because this allows for an engagement
with the sub-institutional power relationships and social practices within and through
which subject positions are called forth, take hold and get reproduced. Against
this backdrop, the chapter builds on May (2014b) and Veyne (2010, pp. 103–105)
to develop a distinction between (i) subjectification through social practices and
(ii) self-formation within and through social practices. In this view, ‘truth’ is not
understood as a category that is imposed on individuals, but rather as something
that emerges from obligatory discourses on the self. To my mind, this implies
to not give too much agency to the concept of impact bonds (and the calculative
practices entailed), but to try to understand the actors, practices and techniques that
make it possible for impact bonds to take hold and get reproduced. In terms of
research agendas, this involves interrogating impact bonds in relation to their concrete
everyday operations, to make them visible in empirical and historically situated terms
(Neal, 2009b, p. 542; Brassett & Clarke, 2012). In this view, ‘truth’ is not understood
as a category that is imposed on individuals, but rather as something that emerges
from obligatory discourses on the self.
Third, I frame the research by the work of Didier Fassin (2007, 2009, 2010a) who
suggests that Foucault’s move from biopower to governmentality not only was a
shift from a stable and coherent conception of power to a constellation of different
rationalities (see above) but ‘also a shift from life to populations’ (Fassin, 2010a,
p. 197). This shift, I argue, is important to interrogate the issue of impact bonds to
finance social programmes as it stresses that social issues are not automatically a
question of biopolitics. Rather, what is at stake is a politics of giving specific value
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and meaning to human life. Rather than just governing life, life is ‘operated through
discourses, programmes, decisions, actions’ (Fassin, 2009, p. 48; Collier & Lakoff,
2008, pp. 22-23). The politics of life makes a selection of ‘existences it is possible
or legitimate to save’ (Fassin, 2007, p. 501) and creates (public) representations of
these existences. This offers an important theoretical understanding of how—in a
topological space—specific vulnerable populations become targeted, and calculated,
by interventions, while other populations are excluded (cf. Rabinow & Rose, 2006).
Based on these theoretical considerations, I develop three case studies in the thesis
to cover a wide and diverse range of perspectives, while still working on the notion
individuals construct of impact bonds in different contexts. I analyse three ‘pioneering’
impact bonds, one in the realm of health, one in the realm of homelessness, and one
in the realm of international development (i.e. education in rural India). Looking at
projects of the ‘early days’ of impact bonds may help make visible the sub-institutional
power-relationships within and through which financial practices and knowledges
are called forth, reproduced, and arguably also altered. Both Collier (2011) and
Fassin (2012) have proposed using fieldwork, as this allows for drawing attention to
‘the moments in which people’s lives are molded by the practices in which they are
engaged’ (May, 2014b, p. 500)—rather than solely focussing on discourses and the
socio-technical infrastructures of impact bonds. In this chapter, I also explain how I
used document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation to
study the three case study projects.
3.1 Foucault-Inspired Analyses of Governmentalities
For Michel Foucault, government famously referred to the ‘conduct of conduct’,
a set of ways of shaping conduct through various agencies and authorities inside
and outside of the state and at various spatial levels. In his last lectures at the
Collège de France (Foucault, 2007; Foucault, 2010), Foucault elucidated the historical
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development of the idea of governmentality from its prestage of the Christian pastoral
in sixteenth-century Western Europe to neoliberal governmentality (cf. Foucault,
1979). In these lectures, governmentality is not presented simply as a question of
what we might usually refer to as ‘government’. Rather, it is assumed to be (Foucault,
2007, p. 144 ):
‘the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections,
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit
very complex, power that has the population as its target, political
economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as
its essential technical instrument’
This definition reflects the intertwining of knowledge and power: processes of
interpretation and knowledge are always the premise for objects to be governed:
they must be represented in certain ways, rendered into discourse as knowable,
administrable and calculable objects, so that they become available for intervention
(Aitken, 2010a, p. 228).
In a second step, Foucault formulates a pre-eminence of governmentality over
sovereignty, that is, he privileges it over more centralised forms of power, emphasising
that power also arises ‘from below’, beneath the level that is usually studied in
political theory (Foucault, 2007, p. 144; May, 2014a). Foucault also privileges
governmentality over discipline or rather, he argues that discipline is best understood
as a historical form of governmentality which has gradually been displaced by the
rise of neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 2010). Third, Foucault urges us not to
understand governmentality as a unified entity or the outcome of rational thought, but
as a ‘historical formation’, as the consequence of struggles and certain contingent
turns of history (Foucault, 2007, p. 144).
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The focus on governmentality allowed Foucault to respond to his critics who argued
that his work failed to focus on macro-political issues. Through the concept of
governmentality he managed to address the points raised ‘without lapsing into the
juridical model of power that he criticized in his genealogical writings’ (May, 2014b,
p. 181). His comparatively small body of work on governmentality aroused attention
among English-speaking scholars who built upon these contributions to develop a
more nuanced understanding of the politics of the ‘new right’ . This interest has
grown considerably since the 1990s when the anthology The Foucault Effect: Studies
in Governmentality was published (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Donzelot
& Gordon, 2009) and Miller and Rose (1990) presented a novel governmentality
approach in their seminal paper Governing Economic Life which focuses on the
ways in which language renders ‘aspects of existence amenable to inscription and
calculation’ (p. 2). Miller and Rose (1990) proposed to link the study of ‘technologies
of government’ to the idea of language. Building from the notion of translation from
Callon and Latour (1981), they suggested that language played a key role in the
formation of networks of institutions, individuals, groups, and authorities, ‘brought
to identify their own desires and aspirations with those of others, so that they were or
could become allies in governing’ (Rose et al., 2006, p. 89). These networks make
possible what Miller and Rose (1990) called, again drawing upon Latour (1987),
‘governing at a distance’, that is, to act from a centre of calculation on the activities
and desires of others. Since then, the social sciences, but also humanities and
organisational science, have seen a rise of ‘studies of governmentality’ (Bröckling et
al., 2010, p. 1) that have both deepened and extended Foucault’s work on political
power (Walters, 2012).
In recent years, governmentality studies have been criticised for developing a
tendency to employ governmentality as a master category that uses a more or less
stable set of rationalities and technologies to understand and explain various political
programmes across multiple spaces (Rose et al., 2006, pp. 97–98). It has been argued
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that studies of governmentality thus lack a certain openness and fail to pick up on the
descriptive analyses that Michel Foucault undertook in the late 1970s (Brady, 2016;
Donzelot & Gordon, 2009). In this chapter, I do not aim to settle such debates and
identify the ‘correct’ approach to governmentality. Rather, I seek to elucidate how
Foucault’s understanding of governmentality can inform my analysis of impact bonds,
retaining analytical sensitivity to the heterogenous logics that Guter-Sandu (2018)
and Langley (2018) highlight in the context of impact bonds.
Governmentality can provide ‘a cluster of concepts’ which can help us understand
governance ‘as an eminently practical activity that can be studied, historicized and
specified at the level of the rationalities, programmes, techniques and subjectivities
which underpin it and give it form and effect’ (Walters, 2012, p. 2). My study
on the emergence and effects of impact bonds can benefit from a focus on how a
set of heterogenous elements and practices comes together to regulate the lives of
‘vulnerable populations’ (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 14). Rather than only
attending to the part that socio-technical devices play ‘in qualifying market objects’
(Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 2007, p. 5), it focuses on ‘the political rationalities
and technologies that animate a particular dispositif’ (Tellmann, 2010, p. 298).
Governmentality is therefore an approach to the study of impact bonds that is well
suited for addressing questions of politics and the political.In what follows, I elaborate
on Foucault’s understanding of governance and map out three ‘pillars’ that will inform
my study of the emergence and operation of impact bonds.
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3.2 Three Concepts to Frame the Research
Topologies of Power
Collier (2009) argues that the point of Foucault’s late research is not the analysis
of a single, regulatory neoliberalism, but rather a constellation of rationalities
(e.g. liberal/non-liberal, domestic/international, public/private etc.) ‘that must be
investigated in context’ (Mitchell, 2017b, p. 272; Piotukh, 2015, p. 32). Rather than
theorising knowledges and technologies as part of a stable and coherent neoliberal
set-up, Collier (2009) proposes to study ‘patterns of correlation’ in which diverse
elements and practices (financial, socio-political, ethical etc.) are configured.19
Collier (2009) suggests that Michel Foucault’s work of the late 1970s moved away
from governmentality as a master concept to a ‘topological analysis’, geared towards
studying ‘“patterns of correlation” in which heterogeneous elements—techniques,
material forms, institutional structures and technologies of power—are configured, as
well as the “redeployments” and “recombinations” through which these patterns are
transformed’ (p. 80). The focus of topological analyses should thus be on forms of
thinking that reconfigure existing mentalities and practices of government, and bring
‘to light a heterogeneous space, constituted through multiple determinations, and not
reducible to a given form of knowledge-power’ (Collier, 2009, p. 100).
For Collier, Foucault’s topological analysis is intimately related to an understanding
of ‘thinking’ as a situated practice of critical reflection that allows subjects to step
back from prevailing forms of understanding and acting, and to rework and recombine
these forms (cf. Rabinow, 2003). This has lines of affinity with the literature on
‘ethical investors’ discussed in Section 2.1 and the study of modern subjectivities of
finance more broadly (Brassett, 2018; Brassett & Clarke, 2012; Langley, 2008, 2010b;
Langley & Leyshon, 2012). This literature engenders the individual as a moral and
19This understanding has also been endorsed by Mitchell (2017a, pp. 115–116).
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responsible agent that not only takes up or resists things, but reworks and reconfigures
them. As Collier (2009, pp. 95–96) specifies:
In this view, thinking is not bound by a knowledge-power regime; it
should not be analyzed, as Foucault argued in a late interview, as a
‘formal system that has reference only to itself’ (Foucault, 1984a, p. 388).
Rather, it is an activity that involves a ‘degree of constraint as well as
a degree of freedom’, that makes possible a certain critical distance
from existing ways of understanding and acting. In sum, the space
of problematization is a topological space, and thinking is a driver of
recombinatorial processes.
Thus, individuals perceive new situations based on their internalised experiences, but
they also react by adapting to new objective conditions. This means that individuals do
not only reproduce their meaning systems but that they also produce and redeploy them
(Heller, 1996). Collier (2011) argues that thinking should be analysed as ‘a practico-
critical activity’ (p. 28). While self-understandings are coined by particular social
positions, they also allow for new responses that might be capable of transcending the
social conditions under which they were formed. Although there are social constraints,
people have the possibility of creative self-development according to their self-chosen
goals. As Rabinow (2003) notes, ‘[t]his simple but momentous shift has been lost
on many Anglo-American commentators (. . . ) who have resisted the implications
of Foucault’s insight that power was not external to freedom’ (p. 45). This suggests
links to a second important understanding in Foucault’s late work, namely ‘his shift
away from emphasizing processes of subjugation, discipline and normalization to a
concern with more complex processes of subjectification’ (Brady, 2014, p. 25).
Subjectification
Two distinct processes of subjectification can be traced in Foucault’s later work that
are helpful in theorising how new ways of objectifying and speaking the truth about
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oneself emerge, and new ways in which individuals are able (and required) to be
subjects (Burchell, 1996, p. 31). The ‘self’ is thus always both an effect of the social
power-knowledge nexus and an agent that interacts with the nexus. This understanding
can help me analyse subjectivity formation in the context of impact bonds. The two
processes are elucidated hereafter (following Heller, 1996; May, 2014b, pp. 500–501;
Veyne, 2010, pp. 103–105).20
Subjectification Through Social Practices
Foucault mainly describes processes of subjectification through social practices in
Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) and the first volume of The History of Sexuality
(Foucault, 2008). Foucault (1977) emphasises ‘that power produces knowledge (. . . )
[and] that power and knowledge directly imply one another’ (p. 27). Our daily
social practices (including discourses) are thus sustained by power relationships and
constitute not only the objects (e.g. madness, sex, or the physical sciences), but
also make ‘the self of each individual into a particular subject’ (Veyne, 2010, p.
103, emphasis in the original). Since power relationships are manifold (Foucault,
1982a, p. 221), this process does not arise ‘in conformity with a single type of power
arrangement’ (May, 2014b, p. 499), but is a complex one. It implies that subjects (or
‘identities’) are shifting, temporary and not connected to an ‘essence’. Veyne (2010)
calls this process of subjectification ‘a kind of socialization’ (p. 104) through social
practices and their accompanying knowledge. The second aspect is to be a subject of
self-knowledge, to which I now turn.
Self-formation within and Through Social Practices
Foucault calls this second subjectification process an ‘aesthetics of existence’
(Foucault, 1984b, p. 231) and mainly elucidates it in the last two volumes of The
History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1986, 1990). Reflecting on his study of ancient Greek
20This section on subjectification is based on ideas that I developed in my master’s dissertation
(Andreu, 2014, pp. 19–25).
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and Roman sexuality, Foucault (1990) proposes ‘to analyze the practices by which
individuals were led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize,
and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire’ (p. 5).
Driven by this aim, Foucault explores what is termed ‘practices of the self, bringing
into play the criteria of an “aesthetics of existence”’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 11) and
presents various techniques that allow willing individuals to work on a kind of
self-cultivation: by regulating their thoughts, conduct, and bodies people fashion
themselves as certain kinds of subjects. These practices of the self lead to ‘a
transformation of oneself by oneself’ (Veyne, 2010, p. 104). Thus, while the self
is an effect of the social power/knowledge nexus (see above), it is also an effect
that interacts with the nexus. Although there are social constraints, people have the
possibility of creative self-development according to their self-chosen goals.
Thus, individuals perceive new situations based on their internalised experiences, but
they also react by adapting to new objective conditions. This means that individuals
do not only reproduce their meaning systems, but that they also produce and use
them (Heller, 1996). This links back to Collier (2011) who argues that thinking
should be analysed as ‘a practico-critical activity’ (p. 28). While self-understandings
are coined by particular social positions, they also allow for new responses that
might be capable of transcending the social conditions underwhich theywere formed.21
This thesis bases its analysis of impact bonds on these two understandings of how
social practices make us into the kinds of subjects we are. This makes it possible,
then, to conceptualise both how subjects are formed by a power-knowledge nexus and
the unruly, active subjects that ‘answer back’ (Herring & Lave, 2001) and act as
‘discursive practitioners’ (Brassett, 2016; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). The resulting
21 In The Psychic Life of Power Judith Butler (1997) elaborates on Foucault when she argues that a
‘subjection’ process simultaneously encompasses becoming subordinated to power and becoming a
subject, one of self-knowledge (cf. Bhabha, 1994; Mills, 2000, 2003).
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subjectivities that emerge from the process of identification can thus be complex,
multiple, and get (re)negotiated (Peterson, 2006, p. 120). The subject does not
spring forth fully formed, nor is it ever complete or identical with its identity claims.
As Langley and Leyshon (2012) argue, there is always a gap: ‘the processes of
identification in which (. . . ) subjects are produced and propelled are necessarily
partial and incomplete’ (p. 371). As such the subject is never fully disciplined, or
docile, but is better thought of as ‘uncertain’ (Langley, 2007). The subject does not
‘escape’ or ‘overcome’ power relations; social processes are about the re-fashioning
the subject within power. At the roots of Foucault’s work of the late 1970s is a
concern with power, truth and subjectivity (Elden, 2016) and as I illustrated in the
previous chapter, it has been used to study ‘financial subjects’ and ‘ethical investors’
(Aitken, 2007, 2010a; Langley, 2010a; Langley & Leyshon, 2012). Subjectivities
that emerge from the process of identification can be complex, multiple, and are
also (re)negotiated over time (Peterson, 2006, p. 120). Building from the account
of dynamic processes of subjectification elucidated above, I propose to understand
social processes as the re-fashioning of subjects within power where subjects are
not stable or reliable embodiments of finance or policy discourses, but ‘emerge
in practice at the intersection of multiple, overlapping and possibly contradictory
discourses’ (J. Clarke, 2019, p. 193; Langley, 2008, p. 33). Linking this discussion
back to the concept of topological analysis, I propose to think of subjectivity
formation as a process in and through which people think about, take up, and alter
problematisations that their society and culture presents to them (May, 2014b, p. 501).
Having elucidated both the notion of topological analysis and the ‘work’ of thinking
subjects in the formation and alteration of power configurations, I next build upon
various articles by the French medical anthropologist Didier Fassin (2007, 2009,
2010a) who offers a third concept that is related to the considerations above. Analysing
Foucault’s lectures of the late 1970s, Fassin argues that the move described by Collier
(2009) was ‘not only a shift from a centralized conception of power to a fragmented
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vision of technologies, it is also a shift from life to populations’ (p. 197, emphasis
added).22 Specifically, Fassin (2009) argues that Foucault’s late analyses were
concerned with ‘the way in which impersonal “living beings” were turned into
populations and individuals, how governmentality and subjectification shaped our
modern vision of the world and of humanity’ (p. 47). As I elaborate below, this
understanding provides an important extension to the theoretical framework developed
thus far since, after all, every impact bond is geared towards a ‘target population’
(Griffiths & Meinicke, 2014, pp. 7–9; Williams, 2019). What Fassin’s work can
add to the analysis of the issue of impact bonds is an understanding governing ‘life’
that goes beyond Foucault’s initial analysis of biopolitics—that is, the exercise of
strategies and forces to control life—and focuses more on how ‘life’ (or a specific
‘population’) gets problematised.
The Politics of Life
As the previous section made plain, by the late 1970s, Foucault treated ‘biopolitics
not as a logic of government but as a problem space in which diverse topologies of
power may be observed’ (Collier, 2009, p. 80). Fassin (2007, 2009, 2010a) argues
that the shift away from biopolitics was not only one towards multiple forms of
power but ‘also a shift from life to populations’ (Fassin, 2010a, p. 197); ‘contrary to
what is often believed, governmentality is not about life but only about populations’
(Fassin, 2010a, p. 186). Rather than just controlling (biological) life through a stable
and coherent exercise of strategies and forces, (social) life gets ‘operated through
discourses, programmes, decisions, actions’ (Fassin, 2009, p. 48)—I would argue in
the form of a ‘problem space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 93; Rabinow & Rose, 2003; Rabinow
& Rose, 2006). This understanding goes beyond both the notion of Foucauldian
biopolitics as formulated in Society Must Be Defended (cf. Foucault, 2003, pp.
22Note that the two others do not build upon nor cite each other’s work. However, they both discuss
the same period in Foucault’s work and (what I take to be related) aspects of the government of
populations.
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245–246) and the politics of ‘life itself’ described by Rose (2001).23 In his article
Another Politics of Life is Possible, Fassin (2009) draws four conclusions about how
governmentality and ‘life’ are connected. In what follows, I provide a summary of
these four conclusions.
First, ‘the matter of governing matters for governmentality’ (Fassin, 2009, p. 48), that
is, topologies of power are not just about the ways in which patterns of correlation are
configured but also about the (social) issues at stake in a ‘problem space’.24 Second,
contemporary societies are not so much characterised by a power ‘over’ life through
an exercise of force at the level of populations, but more by ‘the construction of the
meaning and values of life’ (Fassin, 2009, p. 52). On this view, social issues (e.g.
homelessness in London or the gender gap in Indian education) are not automatically
a question of biopolitics. Rather, what is at stake is a politics of ascribing specific
value to human life (Fassin, 2010a). Third, in consequence, ‘governing’ always
means to make a selection of ‘existences it is possible or legitimate to save’ (Fassin,
2007, p. 501). It is a matter of choice ‘to make live’ or to disallow life to the point of
death (Foucault, 2008, p. 138). For Fassin, this implies an assessment of inequality
and a study of ‘biolegitimacy’ (Fassin, 2010a, p. 197), in other words, the ways in
which specific existences become targeted and calculated by interventions, while
others are excluded (cf. Walters, 2012, p. 155; Rabinow & Rose, 2006).25 Fourth, in
conclusion, Fassin argues that the ‘politics of life’ does not so much regulate the lives
of populations through ‘the exercise of forces and strategies to control it’ (Fassin,
2009, p. 52), but through discursive processes that single out certain existences
(while ignoring others).
23Rose (2001) is interested in the way in which biology and bodies are reshaped based on novel
concepts of science, genetics etc., ultimately driven by new biotechnologies (cf. Franklin, 2000;
Waldby, 2000, 2002).
24A related point about biopolitics is made by Rabinow and Rose (2003).
25Fassin (2009) emphasises that the issue of ‘inequality’ is something that ‘falls outside’ (p. 54)
Foucault’s perspective. Yet, he argues that it is implicitly present as ‘to make live’ always also implies
‘to reject into death’.
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Overall, I would argue that the notion of a ‘politics of life’ is reconcilable with the
notion of topological analysis developed by Collier who stresses that ‘biopolitics
should not be understood as a logic of power but as a problem-space’ (Collier,
2009, p. 91). Linking Fassin’s understanding back to the ‘topologies of power’ and
subjectification processes, I propose to think of the politics of life as processes of
(re-)problematisation, whereby a selection is made of ‘existences it is possible or
legitimate to save’ (Fassin, 2007, p. 501). In relation to impact bonds, Fassin’s
work raises important questions as to ‘what kind’ of social issues are administered,
by whom, and how interventions are being legitimised (see also Reid-Henry, 2014,
p. 419)—and not so much about how service users ‘regulate their own behaviors
according to neoliberal theories of poverty alleviation’ (Rosenman, 2019, p. 157).
Put another way, the analytical focus is not on how people’s activities and desires are
governed at a distance, but on the principles under which the lives of populations
are regulated as well as the ‘inequalities and misrecognitions’ (Fassin, 2009, p. 57)
specific forms of government constitute. Through the notion of a ‘politics of life’, I
can integrate such questions into the examination of impact bonds, and respective
processes of financialisation.
3.3 Governmentality Analysis Through Case Studies
Having elucidated the Foucauldian concepts that inform my research, I now explain
the ‘method’. I develop three case studies to cover a wide and diverse range of
perspectives, while still working on the notion individuals construct of impact bonds
in different contexts (cf. Patton, 2014). I investigate three impact bond case study
projects: Ways to Wellness, the London Homelessness SIB, and the Educate Girls
DIB. These cases are intriguing in that they were all pioneering projects, one in
the realm of health, one in the realm of homelessness, and one in the realm of
international development (i.e. education in rural India). Early impact bonds projects
are cornerstones for facilitating bipartisan dialogues between policymakers and
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investors, especially since ‘the SIB concept was so new and required such drastically
different procurement and contracting that government officials were hesitant to get
involved’ (Kasper & Marcoux, 2015, p. 62). So, looking at these early days of impact
bonds may help make visible the sub-institutional power-relationships within and
through which practices and knowledges are called forth, reproduced, and arguably
also altered (cf. Collier, 2009, 2011). In what follows, I provide a brief overview of
the three programmes analysed.
The first case study project is the so-called ‘London Homelessness SIB’ which was
the second SIB ever developed and the first one to address homelessness. Operational
from 2012 to 2015, the SIB sought to support over eight-hundred long-term homeless
persons in London, many of whom were suffering from complex issues around drug
and alcohol use and mental or physical illness, and ‘whose needs were not being
met by existing services’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 1). Consisiting of two different
sub-programmes, the SIB provided individuals with a dedicated key-worker to
advocate for them and help them off the streets of London.
The second case study looks at Ways to Wellness, which is the first impact bond
in the health sector, caring for patients with long-term conditions (LTCs) such as
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), heart disease or epilepsy. This SIB
was initiated in July 2015 with a project duration of seven years. Although it is
not yet completed at the time of writing, it still provides an interesting empirical
case with regard to the research questions posed. The programme uses so-called
social prescribing, geared towards supporting 11,000 patients through non-medical
approaches outside the GP surgery to improve beneficiaries’ self-care and wellbeing
through sustained lifestyle changes (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015). This is done
through the work of dedicated ‘link workers’ that are assigned to each patient.
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Table 3.1: Overview of Case Study Projects.
London Homelessness
SIB
Ways to Wellness Educate Girls DIB
Geography London, United Kingdom
Newcastle upon Tyne,
United Kingdom
Bhilwara district of
Rajasthan, India
Project
Purpose
Support rough sleepers by
helping them find
long-term
accommodation, gain
qualifications, and
possibly move into
employment.
Help people with
long-term health
conditions achieve
sustained lifestyle changes,
improved self-care, and
well-being.
Enroll girls currently
excluded from
government primary
school education and
improve literacy and
numeracy.
Service
Users
831 long-term homeless
persons
11,000 people with long
term health conditions
such as lung disease,
diabetes, and asthma.
9,000 girls not currently
enrolled in government
primary schools, and a
further 9,000 children in
grades three to five.
Max.
Value
£4.8m £8.90m £0.79m
Investments £1.69m £1.65m £0.22m
Outcome
Funder
Department for
Communities and Local
Government (DCLG)
Newcastle Gateshead
CCG
Children’s Investment
Fund Foundation (CIFF)
Investors
Big Issue Invest, Social
Enterprise Investment
Fund (Department of
Health), CAF
Venturesome, Orp
Foundation, two
individual investors
Bridges Fund
Management
UBS Optimus Foundation
Timeframe
November 2012 –
November 2015
April 2015 – April 2022 June 2014 – July 2018
To showcase and unpack how the impact bond mechanism wanders and travels
from a social policy context into international development, the third case study
investigates the world’s first-ever DIB in education, which is called ‘Educate Girls’.
This programme was geared towards increasing the school enrolment of girls in
Rajasthan, India, as well as improving the educational outcomes of both girls and boys
in Hindi, English, and basic numeracy. The intervention trained a team of volunteers
to conduct door-to-door visits to talk to families and encourage school enrolment of
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girls. Moreover, the scheme delivered a child-centric curriculum three times per week
to boys and girls in grades three to five. The programme was launched in 2015, with
a three-year operation period and targeted 18,000 children.
Analyses of governmentalities are often only based on archival methods (cf. Foucault,
2000, p. 233), that is, not on interviews and other fieldwork methods; the move to
fieldwork is contested (Rose, 1999, p. 19). As Dean (2015) points out, ‘Foucault is
not seeking to access the complexity of everyday life but the conditions under which
we form a knowledge of and seek to govern such domains as everyday life’ (p. 359).
On this view, Foucault’s analytical concern is not with how things really are ‘on the
ground’, but with how ‘how our “finely grained pictures” of reality are produced and
the diverse realm of effects they have within certain practices’ (Dean, 2015, p. 359).
More ‘traditional’ studies of governmentality therefore continue to work exclusively
with archival methods (as Foucault did himself). An exclusive focus on documentary
evidence, however, has also been accused of not always being able to provide the
empirical data to substantiate the arguments made (Brady, 2016; J. Clarke, 2019;
Mckee, 2009; Rutherford, 2007).
Collier (2011) endorses fieldwork (as does Fassin, 2012), raising a couple of
conceptual points to address the tension between the effects of constructed
images/discourses of the real and ‘the real’. He argues that the trick is to not give
‘fieldwork (. . . ) any epistemic privilege’ (p. 5) over other types of knowledge as
it always ‘gets close to practices, to experience, to the quotidian, the anecdotal,
the local, the circumstantial’ (p. 13). But if we understand thinking as ‘a situated
practice through which existing governmental forms are reflected upon, reworked and
deployed’ (Collier, 2011, p. 19), fieldwork and an attention to everyday spaces seems
to be helpful in fleshing out how subjects think about and alter problematisations that
their society and culture presents to them (cf. Lippert, 2005; May, 2014b; Mitchell,
2017a, p. 114).
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I used three different methods of data collection: document analysis, semi-structured
interviews, and participant observation. Rather than treating information gathered
through interviews and participant observation as ‘the real’, I use a threefold rationale
in respect of data collection. First, fieldwork can provide access to discourses and
problems that the researcher might ignore otherwise due to a lack of available
information (Collier, 2013; Lippert, 2005; Walters, 1997). Second, fieldwork allowed
me to also capture the active subjects that acts as ‘discursive practitioners’ (Brassett,
2016; Wetherell & Edley, 1999) as well as ‘the convictions and doubts of the actors,
their blind spots and their lucidity, their prejudices and their reflexivity’ (Fassin, 2012,
p. 13). Third, as Tracy (2010, p. 843) elucidates, triangulation of methods allows
for contextualising and cross-checking qualitative findings. Possible contradictions
and different views (e.g. between different functionaries or between what is written
and what is said) can thus be identified and included in the interpretation and
considerations (Flick, 2010; Flick, Garms-Homolová, Herrmann, Kuck, & Röhnsch,
2012).
The study employed three different methods of data collection. The first one consisted
in the analysis of textual and visual representations of the case study impact bonds.
I looked at various academic, policy and industry-based reports. Commissioning
bodies and investors have published various reports on the case study projects (e.g.
DCLG, 2015; NHS England, 2016; UBS Optimus Foundation, 2018a). As payments
in an impact bond are triggered by projects’ achievement of social outcomes,
the programmes typically contract external organisations to evaluate the impact
bond-financed interventions and produce independent interim and final evaluation
reports, to avoid conflicts of interest. These reports proved to be valuable and very
detailed sources of information on the case study projects (e.g. Kitzmüller, McManus,
Shah, & Sturla, 2018; Mason et al., 2017b; Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015; UBS Optimus
Foundation, 2018b). Moreover, as I will make plain in the next chapter, impact
bonds are gaining traction among leading business schools, think tanks, international
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organisations, charitable foundations, and policy research institutions. Such bodies
produce a bevy of reports on impact bonds.26
The transition from the emerging ‘advisory economy (. . . ) around SIBs’ (Williams,
2018, p. 2) to ‘academic studies’ is fluid; as industry-oriented research institutions not
only assesses impact bonds but also provide advice to commissioning bodies on how
to set up and operate such schemes (e.g. Carter et al., 2018; Government Outcomes
Lab, 2017; J. Liebman & Sellman, 2013).27 At the same time, there are a number of
think tanks, advisories and charities that are dismissive of the impact bond model and
allowed me to integrate critical practitioner perspectives (e.g. A. Brown, 2019; Starr,
2018). Moreover, as I made plain in Chapter 2, there is also a burgeoning critical
academic literature on impact bonds in IPE and beyond, some of which discusses
(or touches upon) my case study projects (e.g. Berndt & Wirth, 2018; Cooper et
al., 2016; Kish & Leroy, 2015). Moreover, I analysed newspaper and magazine
articles (e.g. Picton, 2018; The Economist, 2018), YouTube films about the case study
projects (e.g. Big Society Capital, 2015; Educate Girls, 2016) as well as recordings of
conferences or management seminar (e.g. Blavatnik School of Government, 2018;
SECO – Economic Cooperation and Development, 2018a), and even actual impact
bond contracts. In addition to the material that is specific to the case studies, I
also analysed other industry-oriented reports and articles to contrast the case study
projects with other projects, and complement my analysis with more general studies.28
These sources are all forms of documented information that can serve as a basis to
explain human thought, feeling, and action (Glynos &Howarth, 2007;Mayring, 2000).
26For instance, such reports were published by the Brookings Institution (Boggild-Jones, Gustafsson-
Wright, Sharma, & Ravi, 2019; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015), the World Bank (World Bank Group,
2017), the Government Outcomes Lab at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University
(Government Outcomes Lab, 2018c; Stanworth, 2017) and the Policy Innovation Research Unit (PIRU)
(Tan et al., 2015).
27I will return to this aspect in Chapter 4.
28These sources include, but are not limited to Ecorys (2018); Floyd (2017); Knoll (2018); Neyland
(2018); Saltman (2017); Tan, Fraser, McHugh, and Warner (2019); Williams (2019).
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The second method of data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews with
actors involved in both the contracting and operation of impact bonds. Thirty-two
interviews were conducted, using a semi-structured interview guide as this offers a
good compromise between focused and narrative conversation design (cf. Longhurst,
2010; Meuser & Nagel, 2009). The advantage of this method is that practitioners
can provide insights to the researcher that the latter had ignored due to a lack of
available information, especially in an under-researched field such as impact bonds
(Schmidt, 2004). Due to previous employment and networks, I already had some
contacts in the impact bond industry, and used this network to gain access to the
case study institutions and projects. Thus, I managed to conduct 27 interviews with
individuals involved with the case study projects such as commissioners, employees
of service provider organisations, investors, and service users. Five additional
interviews were conducted in order to contrast the case study projects with other,
external perspectives.29
Building upon Bryman (2001) and Crang and Cook (2007), the third method followed
an ethnographic approach. Whenever I was present at the sites and offices of the
projects, I recorded subjective and momentary perceptions of infrastructure, locality,
and ‘moods’ in an observational protocol to make social practices visible ‘from
the “inside”, in the contexts of their everyday, lived experiences’ (Cook, 2013, p.
167). The advantage of this method is that it avoids the artificial responses typical
of interview conditions (Abolafia, 1998; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I also
employed participant observation in the context of industry-based and academic
conferences on impact bonds. Increasingly, scholars regard conferences as ‘a space
where actors make claims, contest over, and/or come to consensus concerning the
field’s identity through presentations and face-to-face interactions’ (Barman, 2015,
p. 17; Garud, 2008). During talks and panels, but also after conference breaks
and dinners, I took extensive field notes as this is conducive to unpacking how
29A full list of the interviews can be found in Appendix 7.
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populations come to endorse new ideas (cf. Leivestad & Nyqvist, 2017). Moreover, I
also attended numerous virtual conferences and webinars on the case study projects
and recorded my observations in protocols.
Qualitative content analysis is a suitable method for systematically and efficiently
filtering out, structuring and comparing statements from the material that can provide
answers to my research question—even from large amounts of data. On the one
hand, the process of content analysis aims to reduce the empirical material and
produce a concentrated image of the material. On the other hand, it aims to structure
the empirical material. My empirical material—documents, interview transcripts,
and observational protocols—was subject to an interpretative process, in which I
derived categories in an inductive process of integration and interaction of theory and
empirical data. This process started from the theoretical considerations elucidated
above and, based on the empirical data, established a fully-fledged operational list.
Second, the structural features of both the material and the arguments contained were
analysed. Third, after establishing the macro-features of the fragments, I ‘zoomed
in’ and collected cultural references, rhetorical and linguistic mechanisms as well as
specific discursive statements to indicate the values and knowledge claims made about
the impact bond projects in question. Fourth, all of the results were tied together in
order to explain how the performance of a financial mechanism is connected to the
provision of individualised social services for poor and underserved populations (cf.
research question one) and to map out relevant contradictions and gaps (cf. research
question two).30 After that, I placed the findings in a broader context to discuss the
political consequences of the forms of government adopted through impact bonds (cf.
research question three).
30I elucidate the different research questions in the introduction of the thesis.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
If we accept that a clean division between markets and non-market spheres is of
limited analytical utility: how do impact bonds infiltrate the self-understandings and,
in turn, the behaviour of subjects? What are their consequences? In this chapter, I
framed my research by Foucault-inspired analyses of governmentality and made the
case for an ‘experimental investigation’ (Bröckling et al., 2010, p. 15) of specific
cases of impact bonds trough fieldwork. As I have elucidated, governmentality is a
form of analysis that can imply the adoption of different Foucauldian ‘raw materials’
and different methods of data collection.
For my analysis, I build upon topologies of power (Collier, 2009), subjectification
(Heller, 1996), and the ‘politics of life’ (Fassin, 2007). This allows me to make visible
in empirically situated terms how different rationalities (philanthropic, financial,
ethical, managerial etc.) are configured into a programmatic form that gives specific
meaning and value to underserved and poor populations. Against this backdrop,
impact bonds’ configuration of different rationalities and technologies is not to
be understood as a ‘reasonable consensus between actors coming from different
spheres’ (Schinckus, 2017, p. 6). Rather, the focus is upon the sub-institutional
power-relationships within and through which impact bonds are made up, and the
actors who ‘fold’ the social into the market.
In terms of such a research agenda, as Neal (2009a) succinctly puts it, the point is
‘not to begin with ideology and explore what instruments it uses, but to begin with
the mechanisms and practices and explore how they get formed into ideologies and
knowledges’ (p. 168; cf. Aitken, 2010a, pp. 227–228). To my mind, this implies not
giving too much agency to the concept of impact bonds, but to try to understand the
actors, practices and techniques that make it possible for impact bonds to take hold
and get reproduced. Building upon Collier (2011) and Fassin (2012), I thus proposed
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to study the emergence and effects of impact bonds in relation to these specific case
studies that I have introduced in this chapter.
In the next chapter, I will focus on the development of the three impact bond case
study projects, the specific actors and their work in relation to the formation of the
programmes. But before I turn to the these specific cases, I will first explain in detail
what an impact bond is (supposed to be) and the roles of the different social actors
engaged in the impact bond industry. In this context, I will also briefly discuss the
events and practices that led to the formation of the first impact bond in the UK in
2010 and also how the impact bond model has been annexed by more global discourse
around ‘growing the impact bond market’, and ‘impact investing’ more broadly.
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4. Setting the Scene: Context and
Emergence of Case Study Projects
In the last chapter, I established the theoretical framework of this thesis, drawing
upon Foucault-inspired literature on governmentalities, which build upon ‘Foucault’s
working hypothesis on the reciprocal constitution of power techniques and forms of
knowledge’ (Lemke, 2001, p. 191) and focus on the relationship between political
rationalities and practices of governing populations. I employ a case study approach
and develop three different case studies throughout the thesis in response to my
research questions. In this chapter, I set the scene by discussing the history of the
impact bond concept.
In this context, I elucidate how in the UK—which later saw the implementation of the
first impact bond—there had already been policy-driven efforts to generate financial
returns from social investments since 2000, notably driven by the Social Investment
Task Force (SITF) and the Council on Social Action (CoSA). In the wake of the
formation of the world’s first SIB at Peterborough prison in 2010, proponents began
producing a plethora of conferences, industry-based reports, webinars, YouTube
videos, and more. So, even before a second impact bond had been created, there was
an intense period of constructing certain notions and paradigms around it through the
production of conferences, presentation, reports, and such.
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Most of the early implementation-oriented impact bond ‘cookbooks’ essentially
emulated the structure of the Peterborough pilot and provided justificatory logics
as well as guidance for implementing such a scheme. In this chapter, I discuss
these representations and the policy arguments associated with them. However, I
also illustrate the considerable degree of ambiguity as to what an impact bond is
(supposed to be) and the consequently high variability of schemes ‘on the ground’.
Those early days had also already seen the formation of what was later dubbed the
‘social finance infrastructure’ (Schwartz, Jones, & Nicholls, 2015, p. 488) the ‘SIB
ecosystem’ (Kasper & Marcoux, 2015, p. 62), or the ‘SIB economy’ (Williams,
2018, p. 2). This economy consists of newly established social finance intermediary
organisations that facilitate the creation of impact bonds by bringing actors together
and advising on how projects should be structured. Organisations such as Social
Finance, Instiglio, or Numbers for Good are allegedly ‘often the “glue” that holds
investors, government officials, nonprofit service providers, and evaluators together’
(Kasper & Marcoux, 2015, p. 63; Schwartz et al., 2015). Their employees typically
have a background in finance (e.g. accounting, private equity), have then ‘emigrated
to the “social sector”’ (Williams, 2018, p. 2), and are of course knowledgeable about
equity and venture capital investment.
Further elements of the impact bond economy are subsidies made available for
the development and implementation of impact bonds31, external evaluators that
determine the attainment of social outcomes (which is pivotal for the disbursement
of payments), and lawyers who know how to draft impact bond contracts as well
as institutions that conduct research into and promote impact bonds, such as the
Kennedy School’s Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab (SIB Lab). In this
chapter, I also make a brief digression to discuss the discourse around social impact
31Beyond direct subsidies, this support mainly consists of development grants to conceptualise and
create the impact bonds and outcome ‘top-ups’ to render investments profitable.
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investing—or ‘impact investing’ for short—which also emerged around 2007–2008.
This discourse aims to achieve the dual objective of producing a social impact while
earning financial returns on capital, and impact bonds are commonly portrayed as a
subset of impact investing vehicles; according to some commentators, ‘[a]rguably
the best known form’ (R. Davies, 2014, p. 3; Jackson, 2013a). The Rockefeller
Foundation is said to have been the ‘organizing instrument’ (Jackson, 2013b, p. 97)
of the emerging field, as it organised a convention in 2007 that coined the term
‘impact investing’ (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015) and launched a global, five-year
global grant-making programme, which amounted to $38 million, to build the market
(Lane, 2014). The Rockefeller Foundation was also the only non-UK institution to
invest in the Peterborough project in 2010 (Arrillaga-Andreessen & Murray, 2017).
Having elucidated this trajectory and background of impact bonds, I come back
to the argument made in chapter 2 that research must go beyond the impact bond
economy to learn why non-financial actors ultimately accept (and reproduce) the
proposition formulated and the calculative practices entailed. We cannot assume that
the projects implemented on the ground are simply materialisations of a stable source
paradigm. Rather, the particular modes of reasoning and types of labour involved
in conceptualising and implementing such schemes needs to be made visible in
historically and empirically situated terms. Therefore, this chapter segues into the
study of three specific case studies—Ways to Wellness, the London Homelessness
SIB, and the Educate Girls DIB.
To show how the institutional and international aspect (i.e. ‘higher activities’) are
connected to micro-interventions at the local level (i.e. the ‘everyday’), the chapter
proceeds in four principal steps. The first section traces the historical emergence of
impact bonds by portraying the actors, elements, and events that led to the design and
implementation of the first SIB at Peterborough prison. The second section outlines
what an impact bond is ‘supposed to be’ according to the discourse fragments studied.
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I show how the features and logics of the models that are disseminated through
industry based reports vary considerably. The third section discusses the emergence
of the impact bond ecosystem and the formation of an impact investing discourse
with impact bonds as one of the core instruments from the start.
To unpack the peculiarities of the different impact bond projects, the fourth section
then discusses the events and actors that led to the formation of the schemes. I
illustrate how the actors involved reached out to prospective investors, social purpose
organisations, and impact evaluators and the negotiations that ultimately led to contract
conclusions. The concluding section recapitulates the different elements discussed
and segues into the in-depth discussion of the distinct mode of reasoning I diagnosed
in the context of the three case study projects—which is the subject of the subsequent
chapter.
4.1 Social ‘Equity’? Mobilising Private Equity to
Finance Social Projects
Today, various areas of welfare are delivered as outsourced services via tendering
processes and contracts with third parties. Particularly striking in this context is the
situation in the UK.32 In the new quasi-market model, tendering processes were
introduced into welfare provisions, aimed to be more effective and efficient. Some
areas of welfare are consequentially delivered as outsourced goods and services via
contracts with third parties, often third sector organisations (Rees, 2014).
The concept of the third sector had already been disseminated in the US (Levitt,
1973) and in official European Economic Community and European Community
32Both the New Labour (1997–2010) and the Coalition (2010–2015) government significantly
altered the balance between grant funding and contract/commissioned funding for the social sector.
From a ratio of 1:1 (£4.6bn vs. £4.8bn respectively) in 2000–2001 it changed to 2:1 (£8.7bn vs. £4.4bn)
in 2006–2007 to over 5:1 (£11.1bn vs. £2.2bn) in 2012–2013 (Hogg, Kendall, & Breeze, 2015).
76
documents of the 1980s (Kendall & Anheier, 1999). The term ‘third sector’ emerged
as a hypernym for a diverse array of organisations that deliver societal benefits and
are neither statutory nor profit making, such as charities, community groups, NGOs,
or voluntary associations (Haugh & Kitson, 2007; Rifkin, 2000).33 While still being
funded by the state, third-sector organisations (many of them voluntary organisations)
are increasingly forced to enter into competitive markets to obtain funding. In the UK,
there have been various initiatives to fund such services through investments from the
private sector. Since 1997, the UK government had taken various steps to support
and enact social finance initiatives through the support of community development
finance institutions (1999–2002), social enterprise investment (2002–2010), and
eventually social innovation (2010–2015).34
As far as the emergence of impact bonds is concerned, there are two platforms I
would like to highlight. The first one is the SITF, active from 2000 until 2010, which
foregrounded the importance of equity and venture capital investments in the UK
social sector. The second is the CoSA, active from 2007 until 2008, where the impact
bond mechanism was first mooted to pre-finance preventative social programmes. I
hereafter describe both platforms.
Mobilising Private Equity to Fund Prevention
Senior leaders from the voluntary and finance sectors were invited by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, to establish the SITF in 2000. The SITF was a
partnership between the UKSocial Investment Forum, the NewEconomics Foundation
and the Development Trusts Association, aiming ‘[t]o set out how entrepreneurial
practices can be applied to obtain higher social and financial returns from social
33Commissioning/outsourcing has been of central importance to the emergence of SIBs ‘as part of a
new wave of welfare reforms that have been largely driven by the deficit crises’ (Nicholls & Tomkinson,
2015, p. 341).
34A detailed exegesis of those initiatives is provided by Spear, Paton, and Nicholls (2015), Kendall
(2009), and Golka (2019) and would go beyond the scope of the thesis and this chapter (cf. Affleck &
Mellor, 2006; Nicholls & Teasdale, 2017).
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investment’ (SITF, 2000, p. 3). It was chaired by Sir Ronald Cohen, who ‘is often
referred to as the “father of European private equity”’ (Credit Suisse and the Schwab
Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, 2012, p. 42) and who played a central role in
the creation and dissemination of impact bonds ten years later. Former consultant
at McKinsey and co-founder of Apax Partners—one of the first UK venture capital
firms—Cohen had a longer history of promoting social investment. An economist
article describes his efforts as follows (The Economist, 2005, p. 58):
Having arrived in Britain as a refugee, he believes that those who succeed
in the capitalist system have a duty to give back to those at the bottom, and,
indeed, that capitalism may not survive if they don’t—a philanthropic
creed common in America, but still rare in Britain. He has given over
£500,000 ($900,000) of his estimated £70m fortune to Britain’s Labour
Party, skilfully managing to be close both to primeminister Tony Blair and
his probable successor, Gordon Brown, the chancellor of the exchequer.
As Golka (2019) notes, Cohen’s involvement was pathbreaking: ‘[w]hile previously,
the financialization as welfare frame was dominated by discourse on lending as
well as community lenders, now the policy discourse increasingly shifted to equity
financial products’ (p. 145). The SITF recommended various reforms to unlock
entrepreneurial approaches to addressing social challenges. The group initially sought
to lobby the New Labour government to promote investments into communities
through the Community Investment Tax Relief Act, but its focus shifted over time
from direct funds towards so-called ‘social enterprises’—private-sector entities
that‘apply business models and thinking to achieving social and environmental aims’
(Nicholls, 2010, p. 82). Golka (2019) notes that funds focused on ‘capacity building’
for social enterprises to bid for larger service delivery contracts, but also ‘aimed
specifically at increasing social ventures’ “investment readiness”’ (p. 93). Moreover,
in 2008, legislation emerged to found a social investment wholesale institution,
capitalised by funds from dormant bank accounts, to grow the social investment
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market (which would later become Big Society Capital) (Nicholls & Teasdale, 2017,
p. 14).
The group’s recommendation were taken up by the UK government. The decade
before 2010 saw the establishment of various organisations that would later play a
central role in the promotion and implementation of impact bonds. Cohen also played
an important role in establishing those entities. He co-founded Bridges Ventures
in 2002 with £20m of private capital as well as a matching contribution from the
government, and he also acted as its chairman. It was the first fund focused on
community investment , arranging investments in small businesses in ‘under-invested
areas’; in 2014 the fund was renamed Bridges Fund Management (The Economist,
2005, p. 58; Cohen, 2016a). Cohen also co-founded Social Finance Ltd in 2007,
and acted as its director until 2012. Social Finance is a not-for-profit intermediary
organisation that partners with the government, investors and social organisations ,
‘with the aim of developing a social investment market in the UK’ (Cohen, 2016b,
para. 2; cf. UK National Advisory Board to the Social Impact Investment Taskforce,
2014).35 Moreover, the decade before 2010 saw the establishment of organisations
such as Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) Venturesome, one of the first UK social
investment funds, and Big Issue Invest, a social merchant bank, which would also
play a role in the emergence of impact bonds in the UK.
The second programme that played a key role in the emergence of impact bonds was
the CoSA, founded by Gordon Brown in 2007 after he had become prime minister.
The CoSA was an independent advisory group with a two-year mandate, geared
towards generating initiatives to catalyse social action. Two CoSA members also
35Ronald Cohen invested £1.5 million to found and establish Social Finance.
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sat on Social Finance UK’s board of directors.36 The CoSA reportedly approached
Social Finance UK in 2008, ‘interested in whether preventative activity could be
funded from savings made in acute spending as a result of successful preventative
work’ (Bolton & Savell, 2010, p. 2). Social Finance, in turn, built upon a concept
developed by Arthur Wood, a former investment banker and the social investment
specialist at the social entrepreneur network Ashoka who had developed the idea of
the ‘contingent revenue bond’ for financing sanitation projects in developing countries
(Kasper & Marcoux, 2015, p. 59; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015, pp.342–343). In this
model, funders are split into two groups: (i) private for-profit investors providing the
capital financing for work on the ground, and (ii) charitable foundations that would
pay for the results whenmeasured. Thismodel, however, had never been put in practice.
The Young Foundation—an NGO and non-profit think tank from London—then
introduced the term ‘social impact bond’ for the first time in a short paper in 2008,
also building from Wood’s idea. This articulation did not yet encompass private
investment for social benefit, but was applied to a broader range of financial vehicles
that align incentives between different government departments (Bolton & Savell,
2010; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). Building from Wood’s proposal, Social Finance
worked with Geoff Mulgan, Chief Executive of the Young Foundation, and other
actors such as a derivatives lawyer, Graham Allen (MP for Nottingham at the time),
and the CoSA to develop the impact bond model (Bolton & Savell, 2010, p. 2).
The proposition made by the group, however, was not only inspired by Wood’s
model. Prior to the CoSA’s work, the UK government had already started to explore
commissioning based on outcomes, also known as ‘payment-by-results’ (PbR). Such
contracts allow government agencies to outsource the provision of a service to
36It consisted of 15 members, including representatives from Community Links (an east London
charity), the Joseph Rowntree and Young Foundations, organisations promoting social and criminal
justice solutions and volunteering, various social investment and communications advisers, management
consultants from Accenture, lawyers Allen and Overy, Royal Mail, and a fair-trade chocolate company
(Whitfield, 2015).
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private-sector contenders—and only pay once a defined set of outcomes is delivered.
Initial experiments with PbR were already run from 2003–2004 in the the National
Health Service (NHS) Clinical Commissioning processes and, at a later point in time,
in the new ‘Work Programme’ by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). In
this scheme, the government pays a prime contractor (or consortium) on a staggered
basis, reflecting achieved outcomes. The contractor sub-contracts and incentivises a
range of providers to then deliver the services accordingly (Boyle, 2007; Carter &
Whitworth, 2015). However, a concern regarding the PbR scheme was that (especially
small) providers might be unable to bear the upfront costs of service provision—a
problem that was addressed with the development of impact bond model (Disley,
Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes, & Culley, 2011; Griffiths & Meinicke, 2014; Leventhal,
2012).
As the project proceeded, Social Finance UK explored various areas of social need
where the costs were high and where there was a possibility to make a ‘significant
difference’ with a preventive intervention—to then compensate investors who
pre-financed it through the savings made. Criminal justice appeared to be an obvious
choice, as 60% of the 40,200 adults on short-term sentences in the United Kingdom
re-offend within a year after their release (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015, p. 342).
By late 2008, Social Finance started to work closely with the Ministry of Justice
(MoJ) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM Treasury) to build an SIB pilot project.37 As
part of this process, Social Finance UK also engaged with a wide range of groups
such as prison staff, local stakeholders, potential investors (such as foundations
and trusts), voluntary organisations working in the field, and other criminal justice
37Many of the analysed discourse fragments (Clifford & Jung, 2016; Cooper et al., 2016; Lunes,
Frissen, Vermeer, & Revenboer, 2013; Ogman, 2016; Whitfield, 2015) claim that the SIB model
originated with the New Zealand economist Ronnie Horesh (1988, 2000) who introduced the so-called
‘social policy bonds’ in 1988. In this model, the government auctions a non-interest bearing bond on
the financial markets, promising to redeem it at a fixed price whenever a specified social objective
is achieved. This bond would be freely tradable after issue. Obviously, this concept is structurally
different and apparently, neither the Young Foundation nor Social Finance UK, who coined the term
twenty years later, drew upon Horesh’s concept. Yet, Horesh (2016) himself claims that they were
derived from his social policy bond idea.
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experts (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). In 2009, the UK parliament reinforced the
establishment of the SIB pilot. On the one hand, the Justice Committee advocated the
development of a pilot SIB within the criminal justice system (Justice Committee,
2009); on the other hand, the New Labour government stated in a white paper that
it would ‘pilot Social Impact Bonds as a new way of funding the third sector to
provide services’ (HM Government, 2009, p. 32). In March 2010, two months prior
to the May general election, Jack Straw, Justice Secretary at the time, announced
the Peterborough SIB. Gordon Brown describes the project in an article as follows
(G. Brown, 2017): ‘[d]uring the last Labour government, I worked with one of
Britain’s greatest entrepreneurs and philanthropists, Sir Ronald Cohen, to create what
became the world’s first Social Impact Bond’ (para. 3). However, the SIB initiative
was also one of the last government decisions Brown signed off on.
Three months after Jack Straw’s announcement—during the general election—the
Conservative party included impact bonds within their manifesto platform Big
Society, Not Big Government, seeking to contrast with New Labour’s Third Way or, as
David Cameron expressed it, ‘[o]ur alternative to big government is the big society’
(Cameron, 2009, para. 96). Rather than supporting the social sector with new public
money, the aim was to channel financial investments into social enterprises. This call
was later seconded by the Coalition (2010–2015) government, which committed to
completing and extending the previous government’s key social-investment policies,
including the impact bond programme, the Social Enterprise Investment Fund at
the Department of Health, and the Social Investment Wholesale Bank, which was
renamed to ‘Big Society Capital’ (Cabinet Office, 2012; Nicholls & Teasdale, 2017).
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, legislation, electoral constituencies and
organised interests increasingly rendered certain budgetary positions (e.g. pension
expenditure) more inert than ‘soft’ ones such as new job creation programmes
(Breunig & Busemeyer, 2012; Mertens, 2017). The impact bond seemed to be
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strategic response to the post-crisis budgetary limits set to the expansion of social
investment as part of the welfare state (cf. Mertens, 2017) which resonated with
different political players (Hills, 2011; Leggett, 2014). As one of my interviewees,
who has evaluated various impact bonds, emphasised, ‘it’s a good example of policy
mobility’.38
4.2 A Much-Heralded but Unstable Paradigm
The Peterborough Case
September 2010 saw the launch of the Peterborough SIB. It was arranged for the
UK Ministry of Justice by Social Finance UK, designed to reduce reoffending by
short-sentenced prisoners released from HMP Peterborough, a prison with a history of
recidivism (Shiller, 2013, p. 23). The services were delivered by multiple nonprofits,
including the YMCA, St. Giles Trust, and Ormiston Trust, under the guidance of
the ‘One Service’ nonprofit organisation. Social Finance UK had managed to raise
£5m from 17 social investors, mostly foundations and charitable trusts, among them
the Rockefeller Foundation. Toby Eccles—development director at Social Finance
UK—positioned the launch of the Peterborough project as follows (cited in Nicholls
& Tomkinson, 2015, p. 344):
I’m confident that this first bond will be a success, offering excellent
returns on investment. That will give other investors the confidence
to invest in future bonds. SIBs could finance activities like enhanced
support for foster carers, home care services for older people and nursing
in the home for the chronically sick.
The SIB provided services to three populations (cohorts), each of 1,000 short-
sentenced prisoners, both inside the Peterborough prison and after their release
38Author’s personal interview with Nick Henry (Professor of Economic Geography and SIB
Evaluator), 27 September 2017.
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to resettle into the community. The recidivism measure used was the number of
certain re-conviction events incurred within 18 months of release (for crimes: within
one year of release) versus a comparable control group. The SIB had to reduce
re-offending by at least 10% for each cohort or by 7.5% overall for the investors to
receive a minimum repayment of 2.5 % (along with the principal sum) from the MoJ
and the Big Lottery Fund. The greater the drop in reoffending beyond this threshold,
the more the investors would receive, with a return capped at 13% internal rate of
return (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015; Schinckus, 2015).
An external evaluation of the first cohort found a reduction in re-offending by
8.39%–which means that no payments were triggered for the first cohort (Albertson
& Fox, 2018, p. 46). The results for the second cohort amounted to a reduction
of 9.7%, again too low to trigger a payment. The SIB was originally intended
to operate until 2017 but was curtailed after the two cohorts, because the MoJ
privatised the probation service through the Transforming Rehabilitation programme,
which led to the ‘disappearance’ of both the third cohort and the control group
(Deering & Feilzer, 2015; Ministry of Justice, 2015; Nicholls & Tomkinson,
2015). However, since the reduction across the two cohorts was 9% (i.e. above
7.5%), investors could eventually recoup the principal sum invested plus a return
of just over 3% per annum for the period of investment (Albertson & Fox, 2018, p. 46).
According to some commentators, the impact bond’s early termination proves its
success (since it was ‘mainstreamed’ even before it ended). Yet for others, it meant
that the programme’s effects were just unknown due to the early completion (Eccles,
2018). ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ the successor programme shared very few
features with the Peterborough SIB (Government Outcomes Lab, 2019c). Irrespective
of its degree of success, the pilot projects crated a ‘fait accompli’ and according
to Rockefeller’s Judith Rodin led the mechanism to rapidly garner ‘support as an
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innovative approach to financing valuable social programs’ (Hughes & Scherer, 2014,
p. 4). In a similar vein, albeit with a different argument, Ogman (2018, p. 167) notes:
The Peterborough SIB’s early phase out did not signal a change of policy
trajectory away from SIBs, but rather its geographical shift and entry
into other policy areas, including health, employment, homelessness,
education and other areas.
In the wake of the Peterborough SIB, the actors of the impact bond ecosystem started
to produce a plethora of conferences, industry-based reports, webinars, and YouTube
videos. So, even before a second impact bond had seen the light of the day, there was
an intense period of constructing certain notions and paradigms of the impact bond.
The early, implementation-oriented impact bond ‘cookbooks’ essentially emulated
the structure of the Peterborough pilot and provided guidance for implementing such
schemes. In what follows, I discuss what a SIB or DIB is (supposed to be) according
to these ‘cookbooks’ and the reasons they provide to create one. Moreover, I take
some steps towards showing the intermediary organisations, government subsidies
and research institutions that emerged in the wake of the Peterborough SIB to attract
investment and grow the impact bond market.
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What Is an Impact Bond?
In an impact bond, a public institution, a social service provider organisation, and
private investors enter into a contract about the provision of individualised support
for a vulnerable and marginalised target group.39 Private investors supply the upfront
capital to pay for the project (in part or in full), and also periodically consult with the
other stakeholders about the status of the project as well as possible measures for
improvement. A central characteristic of impact bonds is the idea of ‘outcome-based
payment’—also referred to as PbR mechanism—according to which payments for
the provision of social programmes are conditional upon the achieved social outcomes.
Traditionally, social service delivery was traditionally paid on the costs incurred
or the number of people served, for example. The basis for the judgement
of success in that sense is the measurement (and reporting) of changes in the
lives of service users—changes in their wellbeing, knowledge, behaviour, and
circumstances (Callanan, Law, & Mendonca, 2012, p. 12). The financial risk
that thus emerges (i.e. if payments do not materialise due to a lack of positive
outcomes) is placed on investors, shifted away from both public institutions and
service provider organisations. In return, investors are offered the possibility of
earning a financial return if the intervention succeeds at achieving specified social
outcomes. However, if an intervention fails to demonstrate success, the investors
will have to bear the costs; that is, they will lose some or all of the principal
sum and make no (or little) profit (cf. Griffiths & Meinicke, 2014, p. 6). Thus,
such contracts do technically not qualify as ‘bonds’ because the return on the
capital invested is not guaranteed. If they were actual bonds, investors would be
guaranteed a return on their initial investment back at the end of the defined period,
with a fixed interest rate. Instead, the impact bond should be seen as ‘a hybrid
39For instance, such support can be geared towards ex- offenders, homeless persons, chronically ill
people, marginalised indigenous people, or youths deemed at risk from early deprivation, poverty, and
abuse (Dear et al., 2016, pp. 80–88.).
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instrument with some characteristics of a bond (e.g. an upper limit on returns) but
also characteristics of equity with a return related to performance’ (Bolton, 2010, p. 1).
Figure 4.1 depicts the model that can be found in various early implementation-
oriented impact bond ‘cookbooks’ (Apolitical, 2019), and which essentially emulates
the Peterborough SIB model.40
Figure 4.1: Schematic Representation of the Impact Bond Contract Structure
(Author’s own diagram).
The model shown in figure 4.1 always includes a dedicated special purpose vehicle
(SPV)—a subsidiary company with an independent legal status and asset/liability
structure—to arrange the contracts and channel the monetary investments. The
outcomes-based contract is then concluded between a public commissioning body
(i.e. a local authority or a CCG) and the SPV. Voluntary, community and independent
sector organisations are commissioned to deliver the programme for a specific target
group of service users, backed by private investments. While some mainstream actors
like Goldman Sachs explored impact bonds, investors are for the most part charitable
foundations and social trusts that experiment with the model to ‘recycle’ capital
40For instance, this is the kind of model shown in Barclay and Symons (2013, p. 3), Tan et al. (2015,
p. 30), Ronicle, Stanworth, Hickman, and Fox (2014, p. ii) or Mason et al. (2017b, p. 5); see also
Nicholls and Tomkinson (2015, pp. 339-340).
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that they can then reinvest in other social initiatives (Tan, Fraser, & Mays, 2018).
Beyond this schematic representation of contract structures, the mechanism also
often includes one further party: an independent evaluator organisation. To avoid
conflicts of interest, external companies are contracted to determine the attainment of
social outcomes, which is pivotal for the disbursement of payments. Both the choice
of evaluator and evaluation methodology are critical design features of every SIB.
Evaluators charge fees for their audit services and are paid directly by the outcomes
funders independent of the results, as this helps ensure an unbiased assessment.
As Williams (2019) emphasises, ‘in the wake of Peterborough, and the search
for simpler, cheaper, and more standardized models, a number of variations have
emerged featuring different commissioning and contracting structures’ (p. 10). As
the web of stakeholders and contracts may overwhelm stakeholders, later reports
often present a more stripped-down model which is shown in figure 4.2.41
Figure 4.2: Simplified Impact Bond Contract Structure (Bridges Ventures,
2014, p. 5).
41Compare, for instance, Bridges Ventures and The Parthenon Group (2010); Department for Culture
Media & Sport (2016) or Dear et al. (2016).
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As Arena et al. (2016) have shown, there is a variety of contract and payment
structures as well as intervention models. Although all these programmes have been
built from a source paradigm—the first SIB at Peterborough prison (cf. 4.2)—impact
bonds, not only the early ones, have given rise to very different project structures,
actors, and modes of action (Arena et al., 2016, p. 8) and there is ‘a lack of consensus
around their essential ingredients’ (Williams, 2019, p. 12; EVPA, 2015). Over time,
the impact bond economy has become a rather ‘broad church’ and there is not only
disagreements regarding their features but also regarding their definite advantages
(Fraser et al., 2018; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, pp. 47–51). The editors of a
recent special issue in the Journal of Economic Policy Reform emphasise that impact
bonds ‘demonstrate a high degree of “strategic ambiguity” so that they can be framed
in different ways for different audiences’ (Tan et al., 2019; see also Eisenberg, 1984;
Smith, 2017). Hereafter, I nevertheless summarise four advantages that are frequently
mentioned.
First, the prioritisation of measurable outcomes (rather than prescribed processes)
is said to allow third-sector providers the flexibility to work in non- prescribed,
innovative ways that would otherwise not be eligible for direct public funding, which
tends to be risk-averse (Hunter & McNeil, 2015, p. 23). Thus, SIBs are framed as a
possibility to try out new (unorthodox) approaches where the risk is borne by private
investors.
Second, it is claimed that such innovative approaches may lead to better results,
especially because investors and intermediaries support and challenge service providers
to deliver better outcomes for the people in need. Impact bonds are said to facilitate
collaboration across different organisations, departments, and budgetary silos. Thus,
they are said to allow for bridging the lack of incentives that state agencies often have
to work together. The resulting modus operandi is typically defined in opposition
to public sector bureaucracy because impact bond structures are said to be more
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result-oriented, ‘bring in private sector rigor’ (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 2)
and increase the transparency in social service provision. These points echo the
political impetus articulated in Section 4.1. As McHugh et al. (2013, p. 251) note:
While the stated intentions of benefiting the third sector and continuing
to provide essential social services may be genuine, they are expressed
in the language of markets and private sector business. A programme
of austerity and retrenchment lends legitimacy to the argument for
more innovation, and the discourse of markets and business has been
championed in these circumstances.42
Third, impact bonds are said to help actors understand how and to what extent
interventions are effective and, therefore, which types of interventions public
institutions should provide (and scale up). For that reason, impact bonds are also
believed to improve accountability for the use of taxpayers’ money. Beyond improving
outcomes for people in need, impact bonds also re-image the non-profit sector as
based on notions of ‘evidence-based policy’ and ‘value for money’. This is especially
important in the light of the debt crisis. As Leventhal (2012) puts it, SIBs ‘allow
governments to support prevention without the fear that they will pay the cost and not
reap the reward’ (p. 525).
Fourth, the mechanism is portrayed as a tool that can potentially produce ‘cashable
savings’ for governments in the future both by coming up with cost-effective delivery
models and by reducing overall welfare costs in the long run through prevention
and early intervention. In the early papers published between 2008 and 2012, the
focus on early intervention as a means to produce public savings in the future was
very pronounced (cf. Bolton & Savell, 2010; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo’sher,
2011). This resonates with concepts outlined in the book The Third Way: The
Renewal of Social Democracy by Anthony Giddens (2013) suggesting to replace
42See also Seelos and Mair (2012).
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the social security (or ‘passive benefits’) systems inherited from the 1960s with a
‘social investment state’. According to this approach, social investments today will
stimulate labour market participation in the long run, thus leading to more productive
and socially included future taxpayers (Jenson, 2010). Investments in social equity
will generate public and private dividends in the future—and hence reduce overall
welfare costs. Figure 4.3 depicts the paradigmatic ‘value-for-money case’ (Barclay &
Symons, 2013, p. 18), which can be found in numerous industry-based reports on
SIBs. By way of illustration, a Princeton University report explicitly states that ‘[t]he
biggest motivator for governments to implement SIBs is the potential for cost-savings’
(Barajas et al., 2014, p. 4).43
Figure 4.3: Summary of SIBs’ Value-for-Money Calculation
(Barclay & Symons, 2013, p. 18.)
Beyond the (rather broad) principles of early interventions, pay-for-success, and
cashable savings, the actual definition of an impact bond is not fixed and the structures
and ways in which projects are implemented ‘on the ground’ can vary considerably
43Or, as Lake (2015) notes, ‘[t]he announcement of H.R. 4885, the Social Impact Bond Act,
introduced in Congress in June 2014, references “saving government money” and “saving taxpayer
dollars” at least thirteen times in a one-page press release’ (p. 12).
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(Arena et al., 2016; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 27; Williams, 2019). Having
elucidated the different models that emerged in the wake of the first impact bond pilot,
I now turn to the supporting infrastructure that was put in place to encourage and
support local governments and investors to come together and implement follow-up
projects to the Peterborough SIB.
The Infrastructure for the Dissemination of Impact Bonds
The early days saw the formation of what was later dubbed the ‘social finance
infrastructure’ (Schwartz et al., 2015, p. 488) and the ‘SIB ecosystem’ (Kasper &
Marcoux, 2015, p. 62). After the launch of the Peterborough SIB, there first was a
two-year period with no new impact bond-funded programmes (Gustafsson-Wright et
al., 2015, p. 13). During these two years, the UK government along with bodies
like Social Finance, the Young Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation in the
US tried to facilitate practice-targeted communication and policy research. Kasper
and Marcoux (2015) have summarised these efforts in context of the Rockefeller
Foundation’s actions: ‘[i]nstead of growing an individual “plant,” the foundation
decided to invest in building a “greenhouse” that can help many plants thrive’ (p. 61).
The UK government created the Centre for Social Impact Bonds within the Cabinet
Office, which provides technical guidance on the development of impact bonds
(Albertson & Fox, 2018, p. 59). The Cabinet Office also established and allocated
more than £20 million of funding to the Social Outcomes Fund in 2012 which makes
so-called ‘top-up contributions’, available to public sector commissioning bodies that
implement impact bonds (Albertson & Fox, 2018, p. 58; Cabinet Office, 2014, p. 7;
Roy, McHugh, & Sinclair, 2018). Moreover, grants from the Big Lottery Fund funded
Commissioning Better Outcomes, a £40 million fund with the mission of supporting
more SIB development in England that also ‘provided direct operational funding and
development grants for advisory firms such as Social Finance’ (Williams, 2018, p. 6;
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Ronicle, Fox, & Stanworth, 2016).44 Other initiatives include the Youth Engagement
Fund (£16 million), DWP Innovation Fund (£30 million), and the Fair Chances
Fund (£15 million) (Albertson & Fox, 2018, p. 58; Edmiston &Nicholls, 2018, p. 62).
A further key aspect in the UK context is the launch of Big Society Capital in 2012.
The government used £600 million from dormant bank and building society accounts
in the UK—along with further contributions from high street banks—to found a
social investment wholesale institution with a particular emphasis on impact bonds
(Manville & Greatbanks, 2016; Teasdale, Alcock, & Smith, 2012). Thus, beyond
direct subsidies, support consisted of development grants to conceptualise and create
the impact bonds and outcome ‘top-ups’ to render investments profitable (Floyd,
2017, p. 21). In short, many public funds were put into the balance to encourage both
commissioners and private investors to embark on this ‘adventure’.
Such efforts to grow, or rather create, the impact bond market were not confined to
the UK. In the US, the Rockefeller Foundation and other actors made a series of
investments ‘to build an ecosystem of innovation that could help a wide range of SIB
experiments to spread more broadly’ (Kasper & Marcoux, 2015, p. 61). It supported
the establishment of the Kennedy School’s Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance
Lab (SIB Lab), geared towards assisting governments interested in SIBs. The SIB
Lab sought to boost demand among governments by running a national competition
for SIB projects, promising free technical assistance to the winners; 10 out of 28
projects were thus served (Kasper & Marcoux, 2015).45
President Obama also set up the Social Innovation Fund in 2010 within the
Corporation for National and Community Service, a federal agency. It initially made
44In 2016, it also facilitated the creation of the Life Chances Fund, an £80 million top-up fund,
which pays up to 20% of outcome payments in impact bonds (Albertson & Fox, 2018, p. 58).
45Financial support for this competition and the resulting mandates was provided by the Rockefeller
Foundation and the Dunham Fund (an Illinois-based foundation).
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grants of $1 million to $10 million to ‘ecosystem builders’ (Gustafsson-Wright et al.,
2015, p. 140), and shifted its focus in 2016 to develop specific impact bond projects
(Lester, 2015; Floyd, 2017).
While critical analyses often jump at the handful of transactions where commercial
investors such as Goldman Sachs were involved (e.g. Dowling, 2017; Lake, 2015;
Ogman, 2018), ‘most up-front SIB finance does not come from business investors’ (Tan
et al., 2018, para. 11). Rather than an involvement of conventional financial actors,
impact bond investors are mostly charitable foundations and social trusts that have
started to invest part of a foundation endowment or philanthropic assets to produce
social impact and financial returns. As such, impact bonds are said to be a case of
‘philanthrocapitalism’ (Bishop & Green, 2015). A 2006 article first coined this term
(The Economist, 2006), and it was followed by the book Philanthrocapitalism: How
the Rich Can Save theWorld andwhyWe Should Let Them byBishop andGreen (2008).
There is an ongoing debate about the exact definition of philanthrocapitalism
and its goals (McGoey, 2014; McGoey, 2016), but it typically revolves around
bringing rational methods of business to the operation of philanthropy—for example,
using key performance indicators and portfolio strategies to manage risks across
various initiatives or offering advice, coaching, and capacity-building services
to investees (Anheier & Leat, 2006; Guilhot, 2007).46 Impact bonds expand this
understanding of foregrounding ‘hard-nosed’ strategy, such as performance metrics,
by foregrounding ‘techniques and concepts of investment banking and capital markets
(. . . ) to solving some of themost pressing social challenges’ (M.Martin, 2014, p. 607).
46The idea of ‘venture philanthropy’ is not new at all, it dates back to the late 1960s when John
D. Rockefeller III and Andrew Carnegie came up with a concept ‘to apply the rational methods of
business to the administration of charitable deeds, which they considered to be outdated and deficient’
(Guilhot, 2007, p. 451). In the 1990s, it was re-discovered by Letts, Ryan, and Grossman (1997) and
Porter and Kramer (1999) (McGoey, 2014).
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In 2013, Bridges Ventures (which was later renamed Bridges Fund Management
Ltd.) set up the ‘Social Impact Bond fund’—the first one of its kind with Big
Society Capital as a cornerstone investor, committing £10m, alongside, inter alia,
Deutsche Bank, Great Manchester Pension Fund, Omidyar Network, or Merseyside
Pension Fund. The overall fund size amounted to £22.5m (Big Society Capital,
2016; Bridges Ventures, 2016). Thus, a diverse array of actors is observed, including
mainstream finance (Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank), social investment funds, trusts
and foundations, and high-net-worth individuals—a broad spectrum of investors (cf.
Williams, 2019, p. 167).
Social Finance and other newly established ‘social finance intermediary organisations’
play an important role in this setup, as they facilitate the creation of impact bonds
by bringing actors together and advising on how projects should be structured.
Organisations such as Social Finance, Instiglio or Numbers for Good are allegedly
‘often the “glue” that holds investors, government officials, nonprofit service
providers, and evaluators together’ (Kasper & Marcoux, 2015, p. 63; Schwartz et al.,
2015). Their employees typically have a background in finance (e.g. accounting,
private equity etc.), have ‘emigrated to the “social sector”’ (Williams, 2018, p. 2),
and are of course knowledgeable about equity and venture capital investment. After
Ronald Cohen had established Social Finance UK in 2007, he subsequently also
co-founded and acted as a Director of Social Finance US in 2011 as well as Social
Finance Israel in 2013.
Another type of ‘impact bond specialists’ are the organisations that provide specialised
evaluation services and expertise, so-called ‘external evaluators’. They determine the
attainment of social outcomes (which is pivotal for the disbursement of payments).
This group includes organisations such as RAND Europe47, Ecorys (an economic
47Knafo, Dutta, Lane, and Wyn-Jones (cf. 2019) on the pivotal role of the RAND Corporation in the
formation of managerial governance.
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research and consulting company founded in 1929), or the PIRU (Government
Outcomes Lab, 2019a).
As I have already outlined, these were all involved in producing a plethora of
conferences, industry-based reports, webinars, and YouTube videos etc. (e.g.
Barclay & Symons, 2013; Bridges Ventures, 2014; Bridges Ventures and The
Parthenon Group, 2010; Department for Culture Media & Sport, 2016; EVPA, 2015;
J. B. Liebman, 2011; McKinsey & Company, 2012). Even before a second impact
bond had seen the light of the day, there was an intense period of constructing certain
notions and paradigms of the impact bond through the production of conferences,
presentation, and reports.
Especially the early implementation-oriented impact bond ‘cookbooks’ essentially
emulated the structure of the Peterborough pilot and provided guidance for
implementing such a scheme. In 2012, Social Finance UK and the Center for
Global Development (a U.S. nonprofit think tank based in Washington, D.C.)
convened the so-called Development Impact Bond Working Group to make the
impact bond model specific to low- and middle-income countries (Center for Global
Development & Social Finance, 2013b, p. 3). The group included members from
Citigroup, US Agency for International Development (USAID), World Bank, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, to name a few
(Alenda-Demoutiez, 2019). It published a consultation draft in June 2013 (Center
for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013a), followed by a final report in
October 2013 (Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013b). In its
proposed model, aid agencies and/or philanthropic foundations act as outcome payers
instead of of local authorities and similar commissioning bodies. The final report
of the group contains six cases (or rather feasibility studies) for potential DIBs, for
instance geared towards reducing instances of Rhodesian sleeping sickness in Uganda,
preventing HIV and tuberculosis in Swaziland through anti-retroviral treatment or
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energy efficiency in the household, commercial and industrial sectors in developing
countries (Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013b, pp. 38–71).
The report not only proposes a funding mechanism and respective impact metrics,
but also lists potential outcome funders—for example, the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID)—and outlines a ‘multilateral option’ in which
different official donors and private foundations would make resources available (in
the form of a multi-donor DIBs outcomes fund) to pay for the results of successful
DIBs (Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013b, pp. 6; 9). Moreover,
the report outlines ‘investor propositions’; in other words, the overall proposal to
investors, including the total capital required, the target return and the modes of how
and when the principal and return will be paid out (Center for Global Development
& Social Finance, 2013b, p. 112). No DIB had been launched at the time, and the
implementation of the novel funding mechanism in a development context was ‘just a
gleam in the eye of a few creative thinkers’ as Rosenberg (2013, para. 7) put it.
By highlighting these different developments, I seek to emphasise the considerable
effort that governments, foundations, and financial actors made to create an impact
bond market: quasi-governmental subsidies for outcome payments, technical
assistance, conferences, and networking events, for example. Before I expand
on how this impact-bond infrastructure played out in relation to the three specific
case studies the thesis investigates (Section 4.4), I first take some steps towards
explaining ‘impact investing’. This term emerged in 2007, i.e. around the time the
CoSA and Social Finance developed the social impact bond model, and can be seen
as an important meta-discourse that surrounds the emergence of impact bonds.
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4.3 The ‘Invisible Heart’ of Markets?
Development impact bonds and SIBs are commonly portrayed as a nascent part
of the wider set of ideas and practices that make up ‘social impact investing’—or
impact investing for short—an umbrella term that was coined around 2007–2008
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 4; Jackson, 2013a). During the same period,
Social Finance UK and the Young Foundation developed the SIB model for the CoSA
(cf. Section 4.1). In this section, I illuminate how the impact investing discourse
emerged and annexed the impact bonds model.
Impact investing means investments that predominantly come in the form of debt or
private equity (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015, p. 461) and aim to achieve the dual
objective of deliberately producing positive social and/or environmental outcomes
while earning financial returns on capital (Spiess-Knafl & Scheck, 2017). This
goal is generally referred to as ‘blended value’ (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011,
p. 5), or ‘shared value’ (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 66), and is said to be the central
characteristic of impact investing. According to Höchstädter and Scheck (2015,
p. 451), who analysed a large number of academic and practitioner literature to
contribute to a better understanding of the concept, the terms ‘social finance’ and
‘social investment’ also comprise grants, whereas ‘impact investing’ is specifically
geared towards creating monetary returns (while creating positive social outcomes).48
The Rockefeller Foundation—whose role in the promotion of impact bonds I
described in the previous section—is often said to have been the ‘organizing
instrument’ (Jackson, 2013b, p. 97) of the emerging field.49 In 2007, they organised
a meeting at its Bellagio Center in Italy with the aim of exploring ‘with leaders in
48According to Hebb (2013), impact investing goes by many names, including ‘double and triple
bottom line, mission-related investing, program-related investment, blended-value, economically
targeted investing and social finance’ (p. 71).
49The charitable foundation is one of the largest ones in the world with an endowment of more than
$4 billion and a history of efforts that go beyond just allocating funds.
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finance, philanthropy and development the need for, and ways and means of, building
a worldwide industry for investing for social and environmental impact’ (Harji &
Jackson, 2012, p. 1). According to the official founding myth, this convening coined
the term ‘impact investing’ and marked the birth of a new asset class (Burand, 2015;
Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). Since then, impact investing has been said to be an
emerging industry, a novel financial market that groups together various forms of
investments into social enterprises, impact bonds and microfinance (Harji & Jackson,
2012; Nicholls, 2011, p. 121).
However, as Bank (2012) notes, ‘[i]t was not quite a present-at-the-creation
moment’ (para. 2), as the concept of using financial investments to generate social
outcomes was not new at all (cf. Buttle, 2007; Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015, p.
450). Numerous organisations, mainly charitable foundations in the USA, had
already been investing in for-profit vehicles to facilitate social purposes before
2007 (Saltuk, Bouri, Mudaliar, & Pease, 2013a). The same goes for practices
of microfinance (Hummels & Leede, 2014, p. 100), community development
finance in the US (Benjamin, Rubin, & Zielenbach, 2004), development finance
institutions such as World Bank’s International Finance Corporation or the
Commonwealth Development Corporation in the UK (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud,
Saltuk, Bugg-Levine,&Brandenburg, 2010), or practices such as SRI (cf. Section 2.1).
Overall, I would argue, what was really new about impact investing in 2007 was
the framing: ‘disparate and uncoordinated innovation in a range of sectors and
regions’ (Freireich & Fulton, 2009, p. 11) were given a new meaning by assembling
them into ‘a new global industry’ (Freireich & Fulton, 2009, p. 11). Commentators
additionally evoked the sense that a ‘new breed’ (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011, p.
92) of investors had emerged.50 These investors have been said to seek blended value
50In this context it has repeatedly been suggested that Millennials, i.e. people born between 1978
and 2000, are especially ‘keen on impact investing’ (P. Maurer, 2012, para. 1; cf. Fort & Loman,
2016).
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creation and thus capital allocate capital in ‘businesses and funds that can provide
developmental solutions to social and environmental problems at a scale beyond
either conventional SRI or traditional philanthropic interventions’ (Nicholls, 2010, p.
81; cf. Karamchandani, Kubzansky, & Frandano, 2009; Salamon, 2014, p. 81).51
The practice of impact investing is often said to offer a possible ‘return to the “social”
or solidary commitments of finance’ (B. Maurer, 2012, p. 418); ); in other words,
finance for ‘the people’, for the many, not the few, emphasised in recent book titles
such as Investing with Impact: Why Finance Is a Force for Good (Balkin, 2015),
The Power of Impact Investing: Putting Markets to Work for Profit and Global
Good (Rodin & Brandenburg, 2014), or Real Impact: The New Economics of Social
Change (Simon, 2017). Impact investing is presented as a movement that challenges
an economistic, contractual worldview where social and environmental problems
only arise as a consequence of the negative external effects of private transactions.
On this view, they internalise the normative critique of unfettered global capitalism
by re-describing investment in people-centred terms.
An important new element in the framing of impact investing was a sense of urgency.
Proponents of the nascent field have repeatedly argued that harnessing impact
investments from capital markets will become key in responding to the perils of the
‘expenditure gap’ in both the public sector and philanthropy (M. Martin, 2013, p.
5; cf. Salamon, 2014, p. 80). Saltuk (2011) even named her report for J.P.Morgan
Counter(Imp)acting Austerity. Judith Rodin, former president of the Rockefeller
Foundation pointed out that there is an inherent necessity to ‘grow the market’ (cited
in Kozlowski, 2012, para. 4–5):
51It is often argued that impact investing helps create a positive social outcome whereas practices
such as SRI merely minimise negative impact (or only focus on social outcomes to maximise long-term
shareholder value) whereas impact investing practices (including impact bonds) help intentionally
create positive social outcomes (Barman, 2015, p. 16; O’Donohoe et al., 2010, p. 5; Nicholls, 2010, p.
71). However, as Höchstädter and Scheck (2015) emphasis, ‘[o]n a general level, the impact investing
and SRI definitions do not differ dramatically’ (p. 455).
100
We recognized, if you put a price tag on all the social and environmental
needs around the world, it is in the trillions. All of the philanthropy in
the world is only $490 billion. So, the needs far exceed the resources.
(. . . ) The one place where there is hundreds of trillions of dollars is in
the private capital markets. So we, and others, began to wonder are there
ways to crowd in private funding to some of these incredible needs.
Thus, the movement from the start was about moving ‘from niche to mainstream’
(Bridges Ventures and The Parthenon Group, 2010, p. 2) and ‘catalyzing an emerging
industry’ (Freireich & Fulton, 2009). To implement the industry-building plans of the
2007 Bellagio meeting, the Rockefeller Foundation’s board of trustees approved $38
million towards a five-year global grant-making programme in the following year
(Lane, 2014). The aims of that initiative were to build ‘a worldwide industry for
investing for social and environmental impact’ (Harji & Jackson, 2012, p. ix). The
programme invested in 30 core allies and launched much of the ‘ecosystem’ that now
defines the industry (Bank, 2012; Kasper & Marcoux, 2015).
An important characteristic of the emerging field is its impetus on measuring and
reporting social impact (almost like a currency). The focus on measurement helps
attract traditional investors, ‘who are accustomed to evaluating investments using
numerical outputs’ (McWade, 2012, p. 108). Impact measurement and reporting
play a crucial role in providing evidence that the projected impact is actually being
achieved. Therefore, they are said to be the sine qua non in attracting capital from
investors, and ‘[f]unds that do not meet investors’ expectations for demonstrating
impact will be sidelined’ (C. Clark et al., 2013, p. 34; cf. Saltuk, Bouri, Mudaliar,
& Pease, 2013b, p. 20; World Economic Forum, 2013, pp. 27–30). The new need
to provide evidence for achieving blended value requires metrics that go beyond
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financial value creation (Bank, 2012). In the further course of the thesis, I will show
how impact measurement is absolutely crucial to impact bonds.52
4.4 Formation of Three Pioneering Impact Bonds
This section studies the emergence of three specific cases of early impact bonds and
showcases the actors involved, highlighting the modes of reasoning and types of labour
involved in redrawing the border between the investible and non-investible. It also
discusses the everyday politics of these processes. The three case study projects—the
London Homelessness SIB, Ways to Wellness, and the Educate Girls DIB—are very
intriguing in that they were all pioneering projects, one in the realm of health, one in
the realm of homelessness, and one in the realm of international development (i.e.
education in rural India).
The London Homelessness SIB
After the launch of the Peterborough SIB the idea of using the SIB-mechanism as
‘a potential way of trialing innovation in, and bringing new finance to, provision
for rough sleepers’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 16) emerged within the Department for
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in 2011.
Homelessness had become a policy focus in London, especially in the run-up to
the 2012 Summer Olympics when Boris Johnson, mayor of London at the time,
emphasised in 2009 ‘I am determined that rough sleeping should be a thing of the
past, which is why I have committed to ending it’ (cited in Hill, 2012, para. 1). This
52Sector-wide and centralised systems are being built to standardise the frameworks through which
organisations can report social and environmental impact and so that the ‘transaction costs’ for investors
can be reduced (Jackson, 2013b, p. 610). Examples of such frameworks include the Social Return on
Investment (SROI), which focuses on an economics cost benefit calculation, the Impact Reporting
and Investment Standards (IRIS) that provide a common set of terms and definitions for the field, the
Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS), an analogue of the Morningstar or Standard and
Poor’s rating systems, and the B Impact Assessment (BIA) (Jackson, 2013b, pp. 98; Nicholls, Nicholls,
& Paton, 2015). For the topic of impact bonds, these systems are less relevant as impact bonds only
account for small proportion of the capital allocated.
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statement was in line with the New Labour government’s homelessness strategy ‘No
One Left Out’ in which Prime Minister Gordon Brown included the goal to end
unsheltered sleeping ‘once and for all’ (DCLG, 2008, p. 4). As I discussed in Section
4.2, both the New Labour (1997–2010) and the Coalition (2010–2015) government
also sought to push impact bonds as a strategic response to the budgetary limits set to
the expansion of social investment as part of the welfare state. As Nick Henry, one of
the evaluators of the London Homeless SIB, pointed out, ‘there was so much policy
push that they thought they may as well try it out’.53 Impressed by the launch of the
Peterborough project, the DCLG assigned Tim Gray, who had a background in dealing
with homelessness, housing associations, and the voluntary sector, to explore the
development potential of a homelessness impact bond in London. He remembered:54
A lot of people thought it was quite exciting, this idea of “you only pay
for the result if something is successful”. But actually translating that
into a different area is what we’d thought was not so easy.
On DCLG’s behalf, he started to contact exponents of community and voluntary
organisations. Based on statistical data, it was found that a sixth of the homeless
persons in London accounted for almost half of all recorded unsheltered sleeping
occasions. Despite a range of already existing welfare services, the outcomes for
these individuals had remained poor over the years: many of them suffered from
complex issues around drug and alcohol use as well as mental and physical illness.
So, the idea arose to improve outcomes for this group with a dedicated SIB project
(Mason, Lloyd, Andrews, & Henry, 2014, p. 8–9).
The DCLG held informal consultations with different stakeholders from the voluntary
sector, the Greater London Authority (GLA), and London boroughs to discuss SIBs,
and they started to agree with different stakeholder groups to develop the interventions
53Author’s personal interview with Nick Henry (Professor of Economic Geography and SIB
Evaluator), 27 September 2017.
54Author’s personal interview with Tim Gray (former advisor to the DCLG on homelessness), 14
September 2017.
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and the metrics they wanted to use.55 Once the DCLG had—in principle—agreed
with the different stakeholder groups on the design of the intervention design, it
commissioned Social Finance and the Young Foundation to conduct a feasibility
study for a homelessness SIB.56 Building from conversations ‘with a range of
stakeholders in homelessness and rough sleeping’ (DCLG, 2014, p. 2), as well as
other models such as Housing First (cf. Homeless Link, 2016), the feasibility study
proposed to improve outcomes for ‘inbetweeners’ with a dedicated SIB project
(Mason et al., 2014, pp. 8–9). The model stipulated that homeless individuals
were to be provided with a trusted keyworker—a ‘navigator’.57 As there were many
existing homeless services in London (operated by over 150 different providers),
the goal was not to duplicate existing services, but for navigators to slowly build up
trusting relationships with the homeless, fill in service gaps where necessary, and
offer both support and encouragement to support individuals (Mason et al., 2017b, p.
38–77). The actions were geared towards achieving specific outcome targets such as
a reducing unsheltered sleeping, supporting individuals into stable accommodation,
and endorsing individuals to progress towards better health and employment.58
Although the business case that resulted from the feasibility was ‘ unable to identify
a robust evidence base linking interventions with realistic expectations of outcome
55I provide a detailed appraisal of the metrics in Chapter 5.
56Social Finance and the Young Foundation played a central role in the development of both the
default SIB and the Peterborough SIB model (in collaboration with the CoSA, the MoJ, and HM
Treasury.
57There had been a range of fairly successful services for rough sleepers at the time such as Rough
Sleeping 205, an initiative that sought to help the capital’s most entrenched rough sleepers, or No
Second Night Out which aimed to ensure that new rough sleepers receive an immediate intervention
(Mason et al., 2017b, p. 3).
58I provide a detailed explanation of the intervention and metrics in the next section.
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improvements’ (Social Finance, 2012, p. 15; cf. Cooper et al., 2016, p. 70), the
DCLG approved the business case.59 As Tim Gray specified:60
And they liked the idea of trying it out, they thought as finance people,
“well, actually this could be a way forward in terms of getting value for
money for us in the future, we ought to be trying this sort of stuff, to be
innovative”, and so on. Even though it was difficult to be precise about
the extent of any possible cashable savings, it was saying “look, if we are
going to spend this extra money on homelessness—does this look like an
efficient way to get some outcomes for it?”
The DCLG allocated five million pounds to fund the outcomes, including setup
and administration costs. As Gray specified, the sum was not taken out of the
homelessness budget: ‘it was unallocated money at the time, it wasn’t taken out of
the homelessness budget, it was sort of unspent money, unallocated money at the
time, so it was additional money for homelessness’.61
While the DCLG acted as the ultimate outcome funder, the management and
commissioning of the project was designated to the GLA (Mason et al., 2017b, p.
13).62 A ‘competitive dialogue’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 20) process was launched,
hosted by the GLA. Following an initial tender submission, five shortlisted bidder
organisations were invited to present and further refine their proposals. Shortly after
the first dialogue meeting, a so-called ‘market information day’ (DCLG, 2014, p.
viii) was held, where provider organisations were given the opportunity to meet with
59Mason et al. (2014) point out, ‘[t]he analysis identified the costs incurred by the cohort across five
years to total £24m and the potential for substantial savings to be made through improved outcomes’
(p. 8). But no reasonable estimate could be made as to how much money could be saved through the
SIB-funded intervention.
60Author’s personal interview with Tim Gray (former advisor to the DCLG on homelessness), 14
September 2017.
61Author’s personal interview with Tim Gray (former advisor to the DCLG on homelessness), 14
September 2017.
62The GLA is also known as City Hall, which is the devolved regional governance body of London,
with jurisdiction over both counties of the City of London and Greater London.
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potential investors. At a later stage, Social Finance also assisted the GLA in engaging
with prospective investors and hosted a ‘speed dating’ event, where short-listed
service providers were introduced to potential investors and intermediaries (Mair,
2012). The (final) invitation to tender was then issued to the shortlisted providers,
with five weeks for them to prepare the final submission, building from those different
meetings. Four organisations submitted a tender, and the contracts for two different
sub-projects were awarded to the homelessness charities: St Mungo’s and Thames
Reach.
St Mungo’s, a charity that dates back to 1969, operated the Street Impact project in
the north and west sectors of London. The charity had worked with Triodos Bank
(a bank geared towards ethical practices), which acted as an intermediary. For a
fixed fee, Triodos facilitated the establishment of an SPV,63 and the contract was
then concluded between the SPV and the GLA. The investors consisted in CAF
Venturesome (one of the first social investment funds in the UK), the Orp Foundation,
and two individual investors.
The second project in the south and east sectors of London was called ‘Thames Reach
Ace’, operated by the homeless charity Thames Reach, which has existed for over
25 years. The contract was directly held between the GLA and Thames Reach. In
absence of an intermediary, Thames Reach had to negotiate across multiple investors.
Two parties eventually provided unsecured loans: Big Issue Invest (a social merchant
bank) and the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (a fund by the Department of Health).
Moreover, the service provider obtained a grant from the Monument Trust (one of
the Sainsbury Family Charitable Trusts). Thames Reach itself also provided equity
financing.
63The SPV is a subsidiary company with an independent legal status and asset/liability structure (cf.
Section 4.2).
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The DCLG also contracted the consulting company ICF (then ICF GHK) in July 2013
to provide a qualitative process evaluation of the London Homelessness SIB (Mason
et al., 2017b, p. 1).64 In addition, the DCLG published their own impact evaluation
in 2017 (DCLG, 2017, p. 34).
Ways to Wellness: Social Prescribing in the Northeast of England
After the launch of the Peterborough SIB, representatives of Social Finance UK also
came to speak to a group of chief executives of voluntary organisations in February
2011, among them the Voluntary Organisations’ Network North East (VONNE) in
February 2011 (Tan et al., 2015, p. 46). Social Finance explained the SIB model
as well its possibilities and limitations. Following these first meetings and the
discussions they sparked, VONNE obtained a small amount of funding from the
Northern Rock Foundation to identify a suitable project in the Northeast of England.65
The group hired three independent and locally connected consultants to explore the
idea and engage in conversations and exchange with potential project stakeholders.
Although Social Finance had ‘brought’ the idea to VONNE, they chose to work with
other, locally based consultants. Funded by a small grant from the north East Social
Investment Fund (NESIF), two independent consultants with a background in social
investment engaged in conversations with different stakeholders such as the Durham
Tees Valley Probation Trust or the NHS Newcastle Gateshead CCG (i.e. the body that
organises the delivery of NHS services in the area). As an interviewee put it, ‘when
they were first looking, it wasn’t necessarily going to be health, it could have been
homelessness, it could have been children on the edge of care, (. . . ) could have been
addictions, could have been anything that they felt there was an unmet need in the
Northeast’.66 As Jo Curry, the then Chief Executive of VONNE explained,
64ICF produced an interim report in 2014 (DCLG, 2014) and one in 2015 (DCLG, 2015) as well as
the final reports in 2017 (Mason, Lloyd, & Nash, 2017a; Mason et al., 2017b; Mason, Lloyd, & Nash,
2017c).
65Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017.
66Author’s personal interview with Tara Case (Chief Executive at Ways to Wellness), 1 August 2017.
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The Northeast of England is synonymous with being a bit backwards
and a bit slow on the uptake with things and, you know, kind of like
ten years behind London or something. (. . . ) Traditionally, in terms
of any kind social finance, we don’t take it up as much as other regions
and so when Social Finance came to town and were taking to us about
it, I felt determined to be part of the zeitgeist. I really wanted us in
the Northeast of England to do something that was cutting-edge—it felt
ludicrously important to me. And so that is the most superficial reason
you’ll probably ever been given for anything happening but that’s the
truth.67
This is illustrative of how impact bonds are not simply a category that is imposed
upon individuals in the current vantage of post-crisis, austerity politics, and a
hegemonic culture of ‘responsible capitalism’. The actors involved were fascinated
by this new way of experimenting with innovative approaches to address social and
health issues in collaboration with external actors. In the course of the exploration
process, the consultants became aware of a set of earlier small-scale pilot studies
in the area that sought to address the issue of patients with long-term conditions
(LTCs) such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), heart disease or
epilepsy. West Newcastle upon Tyne which ‘has some of the most deprived wards in
England’ (NHS Clinical Commissioners, 2015, p. 1), was a particular outlier, even
amongst areas of deprivation for particular LTCs, with very high rates of COPD.68
The pilot studies had been run by the charity HealthWORKS Newcastle and the
GP commissioning consortium, prior to becoming a clinical commissioning group
(CCG) (i.e. the body that organises the delivery of NHS services in the area). These
pilot studies had revolved around the so-called ‘social prescribing’ approach which
seeks to ‘address the well documented social and economic factors that accompany
67Author’s personal interview with Jo Curry (Executive Director at Changing Lives), 21 September
2017.
68People with LTCs make up for 55% of GP appointments, which of course result in high health
and social care costs (NHS England, 2016).
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long-illness beyond the healthcare setting’ (Moffatt, Steer, Lawson, Penn, & O’Brien,
2017, p. 2) through dedicated ‘link workers’.
Similar to the navigator model of the London Homelessness SIB, this approach seeks
to help patients better manage their LTCs by agreeing on and implementing an action
plan that includes a range of different activities, such as getting involved in local
groups and activities, getting more exercise, eating better, or drinking less alcohol etc.
(cf. Mossabir, Morris, Kennedy, Blickem, & Rogers, 2015).69 There was a group of
commissioners, GPs and community providers in the northeast who—although there
was no definitive evidence at the time—believed social prescribing would help tackle
chronic health problems and thus also potentially help reduce hospital resource use
and GP attendance (Steadman, Thomas, & Donnaloja, 2017, p. 38). In this space, the
group of consultants hired by VONNE identified a ‘sweet spot’, where an outlier
existed in terms of a pressing social issue, a suffering population, and a model to
address it.
In the further course of the four-years development phase, a steering group was
set up, involving VONNE representatives, the NHS Newcastle West CCG, the
Cabinet Office, and organisations that worked with or represented the voluntary and
community sectors.70. The group managed to obtain funding for the development of
the scheme, under VONNE’s lead.71 The CCG and the NHS were involved early
on, but the impetus to try out this novel kind of public-private partnership did not
come from the commissioner. It was VONNE’s steering group that developed the
service specification (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 10). It was very difficult for the
69Proponents of social prescribing in the area had also published a guide in 2011 for commissioners,
primary health care teams, and health/wellbeing boards that proposes a model to address LTCs ‘by
engaging with local non-traditional providers (e.g. charities, community organisations and social
enterprises) to meet their needs’ (NHS, 2011, p. 5).
70These organisation were ACEVO, CapitaliSE, and Business Mind Social Purpose.
71They received a grant from the Department of Health’s Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF)
of £150,000 in 2013 as well as further development funding from ACEVO (£15,000) and technical
assistance funding from the Big Lottery Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund, which amounted to
£150,000) (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, pp. 6; 10; Tan et al., 2015, p. 46).
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group to get the CCG on board. Although there had been earlier pilot studies and
thus a potential of the project to both improve patients’ health and reduce healthcare
costs, they were reluctant to support the project. Above all, ‘the NHS cannot easily
fund this kind of community-based social care, which comes under the remit of local
authorities; while local authorities have little incentive to invest in preventative health
services when the financial benefits accrue elsewhere’ (Bridges Ventures, 2016, p. 4).
Moreover, ‘the CCG’s systems and processes were not geared to such commissioning,
leading to cultural differences and tensions’ (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 10).
The steering group struggled to convince the CCG that the project was one worth
pursuing. As the negotiations continued, the group managed to obtain so-called
‘top-up’ funds: £2m from Big Lottery Fund’s ‘Commissioning Better Outcomes
Fund’ and £1m from the Cabinet Office’s ‘Social Outcomes Fund’. These top-ups are
a form of subsidies to de-risk the project for public sector commissioners and ensure
‘that successful SIBs can provide investors with returns’ (Floyd, 2017, p. 21).72 They
eventually accounted for about 30% of the contract volume of Ways to Wellness’
contract volume and arguably helped persuade the CCG.
The steering group started discussions with a number of social investors in December
2013, ultimately leading to the engagement of Bridges Fund Management. Bridges
provided Way to Wellness with a £1.65m investment to set up the project (Ronicle &
Stanworth, 2015, p. 3), funded through their ‘Social Impact Bond fund’.
72Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017.
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Table 4.1: Ways to Wellness Participants (following Drinkwater, 2016; Greater
Manchester Public Health Network, 2016; Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015; Steadman et
al., 2017).
Organisation Role Desciption
Ways to
Wellness
Special
purpose
vehicle
(SPV)
Umbrella organisation that provides the link between the CCG
and the four service provider organisations of the SIB. It
subcontracts all the delivery work, manages the finances, and
provides monitoring and quality assurance for the service
provider organisations.
Mental Health
Concern
Service
provider
A charity-led mental health group based in the North East of
England providing a range of specialist mental health services.
Changing
Lives73
Service
provider
UK charity providing specialist support services for vulnerable
people and their families.
First Contact
Clinical
Service
provider
Social enterprise providing community-based behaviour
services, behaviour change training, research, and consultancy
support for people and professionals living and working in the
North East of England.
HealthWORKS
Newcastle74
Service
provider
Charity based in Newcastle working with local communities
across the North East of England to improve health, wellbeing
and life outcomes.
Bridges Fund
Management75
Investor
Specialist private markets investor that provided Ways to
Wellness with an investment of £1.65m to set up the project,
financed through their Social Impact Bond fund—the first one of
its kind (with Big Society Capital as a cornerstone investor; cf.
Section 4.2).
Newcastle
Gateshead
CCG
Outcome
funder
NHS commissioning body that organises the delivery of NHS
services in the area, making payments of up to £8.2m to Ways to
Wellness based on the outcomes achieved by the service
providers.
Commissioning
Better
Outcomes
Fund
Top-up fund
Established by the Big Lottery Fund, this fund contributes £2m
in subsidies to de-risk the SIB project for the Newcastle
Gateshead CCG.
Social
Outcomes
Fund
Top-up fund
Established by the Cabinet Office, this fund contributes £1m in
subsidies to de-risk the SIB project for the Newcastle
Gateshead CCG.
73Changing Lives did not receive enough patient referrals and, as a consequence, had to withdraw
from the SIB contract at a later stage (cf. 5.3).
74HealthWORKS Newcastle did not receive enough patient referrals and, as a consequence, had to
withdraw from the SIB contract at a later stage (cf. Section 5.3).
75The company was renamed from Bridges Ventures to Bridges Fund Management in 2014 (cf.
Section 4.1.
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In contrast to the London Homelessness SIB, ‘Bridges’ investment is a fully at
risk investment with no fixed coupon (i.e. a guaranteed rate or level of return to
investors irrespective of contract performance) or secured level of return’ (Ronicle &
Stanworth, 2015, p. 3). The SIB programme repays Bridges through the outcomes
payments they receive from the CCG. In the SIB’s further development, Bridges also
played a fairly influential role and decidedly a greater saying than the investors in
the London Homelessness SIB. This should be attributed to the greater degree of
financial risk they are exposed to. The investors were additionally involved earlier
than the service providers in this case, whereas the service providers of the London
Homelessness SIB had to negotiate deals with investors themselves.
Ways to Wellness had a relatively short procurement process. It started in March 2014
(Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 6) and ‘[i]n June 2014, after a procurement process,
four providers were appointed to deliver the social prescribing service under a two-year
contract, with tasks including employing and managing the so-called Link workers
who support patients with long-term conditions through social prescribing’ (Tan et al.,
2015, p. 46). Ways toWellness functions as an umbrella organisation delivering social
prescribing through subcontracts with four service provider organisations: Changing
Lives, Mental Health Concerns, HealthWORKS Newcastle and First Contact Clinical
(Steadman et al., 2017). Each of the four providers has between five and seven link
workers, who each manage a case load of between 40–70 beneficiaries. The following
table provides an overview of the different actors involved.
Impact Bonds in International Development
In 2012, the same year the DIB Working Group was convened to developed the
DIB mechanism (cf. Section 4.2), DFID launched the so-called Girls’ Education
Challenge (in collaboration with PricewaterhouseCoopers). This was a flagship
programme that made funding available ‘to enable girls to learn through improved
schools, better teaching and greater community engagement’ (DFID, 2016, p. 2).
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The call for proposals invited non-state organisations to submit projects and also
mandated that all applications should reflect DFID’s ‘Value for Money’ approach
according to which applicants must ‘maximise the impact of each pound spent to
improve poor people’s lives’ (Department for International Development, 2011, p.
3). It additionally stated that applicants should ‘consider if their project could be
designed to include Payment by Results (PbR) (. . . ) which implies grant payments
in arrears following independent verification of pre-agreed results, or may also
involve the “development impact bond” approach’ (Department for International
Development, 2012a, p. 16). This is illustrative of how the idea of (development)
impact bonds was gaining traction around 2012 in development policy circles, and
how NGOs were encouraged to produce respective proposals, even though no DIB
had seen the light of the day yet.
One of the organisations that sought to participate in the DFID challenge was Educate
Girls, a Rajasthan-based NGO founded in 2007. Its aim is to empower communities
to facilitate girls’ education in rural India and help them take a stand against gender
inequality (London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), n.d., para. 5).
Operating in government-run schools in Rajasthan, the NGO employs child-centric
teaching and learning techniques to improve children’s motivation and educational
outcomes. The organisation had reached out to Instiglio, a nonprofit, results-based
financing advisory firm in Colombia, to assist the NGO in the development of the
proposal for the Girls’ Education Challenge, including the PbR funding component
(John, Chia, & Ito, 2017, pp. 56–57). The proposed intervention focused on children
living in the Bijoliya, Mandalgarh, and Jahajpur blocks in the Bhilwara district of
Rajasthan—an area which is, according to Husain, ‘still very caste-ridden, very
feudal’ (cited in Crabtree, 2013, para. 6). Rajasthan has nine of the 26 districts with
the worst gender indicators in India—and 40% of girls drop out of school before they
reach fifth grade; only 15% of children in primary school can read a simple story
in Hindi (Gustafsson-Wright, Boggild-Jones, Segell, & Durland, 2017, p. 80). As
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Husain points out, ‘[e]verything the tourists love about Rajasthan—the traditions, the
women in long veils, dresses and gold bangles—all of that can be bad for women’
(cited in Crabtree, 2013, para. 6). The proposed intervention for the competition
was built on identifying volunteers at the village level who are able to identify
out-of-school girls and work with parents and the community to enrol them. These
volunteers were also foreseen to improve educational outcomes of in-school children
through a specific curriculum.
In the course of the application process, however, the UK’s International Development
Secretary announced that no new British financial aid grants would be made to India,
reflecting ‘India’s successful transition to become a key part of the global economy’
(Department for International Development, 2012b, p. 1). Thus, Educate Girls’
proposal was no longer eligible for the competition. As an interviewee from Educate
Girls pointed out, ‘we were left with a concept that was intriguing, exciting, but we
did not have any takers, as in, no investors’.76 The NGO started to conduct roadshows
in India and abroad to promote the project, but although the proposed intervention
aroused interest among potential funders, no one was willing to back it.
A senior UBS banker eventually learnt about the concept at a reception for Educate
Girls in Geneva (hosted by one of the NGO’s regular funders) in 2013 and introduced
them to representatives of the bank’s foundation, UBS Optimus Foundation. Husain
was subsequently invited to speak at the UBS Philanthropy Forum—‘a networking
event for the superrich’ (Finews, 2016, p. 4) in the luxury winter resort of St. Moritz
in Switzerland (Finews, 2016). As Loraque (2018) describes, ‘Instiglio talked with
UBS about funding Educate Girls through a DIB, which they found intriguing’ (p.
67)—and thus, ‘out of the ashes of our mammoth proposal rose the framework
of our DIB’ (Bukhari, 2017, para. 7). As the proposal already had an impact
76Author’s Skype interview with Maharshi Vaishnav (Development Director at Educate Girls), 5/6
October 2017
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bond-like structure, it provided a good starting position for heeding the calls in
development policy circles for assembling the first development impact bond. UBS
Optimus (which was not part of the aforementioned DIB Working Group) seized
the opportunity and turned the proposal into the first DIB pilot. This decision also
allowed Instiglio to established its position in the impact investing advisory market
through the pioneering DIB project. UBS Optimus Foundation acted as an investor
and provided the working capital needed for the ‘proof of concept’ to be implemented.
So, instead of soliciting investors, the challenge for Educate Girls and UBS Optimus
Foundation was to find an underwriter to guarantee interest and repayment. Rather
than seeking a public institution to fund the project, UBS Optimus sought to work
with a grant-making foundation to create a showcase project that would make the
DIB model palatable to donors and investors. As Perakis (2014) points out, ‘in
addition to improving the lives of children that stand to gain from this pilot, UBS
Optimus Foundation’s interest in it was to test the model and potentially demonstrate
to other investors that DIBs could be a way to invest in social outcomes and help to
scale programmes that can demonstrate success’ (para. 4; cf. Chandrasekhar, n.d.;
(Shankaran, 2018, para. 5)).
According to Finews (2016), the partner organisation that was originally meant to
act as outcome payer for the DIB had dropped out in the run-up to its launch of the
DIB, and ‘the foundation had a problem’ (p. 3). The Children’s Investment Fund
Foundation (CIFF), a London-based grant-making foundation linked to TCI Fund
Management Ltd., became the new outcome payer. TCI Fund Management is a
London-based hedge fund management firm founded by Christopher ‘Chris’ Hohn,
‘an immensely rich British investor who with his fund (. . . ) once forced the head of
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the German stock market to resign’ (Finews, 2016, para. 5).77 The CIFF had already
been researching SIBs in the past and ‘was excited about being involved with the first
one, and to learn from the experience and contribute to the knowledge and evidence
about this emerging field’ (Loraque, 2018, p. 67). But CIFF was also reluctant to
embark on the adventure at the beginning, ‘[t]he foundation’s board went back and
forth about the decision debating whether the DIB was viable’ (Saldinger, 2016, para.
13). So even with the strong ‘bonds’ between UBS Optimus and the CIFF, actors
were still cautious, not immediately convinced by the DIB proposition. The CIFF
eventually agreed to act as outcome funder of the programme.
Two different evaluation tracks were implemented for the DIB. On the one hand,
the US-based impact evaluation company IDinsight was contracted to design and
implement the outcome evaluation and deliver outcome reports to the DIB Working
Group (John et al., 2017, p. 57). On the other hand, the DIB also hired a second
international development consulting firm called Dalberg Global Development
Advisors as a ‘process evaluator’. Their job was to ‘document the DIB design process,
follow implementation and disseminate learning’ (John et al., 2017, p. 57). These
different verification agents are responsible for auditing the schemes.
As Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017) emphasise, ‘[e]ven if the eventual outcome funders
will be donors, it is still important to engage with the domestic government in
developing countries to ensure that the impact bond aligns with the administration’s
policy priorities’ (p. 31). The DIB correspondingly included two memorandums of
understanding with the state of Rajasthan, as the programme targeted public schools
(Gustafsson-Wright & Gardiner, 2016, p. 51; Loraque, 2018, p. 67).
77UBS Optimus Foundation’s CEO, Phyllis Costanza, had been director of leverage at CIFF and
also sat on its board before she joined UBS Optimus Foundation (Finews, 2016; Loraque, 2018). Yet,
UBS Optimus’ head of communications assured that ‘[t]he fact the CEO Constanza had worked for
CIFF however, had “absolutely no influence” on the decision’ (Finews, 2016, p. 3). UBS Optimus
foundation and CIFF had already worked together before. In 2013 they both engaged in the Global
Nutrition for Growth Compact project to combat child malnutrition (Philanthropy News Digest, 2013).
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
Impact bonds have become a hot topic, not only regarding funding welfare
arrangements and development projects but also as a nascent part of the wider set
of ideas and practices that make up the field of impact investing. This chapter
has outlined how certain questions concerning welfare-state configurations, fiscal
austerity, social-policy innovation, financial innovation, philanthropy, and the
expansion of the financial industry have prepared for the emergence of impact
bonds to finance welfare and development projects. To describe this development, I
elucidated the formation of three impact-bond case study projects: Ways to Wellness,
the London Homelessness SIB, and the Educate Girls DIB. The case of impact bonds
also reveals how ostensibly ‘local’ projects entail a host of spatial connections and
entanglements between everyday social welfare provision and the ‘rarefied’ spaces of
global finance (cf. French, Leyshon, &Wainwright, 2011). In this sense, impact bonds
are an example of how financialised capitalism reaches directly into the mundane
geographies of everyday life. In the course of this analysis, I have particularly
focused on the different events and practices that led to the formation of the first pilot
impact bond in the UK. Moreover, I examined the work that organisations like the
Rockefeller Foundation and Social Finance carried out to build an ecosystem for
disseminating impact bonds and providing ‘free’ (i.e. subsidised) technical assistance
to government agencies, investors, and social purpose organisations.
Every impact bond is set up in specific local contexts by actors who mobilise specific
elements and combine them in the form of a particular intervention. Agreeing on
the different metrics, creating and signing the different contracts, and launching the
service was a rather cumbersome process. As a representative from Ways to Wellness
stated, ‘[t]here are multiple stakeholders (CCG, SPV, four service providers, the
Fund, Cabinet Office and Bridges Ventures), each with their own interests and own
contracts. Aligning them all has been immensely difficult and led to a “complex web
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of contracts”’ (cited in Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 9). Having investigated the
emergence of the three case study projects, the next chapter focuses on their structure
and operation. I argue that the conflation of evidence-based practices and benevolent
finance gives rise to a distinct mode of reasoning marked by an outcome-oriented
structure that enacts a particular logic of the everyday.
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5. Factivist Finance as a New
Repertoire for Public Action
In Chapter 4, I discussed the platforms and events that led to the formation of the
world’s first SIB at Peterborough prison, the emergence of the impact investing
economy, and the formalisation of the case study projects. The discussion showed
how the three impact bonds were set up in local contexts by different actors who
mobilised specific elements in their development. This chapter now examines the
actual interventions, metrics, and their effects in an everyday context. First, the
chapter discusses an SIB that sought to improve outcomes for homeless persons in
London, then an SIB in health geared towards tackling socio-economically patterned
health conditions, and finally ‘an early attempt to adapt the social impact bond
methodology for international development projects’ (John et al., 2017, p. 11).
The case studies demonstrate that—rather than simply implementing existing
financial or ethical values—impact bonds bring elements from different domains
together through long and difficult negotiation processes to produce a distinct mode
of reasoning. Complex experiments are enacted that specifically use randomised
control trials (RCTs) and other (quasi-)experimental methods to test if interventions
lead to positive social effects for people in need. These experiments rely on a set of
specified positive changes in service users’ lives and circumstances—social outcome
targets—as well as continuous data-collection activities to ascertain whether the
projects make progress vis-à-vis the defined outcomes. The role of risk capital in
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these programmes is said to consist of facilitating a testing ground for trying out new
preventative approaches and for finding evidence of what works in tackling complex
social problems, rather than just alleviating suffering (cf. Mason et al., 2017b, p.
34). Data-collection activities not only help actors oversee and steer such projects;
payments are made contingent upon the measured results. Thus, data-collection and
evaluation practices also play a role in reassuring financial subjects that they are not
simply buying into a feel-good investment. Monetary returns are not produced by a
financial instrument in the abstract; governments and foundations only compensate
investors if positive social outcomes can be demonstrated for a given timeframe.
In this particular outcome structure and culture, both social work and financial and
contractual frameworks are organised around the improvement of a set of social
outcomes, meaning positive changes in the wellbeing, behaviour, and knowledge of a
marginalised group. Impact bonds give rise to a fact-based, aspirational ethics that is
predicated on evidenced solutions to help service users through individualised social
interventions at the local level. Through the adoption of an ‘aura of science’, a new
field is opened for public action in which complex social problems can (and must) be
tackled with the help of private financial risk-taking. In this logic, charismatic and
influential ‘compassionate capitalists’ not only fund the implementation of complex
and challenging experiments—they also invest time and expertise to conceptualise
these programmes and ensure their success. Against the background of exacerbated
issues of inequality and poverty and a strained welfare state, these actions are
portrayed as a way of dealing with limited resources economically. Either their social
impact is demonstrated, or impact investors pay the bill. As I show in the chapter,
this particular configuration brings the existing practices of PbR and impact reporting
to a new level, sketching out a new repertoire for public action. For investors, in turn,
there is almost a ‘responsibility to profit’, as they can only gain financially if service
users’ lives are demonstrably improved (at least according to the reference points).
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The ‘everydayness’ of the impact bond mechanism is a direct concern of the chapter,
reflecting how impact bonds construct a particular logic of the everyday through a
result-oriented structure that determines the operation of such interventions. I draw
attention to examples of metrics and data collection practices and the reliance on
IT systems. Rather than only evaluating data retrospectively, the schemes employ
practices of performance management based on near real-time data to track progress
and adapted their operations if the results show that outcome targets were not met.
In this setup, investors are not merely passive sources of money but devote time
and expertise to dealing with complex social issues. Rather than only providing
investment capital, they regularly meet with other stakeholders to discuss results and
both support and challenge service providers to improve outcomes for a target group.
To develop this argument, the chapter is divided into three broad sections. The first
section provides an overview of the intervention of the three different cases studies to
then lay out the social outcome targets used. Section two elucidates how impact bonds
bring a set of disparate elements together to produce a distinct mode of reasoning.
In this context, I also discuss the testing ground argument, meaning the claim that
private finance is needed in the context of impact bonds to finance experiments for
testing new preventative approaches that can then be scaled up if they are successful.
Section three analyses how the outcome-oriented structure and culture of impact
bonds infiltrates the operation of social projects at the subject level, constructing a
particular logic of the everyday. The concluding section restates how, rather than
simply implementing existing financial or ethical values, the case study projects bring
elements from different domains together to enact ‘field experiments’. The section
then segues into a discussion of how this ‘space of problematization’ (Collier, 2009,
p. 96) reveals inconsistencies and limits, which are discussed at length in Chapter 6.
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5.1 The Primacy of Measurable Social Outcomes
In Section 4.4 I portrayed the events and actors that led to the development and
implementation of three different impact bond case study projects. Having shown how
the actors involved worked with social service providers, advisors, impact evaluators,
and investors to formalise and launch these schemes, I now discuss the different
intervention models of these impact bonds and how they connected to specific sets
of so-called social outcome targets. In the first step, I provide an overview of the
different interventions and metrics that were used. In the second step, building upon
the theoretical framework established in chapter 3, I discuss in detail what notion
individuals construct of impact bonds in these different contexts as a certain object of
thought and how disparate rationalities and techniques are connected in this process.
Changing the Lives of Rough Sleepers
The London Homeless SIB was operated from 2012–2015, seeking to care
for homeless individuals who had been on the streets for years and who are
‘amongst the most vulnerable people in society’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 7).
Its target group of the SIB consisted of 831 homeless persons, defined based
on the so-called Combined Homelessness and Information Network (CHAIN)
database—a multi-agency database that contains information on homeless
individuals in London. This database is probably unique in the world and
contains a large amounts of data on homelssness in London, including names of
individuals with a history of rough sleeping, along with data on their support needs,
nationality, and age (DCLG, 2017, pp. 13–14). The CHAIN database is constantly
updated by various London homelessness agencies and already existed prior to the SIB.
This database played an important role for both the definition of the target group
and for measuring the intervention’s effects. Based on its information, the actors
involved in the design phase of the SIB-funded intervention identified a group they
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referred to as ‘inbetweeners’: homeless persons ‘who have had multiple separate
episodes of rough sleeping related to various underlying “problems”, but who have
not yet been labelled as chronic’ (Cooper et al., 2016, p. 70). This group has fallen
through the cracks of existing homelessness services which are typically either geared
towards individuals who have just started sleeping rough or those who are chronically
homeless. The outcomes for these ‘inbetweeners’ have remained poor over the years.
Many of them suffered from complex issues around drug and alcohol use, and mental
and/or physical illness. The analysis of the CHAIN database revealed that a sixth of
the rough sleepers accounted for almost half of all recorded unsheltered sleeping
occasions in London, and that ‘inbetweeners’ were a significant part of this. The
DCLG held informal consultations with various stakeholders from the voluntary
sector, the GLA, and London boroughs discussing SIBs and started to agree with
different stakeholder groups on developing interventions and the metrics they wanted
to use.78
Depending on their reported location, members of this inbetweener-group were
assigned to the two sub-projects: ‘Street Impact’ and ‘Thames Reach Ace’ (cf.
Section 4.4). These two programmes provided each rough sleeper with a ‘navigator’,
that is, a consistent, trusted adult who acted as a personal contact to bring them off
the streets and into stable accommodation. As there were many existing homeless
services in London (operated by over 150 different providers), the goal was not to
duplicate existing services but for navigators to slowly build trusting relationships
with the rough sleepers, fill in service gaps where necessary, and offer both support
and encouragement to support individuals.
‘Investors were interested in fundamentally solving the problem of homelessness’
as one of the programme evaluators put it. In other words, they wanted to address
the complexity of the service users’ needs and situations to enable them to sustain
78I provide a detailed appraisal of the metrics in Chapter 5.
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accommodation in a stable way.79 The project tried to achieve this by being fact-based
about poverty alleviation, calling forth an eminently instrumental approach that
relied on outcome measurement. The actions were geared towards achieving specific
outcome targets such as a reducing unsheltered sleeping, supporting individuals into
stable accommodation, and endorsing individuals to progress toward better health
and employment. Five different social outcome targets were defined and weighted
(i.e. different proportions of funding were allocated reflecting the project’s priorities).
Below, I provide a brief summary of the SIB’s targets (the percentages in brackets
indicate the funding allocated).80
Reduce unsheltered sleeping (25%): This payment metric was geared towards
reducing unsheltered sleeping each quarter. The proportion of people from the
group seen sleeping unsheltered had to meet or fall below a quarterly reduction
target. Achievement of this target was assessed based on the CHAIN database
as the system not only contains sociodemographic characteristics but also logs
the contacts rough sleepers make with outreach workers and their arrivals and
departures from short-term accommodation (e.g. hostels) (Cooper et al., 2016,
p. 70). Service provider staff not only had to track the respective information
of every member of the target group in CHAIN but also constantly update it
with new information on rough sleepers (as the other homelessness agencies
that use CHAIN do).
Support service users into stable accommodation (40%): Since hostels are
typically only a first step from the street, navigators supported individuals
into settled accommodation. Beyond helping people move into settled
accommodation, the project aimed at confirming tenancy sustainment for
12 and 18 months, respectively. Stable accommodation was evidenced by
service provider staff for each cohort member, based on tenancy agreements
79Author’s personal interview with Nick Henry (Professor of Economic Geography and SIB
Evaluator), 27 September 2017.
80For a detailed overview of the metrics see Mason et al. (2017b, pp. 38–77)
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and similar documents. These evidences were audited by the GLA (Centre for
Social Impact Bonds, 2013).
Reconnect to a country in which individuals have local connections (25%):
This outcome target was geared towards reconnecting individuals to a country
in which they had local connections. For non-UK nationals without a right to
reside in the UK—as well as individuals who had a right to remain but who
volunteered to return—the project aimed for evidenced moves to the home
country ‘where this is the most appropriate outcome’ (DCLG, 2015, p. 3)
tor them. Some of the homeless persons in the cohort had no recourse to
public funds—a condition imposed on someone due to their immigration status.
Persons with this condition cannot access social housing, welfare benefits, or
employment. If service users had that particular status or other reasons why
they did not want to stay in London, navigators engaged them in conversations
about the option of returning to their home country. While the reconnections
mainly comprised ‘assisted voluntary repatriation’ (DCLG, 2014, p. 1), they
also included cases of administrative removal and deportation. This outcome
target was therefore heavily criticised by activist groups such as Corporate
Watch (Corporate Watch, 2017) as well as various articles in The Guardian
(Picton, 2018; D. Taylor, 2017). The integration of this outcome target is
particularly illustrative of how heterogeneous (and violent) the structures of
impact bonds can be.81 To verify the achievement of the reconnection target,
navigators had to collect ‘information and the necessary paperwork from
foreign countries, either from the relevant authorities or from clients’ relatives’
(DCLG, 2014, p. 76).82
Support people into employment, volunteer work, or education (5%): This
target was geared towards volunteer work or the achievement of a level 2
81I will return to this target and the issues around it in Chapter 7.1.
82A precondition for the reconnection target, obviously, also was that the individual does not reappear
sleeping rough in London, i.e. no re-appearance in the CHAIN database.
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National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) as well as part-time and full-time
employment over several weeks.83 For this outcome, the evidences required
consisted of service users’ payslips, proof of NVQ achievement, or confirmation
of volunteer work.
Better health management (5%): For this last metric of the London Homelessness
SIB, accident and emergency (A&E) episodes were compared against a defined
reduction target. This outcome was geared towards supporting service users
to better manage their health and, as a result, reduce their A&E consultations.
Assessment of this metric was based on NHS Hospital Episode Statistics (HES),
a data warehouse containing details of admissions, outpatient appointments,
and A&E attendances (NHS Digital, 2019). Based on HES, the SIB metric
was planned to compare A&E episodes against a defined reduction target. The
outcome target was geared towards supporting service users to better manage
their health in order to become less frequent A&E users.84 As I show in the
next section, this metric was very similar to Ways to Wellness’ secondary care
costs reduction target.
This framework is one example of a socio-technical infrastructure that gauges social
value, as I described in section 1.3. The technocratic approach of the SIB outlines a
very particular kind of knowledge about situations characterised by precariousness,
meaning the idea that the truth can be found in numbers. Metrics create a frame
for reading and classifying individuals’ behaviour. Defining them is a process of
abstraction and simplification that transforms complex issues like homelessness or
educational alienation into stable numerical output, graphs, and charts.
83The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2016, 5) describes NVQ level two as follows:
[C]ompetence, which involves the application of knowledge and skills in a significant range of varied
work activities, performed in a variety of contexts. Some of the activities are complex or non-routine,
and there is some individual responsibility or autonomy. Collaboration with others, perhaps through
membership of a work group or team, may often be a requirement.
84As I will explain in Chapter 6, this outcome target could eventually not be assessed because the
NHS retracted a previous data sharing agreement (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 29).
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This heterogeneous set of outcome targets had already been developed in the
DCLG-commissioned feasibility study (cf. Section 4.4) prior to the project’s
tendering process. Albeit in consultation with various homelessness stakeholders, it
was ultimately the DCLG that defined the outcome targets, put a maximum price on
them, and subsequently let the bidders compete to try and deliver the pre-defined
outcomes as effectively as possible (Mason et al., 2017b). This procurement
procedure reflects longer trends in terms of the role of modern government associated
notions of ‘new public management’ (Ferlie, 1996) and ‘reinventing government’
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).85 The way the London Homelessness SIB was tendered
out is reflective of decentralising government structures in favour of enterprising
models for social welfare provision (cf. Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015, p. 340). This
example correspondingly shows how this type of decentralisation does not imply
a retreat of the state but a financialised reconfiguration of service provision with,
as Berndt and Wirth (2018) argue, a ‘continuing presence of the state as a distant,
yet active player’ (p. 33). The DCLG set the targets according to their priorities,
including not only their aim to act on homelessness in the city but also the creation
of the aforementioned ‘hostile environment’. This aspect is illustrative of the ways
disparate considerations can be assembled into such a programme.
While the DCLG took a leading role in developing the outcome targets and the
tendering procedure, it outsourced the financial risks. Private investors provided
the up-front funding with which the SIB project was run. There was no basic state
funding for running the service. The GLA, which was responsible for managing and
commissioning the project on behalf of the DCLG, only paid the service providers
in arrears (quarterly) and dependent on the outcomes they had achieved (DCLG,
2015). The service providers, in turn, paid off the investors, who received a fixed
85These approaches typically envision the introduction of market mechanisms, the decentralisation
of management authority in order to split up bureaucratic organisations, the establishment of targets
and performance measurement (against these targets), and the emphasis on the customer-orientation of
services (cf. du Gay, 1996; Hood, 1995).
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annual interest rate of up to 6.5% per year on their original investment as well as the
principal sum in late 2016, after program completion and an additional 12 months to
assess the sustained outcomes (Mason et al., 2017b).
This funding structure marks a departure from the SIB model described in Section
4.2: investors’ financial returns are, in this case, not contingent on the project’s
outcomes (DCLG, 2014, pp. 50–52).86 As I elucidated in Section 4.2, there is
no stable paradigm in terms of the formal features of an impact bond; ‘the things
we call “impact bonds” are so different from each other that they can’t easily be
understood as a defined model’ (N. Ball, 2019, p. 3). In contrast to the Peterborough
SIB and many other programmes, the London Homelessness SIB transferred about
a third of the financial performance risk to service providers and away from the
commissioner and the investors. St. Mungo’s and Thames Reach themselves
provided equity financing, which was at risk before the investors’ principle sum
was. However, the fact that the service providers had some investment also meant
that they had the opportunity to earn financial returns from the intervention (which
they eventually did).87 Thus, this programme also made the service provider
organisations, which are both larger providers of homelessness services, into investors.
The programme’s impetus on data collection and performance management to achieve
the targets listed above is said to have allowed the service providers the flexibility to
work in non-prescribed, innovative ways that would otherwise not be eligible for direct
public funding. As the focus of the project lay on the outcomes above, navigators
were given a high degree of freedom as to how they achieved them. This structure
enabled navigators to work more flexibly without consistently consulting the GLA
86The only performance-dependent payment was agreed with Big Issue Invest, but on top of a fixed
rate.
87Interviewees made contradictory statements regarding the final profit earned by the service
providers but there decidedly was a surplus for both organisations.
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(as it would be the case with traditional, delivery-based contracts). As a St Mungo’s
interviewee specified:88
In-depth case work needs time and (. . . ) these sort of contracts give the
workers who are doing the outreach work time to focus on people, (. . . )
[to] really drill down, because everyone’s got a story.
The strict focus on outcomes is believed to lead to better results. This is often referred
to as ‘black-box approach’; in other words ‘the focus on outcomes frees service
providers to offer innovative interventions and, if necessary, the flexibility to modify
those interventions during delivery’ (Carter et al., 2018, p. 13; cf. Albertson & Fox,
2018, p. 92; Sinclair et al., 2014, p. 121; Sinclair et al., 2019, pp. 4, 5, 10). So,
while there was very clear guidance regarding data collection on the projects, service
providers were given a high degree of freedom as to how they achieved impact.
It is often argued that service providers are empowered through impact bonds to
do ‘the right thing’. The navigators were given a high degree of freedom as to how
they spent money and worked together with rough sleepers individually to achieve
outcomes. Service-provider staff argued that the prioritisation of outcomes allowed
them to look ‘at each individual person in the cohort you are working with’ and
improve the outcomes for them individually.89 So, the navigators had more time to
provide assistance with personal talks or visits to the authorities, and they could also
place service users in a bed and breakfast on short notice. Moreover, they could make
use of personalised budgets, for instance to pay for furniture, swimming lessons, or
the renewal of birth certificates and identifications (which are crucial documents for
not only the rehousing process) (Swain, 2015). The personalised support through
a dedicated navigator and the autonomy they had in spending money were seen as
central success factors for the project, as it allowed navigators to focus on service
88Author’s personal interview with Kathleen Sims (Service Development Manager at St Mungo’s),
5 September 2017.
89Author’s personal interview with Kathleen Sims (Service Development Manager at St Mungo’s),
5 September 2017.
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users’ individual needs (Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 58–60). Incorporating outreach
work into a frame of calculation is not only geared towards establishing an evidence
base but also becomes the basis for organising social work. Data thus reported were
used for more transparent reporting and data-driven performance management. As
Mason et al. (2017b, pp. 32–33) point out:
Active, consistent, ongoing performance management was required to
ensure progress was being achieved (and the PbR led to a much greater
awareness of clients’ needs and progression).
Thus, the data collection regimes of impact bonds play a key role in rendering
interventions investible, reassuring stakeholders (not only investors) that the monetary
returns are not generated by a financial instrument in the abstract, but only accrue
if people’s lives and destinies have been de facto improved. Such performance
management seeks to increase the rigour and responsiveness of service provision by
encouraging staff to ‘stay on track’ (Edmiston&Nicholls, 2018, p. 69). As Gustafsson-
Wright and Gardiner (2016) emphasise, ‘[w]ithout performance management, the
traditional tools of monitoring and evaluation and impact evaluations often provide
too little information too late’ (p. 53). Having elucidated these metrics in the context
of the London Homelessness SIB, the next section moves to an analysis of the Ways
to Wellness project.
Changing the Lives of Patients with Long-term Conditions
The Ways to Wellness programme uses social prescribing, geared towards supporting
11,000 patients to make sustained lifestyle changes with the aim of improving their
self-care and wellbeing through non-medical approaches outside the GP surgery
(Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015). This is done through the work of dedicated link
workers who are assigned to each patient. Individual goals commonly include
a mix of healthy cooking and eating, physical activity, increased social activity,
and connecting to voluntary and community groups and resources in the area (e.g.
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walking groups, welfare rights advice, physical activity classes, gardening clubs,
continuing education, arts groups). Moreover, the service provides support around
benefits and welfare rights and promotes volunteering opportunities.
Similar to the London Homelessness SIB, this intervention employs an individual
approach to helping service users and seeks to work with existing services. Link
workers often cross-refer between voluntary organisations and social services: ‘[i]f
the link worker believes that to accompany the client to the first session (or more) will
help address communication and confidence issues, they will do so’ (Steadman et al.,
2017, p. 39). Also similar to the London Homelessness SIB is link workers’ degree
of freedom. As Steadman et al. (2017) point out, ‘link workers have no restrictions on
the number of times they meet with a client, although they work on a defined budget
per client, which depends upon the length of time the patients are on the programme’
(p. 39). The contact between the link worker and the service user can be in person,
on the phone, or via text message and/or e-mail. The beneficiaries can remain in the
programme for up to two years, but also beyond two years if the link worker thinks it
is necessary. Link workers are trained in ‘behaviour change methods’ (Moffatt et al.,
2017, p. 2) and work with beneficiaries to identify personally meaningful health and
wellness goals. Service users are said to become ‘equal partners in managing their
health’ (NHS England, 2016, p. 1).
In the case of the London Homelessness SIB, the outcome targets were defined
at a relatively early stage in the DCLG-commissioned feasibility study and later
transferred to the invitation to tender. In the case of Ways to Wellness, long and
complex negotiations took place between the actors involved. Many different
outcome metrics were discussed but ‘discounted for either being unmeasurable or not
a direct or reliable proxy for the outcome sought’ (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 9;
Government Outcomes Lab, 2018c, p. 2). It was very difficult for the steering group
in the run-up to the SIB to get the CCG on board. One of the key difficulties was
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creating metrics that reflect both individual health improvements for patients and
savings from reduced secondary care costs. Elaborating a respective framework of
metrics was a considerable challenge for the parties involved. The actors involved
eventually agreed on using two different metrics: the Wellbeing Star, which reflects
concerns of sustained health improvements, and secondary-care costs reductions ( i.e.
‘cashable savings’) for the CCG. Hereafter, I elucidate the two different metrics:
Wellbeing Star (30%): Service users who enter the scheme complete a wellbeing
and health self-assessment called the Wellbeing Star (see figure 5.1). The
results are used to identify areas for behaviour change but are also one of the
two outcome targets of the SIB (NHS Clinical Commissioners, 2015). Based
on the Wellbeing Star, a patient’s state of health and wellbeing is recorded
along eight different dimensions such as ‘looking after yourself’, ‘family and
friends’, ‘managing symptoms’, and ‘feeling positive’. Every patient who enters
the scheme carries out the Wellbeing Star assessment with a link worker during
their first appointment. The self-assessment is then repeated every six months.
In the course of the self-assessment, ‘the patient basically says: “I think I’m
a three on that, a four on that one” and that gives you an overall score’ (NHS
Clinical Commissioners, 2015, p. 8). Upon completion, link workers record
the results in a dedicated management information system (MIS), which Ways
to Wellness developed in collaboration with an external IT company.
As Ronicle and Stanworth (2015) note, ‘[j]oint completion minimises the risk of
either beneficiary or provider under- or over-estimating progress made’ (p. 5). Link
workers not only use this self-assessment to assess a patient’s current health situation
and create numerical output for the SIB but also to identify areas where patients want
to improve and set respective goals with them. The Wellbeing Star is then carried
out every six months to verify if there have been improvements and if clients have
achieved the agreed-upon goals; four such assessments are typically completed per
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Figure 5.1: Wellbeing Star Assessment
(Triangle Consulting Social Enterprise, 2018, p. 4)
patient (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015; Tan et al., 2015, p. 47). As Chris Drinkwater,
Ways to Wellness Chair and Trustee Chair, noted, the Wellbeing Star is:90
something that can be used in daily practice by the link workers and it
functions as a quality assurance tool for the link workers and it’s not, if
you like, and add-on research tool; so it’s something the link workers use
in daily practice.
The service providers are paid for the completion of the Wellbeing Star assessment,
regardless of the score (to avoid perverse incentives).91 Ways to Wellness—the
entity with an independent legal status that manages the delivery—however, receives
90Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017.
91In order to avoid perverse incentives, the payments to the four service providers were not tied to
health outcomes but to the number of patients they support. As Ronicle and Stanworth (2015) specify,
the service providers received £125 for every patient referred to the service, £100 after completion of
the Wellbeing Star six months after the referral, and ‘£50 payable at 15 months after referral and every
6 months thereafter for as long as the client remains engaged with the WtW project and there is an
improvement in their wellbeing scores’ (p. 5; Tan et al., 2015, p. 48).
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payments of up to £492.50 per patient on a sliding scale.92 The entire amount is
paid if a patient scores an average of 1.4 points higher than the initial assessment on
the final one and reduces down to 0% if it is less than 0.5 points higher (Ronicle &
Stanworth, 2015, p. 5).
The second metric Ways to Wellness used is geared towards measuring the cost
of secondary healthcare services—which, in the case of success, results from the
improved health management of the patients in the target group.
Reduction of secondary care acute usage (70%): This metric aims at a 22%
reduction of the patients’ costs in secondary care acute usage per year compared
to the control group (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 5). ‘Secondary care
acute usage’ is defined as the cost of use of hospital services, both unplanned
and planned admissions, as well as the use of outpatient and A&E services
(Rizzello, Caridà, Trotta, Ferraro, & Carè, 2018, pp. 94–95). Progress for this
outcome target is measured through a counterfactual, meaning a comparison to
the secondary care costs of patients with similar characteristics who do not use a
social prescribing programme. The calculation relies on the RAIDR (Reporting,
Analysis and Intelligence Delivering Results) system—an application that
extracts data from GP IT systems. Based on RAIDR, secondary care data from
the target group is compared to a control group in Newcastle East and Newcastle
North. This is done in order to determine the health effects in terms of reducing
secondary care acute usage through the intervention (Tan et al., 2015, p. 47).93
92It is for this reason that an SPV is usually set up, i.e. to shield service providers from the
performance risk of the contract. An SPV was also arranged for the Street Impact programme run by
St. Mungo’s (see above).
93In the run-up to the project, it took stakeholders a very long time to set up an information
governance structure that meets the NHS’ patient data protection requirements. The project went
through a cumbersome approval process to obtain a permission to access the patient data needed for
the SIB. This even delayed the launch of the project.
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Based on the positive causal effects of the service thus evidenced, the CCG pays a
maximum of £332.50 per patient every year if the scheme achieves a 22% reduction
of costs in secondary care acute usage (compared to the control group).
Improving Outcomes for Children in Rajasthan
The third case study, the Educate Girls DIB, was geared towards increasing school
enrolment for girls in Rajasthan, India, as well as improving educational outcomes of
both girls and boys in Hindi, English, and basic numeracy. Launched in March 2015
with a three year operation period, the intervention trained a team of volunteers to
conduct door-to-door visits to talk with families and encourage girls’ school enrolment.
Moreover, actors organised community meetings in the villages and also used elders
to convince families of the merits of educating their daughters (Mannion, 2018;
Saldinger, 2017). Moreover, the scheme delivered a child-centric curriculum three
times per week to boys and girls in grades three to five.94 In total, the scheme targeted
18,000 service users. UBS Optimus Foundation invested in this endeavour to ‘test the
[DIB] model and potentially demonstrate to other investors that DIBs could be a way
to invest in social outcomes’ (Perakis, 2014, para. 4). In terms of metrics, there were
two building blocks to the outcome assessment.
Enrolment of out-of-school girls (20%): The number of girls on school rosters in
grades 2–8 in the treatment group was measured over three years. Every girl
whose enrolment could be attributed to the DIB programme therefore counted
as ‘one unit of enrollment’ (Instiglio, 2015b, p. 22).
Eligible girls were between the age of seven and 14 over the course of the three-year
period (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2017, p. 81; Instiglio, 2015a, p. 5). Through
household surveys conducted prior to the DIB launch, a baseline of out-of-school girls
was created. The accuracy of the enrolment list was independently verified by the
evaluator IDinsight (Kitzmüller et al., 2018). Educate Girls considered enrolment into
94The scheme covered activities in 166 government schools in 140 villages, and targeted 15,000
children (9,000 of them girls).
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grade one to be the government’s obligation (Instiglio, 2015b, p. 22). Enrolment was
then measured among girls in grades two to eight in government primary and upper
primary schools, verified by the headmasters’ signatures in the respective schools
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2017, p. 82). In addition to enrolment, the DIB used a
metric that focused on both girls’ and boys’ learning outcomes.
Aggregate learning gains for all students in grades 3–5 (80%): The educational
outcomes of both girls and boys in Hindi, English, and basic numeracy
were measured was based on the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER)
assessment. Created by the Indian nongovernmental organisation Pratham, the
ASER test annually measures arithmetic and reading levels of children from ages
six to 14 (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2017, p. 81; Savedoff, Perakis, & Schwanke,
2016, p. 3). It aims to ‘to provide reliable estimates of children’s enrollment
and basic learning levels for each district and state in India’ (Saldinger, 2018,
para. 24). The test specifically assesses basic literacy in Hindi and English as
well as basic numeracy (i.e. the starting grades on a scale) of A to E for English
and math, and A+ to E for Hindi. Male and female students in grades one to
five went through a respective baseline test.
‘[I]n an effort to use one of the most rigorous tools available given the scrutiny the
bond would be under’ (Saldinger, 2016, para. 19), the DIB employed a clustered
RCT. This (quasi-)experimental method uses a counterfactual, in the form of
control groups, to determine the DIB’s causal effects (i.e. the impact generated).
As Athey and Imbens (2017) explain, ‘[c]lusters may take the form of schools,
where within a school district a number of schools are randomly assigned to an
educational intervention rather than individual students, or villages’ (p. 109). For
the analysis, IDinsight compared the arithmetic and reading levels of children in
schools targeted by Educate Girls to the levels of children in control schools, based
on the aforementioned ASER testing tool (Kitzmüller et al., 2018, p. 4). At the end
of every school year, the students were assessed again. The evaluator then calculated
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the aggregated improvements (in terms of the levels gained on the ASER scheme)
and compared them to the improvements made by children in the control schools.
The data thus reported did not only serve as a basis for the external justification of
activities. In a similar manner as the Ways to Wellness and the London Homelessness
SIB, actors used such numerical output for data-driven performance management. As
Safeena , founder and CEO of Educate Girls put it (cited in Instiglio, 2017, p. 87):
One of the benefits of the DIB has been building an organization that has
performance management in its DNA. Regardless of the scale, every part
of the organization is delivering to outcomes.
Here, again, the focus on outcomes (rather than prescribed services etc.) is said to be
a central advantage of the model. As Husain pointed out (cited in John et al., 2017, p.
56):
Payment by Results was attractive because its ‘activities agnostic’
approach would help us maintain a razor sharp focus on impact without
any distractions; we could innovate, adapt and tailor our programmes to
achieve the best possible results for marginalised girls, and ensure that
funders only pay for results achieved. It would expedite scale and help us
leave a larger impact footprint.
Based on the data reported, Educate Girls implemented many changes to the service
delivery structure during the project. For instance, actors found that it is more difficult
to get older girls back into school, and they adjusted their techniques and efforts to
focus more on this particular group (Saldinger, 2017). Moreover, the teaching groups
were further aligned with pupils’ competency levels, and the curriculum content
was improved. For persistent absentees, additional home visits were conducted. As
Gustafsson-Wright and Boggild-Jones (2018b) note, ‘[w]ith a focus on outcome
metrics and improved performance management, Educate Girls were able to respond
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to new information to improve their service provision’ (para. 6). A similar aspect is
put forward in an article about the DIB in The Economist (2018, p. 64):
Instead of having to send tedious reports to a donor about how [Safeena
Husain, founder and CEO of Educate Girls] was spending money, she
concentrated on solving problems. Educate Girls found, for example, that
many pupils could not do long division because they did not understand
the concept of place value. So its workers taught remedial classes.
These aspects are illustrative of how the emergence of impact bonds not only
financialises the operation of such interventions. With the mechanism also comes
a particular outcome-oriented structure that builds from scientific methods as well
as performance-management practices that seem new to voluntary and non-profit
organisations. The ensemble of these different elements and practices infiltrates
the ways in which projects are understood and operated at the subject level. This
also seems to be the case regarding investors who perform types of labour that
go beyond the practices of the ethical investors described in Section 2.3. Instead
of only choosing certain investment opportunities and compiling an individual
ethical investment portfolio, investors are closely involved in developing, structuring,
tendering, contracting, and overseeing these schemes. In what follows, I map the
distinct mode of reasoning that seems to contextualise the three case study projects.
5.2 Do-Good, Not Feel-Good Investing: The Promises
of Measurement
As shown in Section 2.1 and Section 4.1, the rationalities and techniques that can be
observed in this space are not necessarily new. Discourses on PbR and evidence-based
policy have a longer history in the social and development sector: the introduction of
rational methods of business management to the administration of charitable deeds
dates back to Rockefeller and Carnegie in the late 1960s, and practices of impact
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investing have been around since the 1970s in the form of SRI, microfinance, and
other vehicles.95 Impact bonds recombine and deploy these different elements in
a particular configuration that governs the lives of a ‘target population’. Invoking
Collier’s (2009) notion of a topology of power, I outline how these practices are
assembled into a new formation of government through a distinct mode of reasoning,
whereby private monetary returns are made contingent upon the perceived wellbeing
of LTC patients in Newcastle upon Tyne or the arithmetic and reading levels of
schoolchildren in Rajasthan.
A Responsibility to Profit?
Although revealing very different (sometimes antagonistic) aims, formal features,
and actors, the ensembles thus formed all gave rise to a particular logic. Impact
bonds employ a seemingly scientific approach to ‘do-gooding’. This version of
compassionate capitalism does not so much rely on moral virtue or emotionally
compelling stories and images of socially distant others (or aid rituals) but seeks
to bring a greater measure of objectivity to care for the poor. I argue that the
data-collection regimes of impact bonds play a key role in both rendering interventions
investible and reassuring stakeholders (not only investors) that monetary returns
are not just generated by a financial instrument in the abstract but have always
demonstrably improved people’s lives in comparison to the status quo.
Impact bonds facilitate experiments that produce numerical evidence of projects’
positive social outcomes, thereby departing from both investing vehicles and social
and development policy that is predicated on only good intentions. One of the London
Homelessness SIB investors I interviewed said:96
95See Section 4.3 for a detailed description of impact investing.
96Author’s personal interview with Katy Pillai (Investment Director at Big Issue Invest), 1 November
2017.
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What I quite like about this structure is that it allows you to answer
questions objectively (. . . ) whereas before it just tended to be ideology.
The numerical output generated by impact bonds manages to constantly reassure
actors that they are not mistaken about what it means to do good, that financial profits
are meaningful and justified, and that tax money (or part of a foundation’s endowment
capital) is thus well spent. The resulting empirical evidence immunises impact bonds’
transactions against the interferences of political confrontation.
The creation of an ‘aura of science’ is impressively illustrated by the use of
comparative models such as RCTs, which are considered the gold standard for impact
bond evaluations (Tse & Warner, 2018, p. 9). The RCT is a (quasi-)experimental
method that uses counterfactuals in the form of control groups to determine the
causal effects of an intervention (i.e. the impact generated) compared to the status
quo. Put differently, RCTs are believed to help isolate the positive effects of social
interventions from those of the environment (cf. Athey & Imbens, 2017). The use
of (quasi-)experimental methods that use a counterfactual reflects a broader shift
in the study of international economic development. As Wykstra (2018) argues,
prior to 2000, economists used to study the macro issues, such as looking at large
datasets, comparing many different factors across countries, and reasoning why
certain countries displayed economic development while other did not. However,
since the early 2000s, economists like Duflo and Banerjee (2017) have shifted focus
from thinking about the root causes of poverty to the effects of micro anti-poverty
programmes.97
Educate Girls is the only case study project that employed an RCT, yet Ways to
Wellness also uses a control group to determine the reduction of secondary care acute
usage. Relying on RAIDR, which extracts data from GP IT systems (cf. Section
97The common examples of such evaluations include the distribution of bed nets to combat malaria,
or the effects of deworming pills on children’s school attendance and later-life income (cf. Leigh,
2018).
140
5.1), secondary care data from the target group is compared to a control group
to determine causal effects (Tan et al., 2015, p. 47). In the case of the London
Homelessness SIB, the DCLG conducted its own supplementary study, in which it
examined the difference between the intervention and two comparison groups from
2010 and 2011 that did not benefit from the SIB.98 The groups were matched using
the propensity score matching (PSM) method (DCLG, 2017, pp. 23–24). Propensity
score matching allows for comparing a treatment group to other individuals who
have comparable characteristics but did not participate. In comparison to other
matching methods, PSM uses a single (propensity) score that encompasses multiple
characteristics. This method thus helps simplify the matching procedure through
a reduction of dimensionality ‘instead of requiring a one-to-one match of each
characteristic’ (Peikes, Moreno, & Orzol, 2008, p. 222).
Impact bonds do indeed bring about a novel socio-technical infrastructure to gauge
social value, which is ‘connected to but ultimately distinct from financial value’
(Guter-Sandu, 2018, p. 247; cf. section2.3). However, rather than merely rendering
‘“uninvestable” organizations investment-ready’ (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014, p. 28),
the mechanism also counteracts the ‘warm glow effect’ (Andreoni, 1990)—in other
words, investing on emotional and self-gratifying impulse to feel good (cf. Crumpler
& Grossman, 2008; Kappeler, Kirchschläger, Müller, & Wuffli, 2012). This form
of ‘hard facts’ sets impact bonds apart from other forms of impact investing. For
example, in a 2015 analysis of six high-profile RCT studies of microcredit initiatives,
very few conclusive results on positive social outcomes could be found, and the
authors diagnosed a ‘lack of evidence of transformative effects on the average
borrower’ (Banerjee, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015, p. 3; cf. Mader, 2018, p. 471). Such
findings emphasise that impact investing vehicles may indeed ‘bear[] the risk of
feel good rather than do good investing (. . . ), similar to the phenomenon of green
98The comparison groups were taken from 2010–2012 rather than the same time period (2012–
2014) which critically limits the conclusiveness of the evaluation. The DCLG (2017) explains this
shortcoming in the report.
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washing’ (Weber & Duan, 2012, p. 171, emphases in the original). In contrast
to other forms of impact investing, impact bonds measure social outcomes more
rigorously through (quasi-)experimental methods (such as RCTs) and can claim that
public institutions only compensate investors for their financial risk-taking if there
is empirical evidence that the lives of the people in need have been improved—at
least according to the agreed-upon reference points and the data collection methods
used. The results thus measured are not only used symbolically for external reporting,
justification, and claims of moral legitimacy—any payment is contingent upon the
‘evidence’.99 Thus, financial actors impose upon themselves a comparably high
standard of rigour. Private pre-financing is combined with experimental methods, so
that investors can only recoup their investments if there is a counterfactual that allow
for isolating the causal effects of projects.
By thus aligning social and financial incentives, the pay-for-success logic almost
articulates a ‘responsibility to profit’ (Andreu, 2018, p. 720), since investors only
earn returns if service users are demonstrably better off. According to this logic,
maximising financial returns to capital inevitably (and evidently) also means greater
positive social impact. Financial returns appear to be legitimate since they are (in a
Rawlsian sense) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged—and the schemes can
prove it by pointing at both the results and their adaptive framework of service delivery.
I typify this mode under the rubric of ‘factivist finance’, whereby investment is re-
described in benevolent terms, and the disbursement of payments is made contingent
upon empirical evidence that social outcomes for people in need have been positively
changed. Amash-up of ‘fact’ and ‘activism’, the neologism ‘factivism’ was introduced
99In the case of the London Homelessness SIB, payments to investors were predominantly not
contingent upon the results. The payments from the GLA to the service provider organisations,
however, relied on the measured outcomes (cf. Section 5.1.
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by Bono, the vocalist of the rock band U2, in a 2013 TED talk (Bono, 2013).100 My
typification builds from Mitchell (2017a), who analysed ‘the discourse of “factivism”
as an example of a new configuration of humanitarian reason’ (p. 123).101 As I have
outlined, such ‘factivist finance’ reveals a results-oriented, technocratic culture geared
towards financing and managing experiments to find new ways of tackling complex
social problems at the local level (rather than just alleviating suffering). This particular
‘problem-space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 90) not only connects financial rationalities to
statistics, and performance management—it also emerges as an instrument of public
policy and international aid. This setup goes beyond the mere adoption of financial
tools and logics in the pursuit of philanthropic and statecraft objectives. In what
follows, I take a closer look at the implications the model has in policy contexts.
Policy Implications of Pay-for-Success Financing
Initial experiments with PbR in the UK were already conducted in 2003 in the NHS
and at a later stage in the DWP’s ‘Work Programme’ (as I mentioned in Section 4.1).
The central characteristic of such PbR schemes is that the payments for the provision
of social services are conditional upon the achieved outcomes (i.e. a certain success
rate) rather than outputs (e.g. 400 beneficiaries served). As such, PbR is often said
to challenge ‘the output “target culture” associated with the NPM’ (Fraser et al.,
2018, p. 10) through a focus on ‘what works’ (Deering, 2014). The impact bond
idea extended this mechanism by shifting the financial non-performance risks onto
investors (Griffiths & Meinicke, 2014), in contrast to direct PbR contracts (where the
burden and financial risk is placed on the service provider or commissioner).102
100The same Bono also recently co-founded a company to measure the effects of impact investments,
emphasising that ‘[i]f capitalism is to be a force for good we have to be able to measure when it’s doing
good and when it’s doing harm, (. . . ) [w]e need cold hard facts’ (cited in S. Clark, 2019, para. 4; cf.
Schäfer & Höchstötter, 2015, p. v).
101Mitchell (2017a) touches upon the issue of impact bonds, and impact investing more broadly, but
does not discuss them in terms of financial aspects, but the conflation of compassion and quantification.
102Note that this principle of shifting financial risk was only partly realised in the case of the London
Homelessness SIB, as discussed in Section 5.1.
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This has lines of affinity with the calls for quantitative results-based governance
of aid initiatives, which have increased in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis
and put the emphasis on ‘value for money’ (Best, 2014, ch. 8). As Section 4.4
highlighted, the call for DFID’s Girls’ Education Challenge (which led to the design
of what would later become the Educate Girls DIB) tellingly included both an
emphasis onDFID’s ‘Value forMoney’ approach aswell as the PbR (andDIB) concept.
To measure outcomes and legitimately claim the creation of public and social
‘value’, both performance management and (retrospective) evaluation became more
sophisticated, seeking to embrace the complexity of measuring social outcomes. As I
outlined above, this ties in with the calls for RCTs and other (quasi-)experimental
methods articulated through networks of development economists (Wykstra, 2018),
increasingly along with philanthropists who adopt a broadly consequential approach
to philanthropy. For instance, ‘effective altruism’ is a movement that seeks to
donate money to the best-performing development and aid organisations (Gabriel &
McElwee, 2019).
Factivist finance connects these practices to rationalities of evidence-based policy
and financial risk taking, facilitating ‘testing grounds’ to try out new, innovative
approaches that would otherwise not be eligible for direct public funding. Albeit still
heavily subsidised by the public purse (cf. Section 4.2), the impact bond is believed
to become a long-term option for dealing economically with limited resources: either
it is shown that social impact is created or else impact investors pay the bill. As Tan
et al. (2015) note, ‘[i]n many ways the focus on outcome measurement may be seen
to unite both champions and critics of SIBs, and function as its major strength in
policy terms’ (p. 19).
There is a burgeoning literature on the ways in which public institutions increasingly
use financial tools—and work with financial actors—to pursue statecraft objectives
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(Christophers, 2017; Deruytter & Möller, forthcoming; Lagna, 2016).103 In a similar
vein, it has been shown how donor agencies increasingly deepen and accelerate
financialisation under the banner of ‘international development’ by working with
financial actors and by de-risking private sector investments to unlock large-scale
investments ‘beyond aid’ (Kharas, Makino, & Jung, 2011; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo,
2015).
While factivist finance indeed speaks to both of these wider literatures, it reveals a very
particular case of financialisation. Beyond the utilisation of financial tools and logic,
factivist finance is connected to wider discourses of finding evidence of ‘what works’
in tackling complex social problems and how the quest for solutions to these problems
should be funded, overseen and administrated. Measuring and reporting changes
in the knowledge, wellbeing, behaviour, and circumstances of individuals not only
triggers payments but is hard-wired into the everyday operation of such interventions,
creating a particular logic of the everyday. Below, I examine the everyday operation
of the outcome-oriented structure that determines the operation of impact bonds.
5.3 A Particular Logic of the Everyday
To furnish evidence of positive social effects, impact bonds enact a particular logic of
the everyday through data-driven performance management systems. As the chief
executive of Thames Reach put it, impact bonds are ‘much more geared around
making change and very, very focused around some very practical outcomes that were
essential in our view for changing people’s lives’ than more orthodox grant-funding
schemes.104 The impact bond narrative holds that instead of discovering that a project’s
103For instance, Lagna (2016) analyses the derivatives-based strategies of the Italian government
during the period of 1993–1999, Deruytter and Möller (forthcoming) discuss how ‘municipal debt
management’ increasingly links the work of city halls to financial markets, and Christophers (2017)
studies how the UK state increasingly uses public land as a form of financial asset.
104Author’s personal interview with Jeremy Swain (Chief Executive at Thames Reach), 2 October
2017.
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actions have had no (or negative) effects on people’s lives at its end, continuous data
collection, reporting, and data-driven performance management allow for tackling
issues head-on and taking corrective actions. This outcome-oriented culture infiltrates
the operation of social interventions at the subject level. Social workers need to
collect data on a daily basis, and their managers need to steer interventions based
on that data. Numerical output is also the basis for meetings and discussion with
investors, outcome funders, and intermediaries.
Data Collection and Analysis
The outcome-oriented structure I have so far discussed in this chapter organises
non-profit work, public-sector commissioning, investing, and grant-making around
the improvement of a specific set of social outcomes. This results-oriented structure
determines the operation of these interventions A manager of one of the London
Homelessness SIB’s navigator teams explained the main difference between the SIB
and other projects as follows:105
our team meetings had a very clear agenda and (. . . ) it was just focused,
it was quiet business-like in a sense (. . . ) our team meetings very much
focused on targets. So we would have our forecasting sheet in front of us
to show us how many clients we needed to get into accommodation in
each month to achieve our quarters.
Navigators had to track information about rough sleepers in the CHAIN database
as well as update the database themselves. Moreover, they had to collect tenancy
agreements and similar documents, evidence of people’s returns to their home
countries (for the assessment of the contested reconnection target), obtain service
users’ payslips if they worked, or obtain confirmation of volunteer work (among other
tasks).
105Author’s personal interview with Kathleen Sims (Service Development Manager at St Mungo’s),
5 September 2017.
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Technology systems play a crucial role in enabling this type of outcome culture. In
the case of Ways to Wellness, upon completion of the wellbeing assessments, link
workers have to record the results in a dedicated MIS. This system allows them to enter
a new referral and from that referral they can then log the Wellbeing Star assessments,
every contact they have with the patient, and every attempt to contact the patient. The
system also signals when the next Wellbeing Star assessment is due and issues reports
for the link workers so they can plan ahead.106 As Drinkwater elucidated:107
I think the link workers, as ever, resent having to spend time entering
data [laughs], they like seeing clients, they don’t like entering data—so
we tried to make that as simple as possible for them.
Educate Girls also made very pronounced use of technology. For instance, they
equipped staff with a mobile handset that had a tracking application. The application
traced volunteers’ movements and registered the location and time via GPS. Moreover,
the application was used ‘to register village & school level information like number
of girls & boys, school infrastructure, number of teachers, education quality and other
information mentioned in the School Assessment Chart’ (World Bank Group, 2017,
p. 14). The application was integrated with a dedicated performance-management
system that collected, aggregated, and monitored programme activities in the field
and provided a dashboard to study progress as well as roadblocks (Educate Girls,
2018, p. 11). This also meant that the NGO had to find individuals for the projects
who had the appropriate skill sets and experience. As Alison Bukhari, UK Director
of Educate Girls, explained (cited in Katsomitros, 2018, para. 2):
It took time to fully explain the DIB concept to the whole team and
align them around the new way of working. We had to hire people with
106Author’s personal interview withWays toWellness staff member, 1 August 2017; Author’s personal
interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness), 20 September 2017;
the MIS generates performance reports on Wellbeing Star improvements as well as reports on the
ethnic and gender splits (if patients agree to disclosed the information)
107Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017.
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different skills, as well as train and give regular ongoing professional
development to bring the teams up to speed, particularly in terms of the
data analysis.
As this delineation makes plain, such programmes do not simply financialise existing
operations but also require different skills that have not historically been needed in
those organisations and are not always readily available. The implementation of
impact bonds goes beyond simply measuring the work that would have been carried
out anyway, infiltrating everyday social work on a structural level and also in terms of
hiring procedures and professional formation.
This different way of ‘doing things’ is not limited to nonprofit and voluntary
organisations but also affects the ultimate outcome funders (i.e. public institutions
or charitable foundations) in that the focus on data-driven performance management
requires them to adapt to a different way of contracting and commissioning. The
auditing of the outcomes was performed by a GLA employee, who assessed the
status of the rough sleepers in the CHAIN database or reviewed documents such
as tenancy agreements. Based on the data, a different form of commissioning was
performed—‘outcome-based commissioning’ (cf. Government Outcomes Lab, 2017).
As Jonathan Qureshi (Senior Project Officer at the GLA) put on record:
‘It’s more than just the PbR, it’s having that good relationship (. . . ) when
we’re talking about evidence that the service providers have uploaded we
ask them: “can you tell us a bit about your exit strategy for Bob because
we know that you’ve put him into this place and we know he needs serious
mental health support”. (. . . ) But also, there’s a lot of admin (. . . ) It’s a
nightmare, it hurts your head, it’s a lot of work. (. . . ) There is that admin
side which is (. . . ) a bit boring as well, you know, you’re just checking
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[data], it’s not fun work—thinking you’re really helping people sleeping
rough, and you [just] do your ongoing contract monitoring.’108
This illustrates the ways in which, beyond the mobilisation of private monetary
capital, the impact bond structure gives rise to a different way of commissioning such
projects that relies on data verification and interpretation activities. The focus on
numerical output creates a (contemplative) distance between the everyday realities of
the homeless or out-of-school girls and the actors who analyse outcomes on a screen.
Yet, the outcome-oriented structure and culture of impact bonds does not only change
operations at the level of service providers and outcome funders but also assumes a
different role of investors, which I discuss in the next section.
The Role of the Factivist Investor
As the Center for Global Development & Social Finance (2013b) put it, ‘[t]he investors
are not passive sources of money: they have skin in the game, and so have reason
to pursue innovation and excellence to drive better results’ (p. 6; cf. Schinckus,
2017, p. 731). Impact bonds assume a rather active role of investor subjects that get
involved not only in the design and contracting of interventions but also in steering
and managing them. As Mason et al. (2017b, p. 80, emphasis added) emphasise with
regard to the London Homelessness SIB:
Social investors’ key role in working with the two provider organisations
was in overseeing the performance management of the SIB contract.
For those investing in St Mungo’s, this was a more active role through
the structure of the SPV. Results were reported to them on an initial
monthly and then quarterly basis. There was active and ongoing review
and collective discussion with St Mungo’s of performance. (. . . ) For
those investing in Thames Reach, one investor had a place as an observer
108Author’s personal interview with Jonathan Qureshi (Senior Project Officer at the GLA), 4
September 2017.
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on the organisation’s Board. This provided greater certainty for the other
investor about the performance management of the SIB.
The role of investors is thus not just seen as providers of capital, their role also consists
in supporting and challenging service provider staff to deliver better outcomes. In
contrast to other forms of impact investing (such as SRI or microcredits) investors
meet with the service providers on a regularly basis, discuss complex social problems,
and also offer advice and ‘out-of-the-box’ solutions in response to problems that
occur on the programmes. One of the investors of the London Homelessness SIB
said about the board meetings that service providers would:109
present figures to us for how things were going, we would look at that
versus expectations, we would discuss the issues that had arisen, come
up with questions, ideas for things that could change both in terms of
information, but also in terms of how the service was operating.
Thus, impact bonds not only give rise to a particular ‘ethos about the way money
is used’ (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008, p. 2), they also outline an interesting role for
investors and a particular form of investor agency. Similar to practices of venture
capital investment, investor subjects also need to provide time and expertise if
projects struggle to meet their targets (cf. Shachmurove, 2014). As Chris Drinkwater
explained:110
Bridges sit on our board and on an operational management group—they
have two representatives. We meet with them on a regular basis, at least
twice a month. (. . . ) They are very different from NHS contractors in
[that] they drive fairly hard in terms of the outcomes on the referrals and
for me I think this has been an enormous learning experience in terms of
rigour around contract management.
109Author’s phone interview with Russ Bubley (founder of ‘i for change’; investor) 20 November,
2017.
110Author’s personal interview with Ways to Wellness staff member, 1 August 2017.
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The emerging subject of the factivist investor is one that that seeks ‘hybrid deals’ (p.
76), for whom do-gooding and financial returns are commutated, where achieving
greater social impact maximises financial returns to capital. As I highlighted in
Section 4.2, Bridges’ Social Impact Bond fund includes investments from Deutsche
Bank but also the Great Manchester Pension Fund or the Merseyside Pension
Fund—investors that demand not only social, but financial return from the fund.
Similar to ‘activist investors’ (Engelen, Konings, & Fernandez, 2008), the facitivist
investor is represented on the board of the impact bond delivery vehicle, attends
meetings, and influences the programmes’ priorities and strategies.111 This role is
even more pronounced in the case of UBS Optimus Foundation which facilitated
the creation of the DIB as a ‘proof of concept’ to emphasise ‘the role of the private
sector in bridging the funding gap to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals’
(Gustafsson-Wright & Boggild-Jones, 2017, para. 4). Although the role of conducting
performance management was taken on by Instiglio, the foundation was closely
involved. While investors and intermediaries support and challenge service providers,
it can also get very uncomfortable for the latter if they fall behind their targets.
Investors and intermediaries sometimes do not only encourage but compel service
providers ‘to perform to profile’ (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018, p. 73) and as Bridges
Ventures (2014) emphasise in a report, investors may even go one step further and
‘replace service providers altogether’ (p. 24).112 Such hard-nosed practices are always
justified with both a concern for the people in need and the financial performance.
111Activist investors are entities such as hedge funds, private equity funds or sovereign wealth funds
that purchase a larger number of public companies’ shares in order to obtain seats on a firm’s board
and influence the strategy in a certain way.
112In the case of Ways to Wellness, two of the four service provider organisations pulled out in
the first three years. The organisations Changing Lives and HealthWORKS Newcastle struggled
financially, since they were not receiving enough referred patients. As Chris Drinkwater explained,
‘whether that’s in the control of [GP] practices or in the control of the provider is always difficult to
ascertain’. Either way, it meant that they were not doing well financially and had to pull out (Greater
Manchester Public Health Network, 2016, pp. 22–24).113
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The novel managerial perspectives that I observed in this space describe a very
particular kind of knowledge about situations characterised by precariousness, namely
the idea that a strict results culture allows for solving complex social issues. Beyond
trying to change the lives and destinies of people who have been relegated to the fringes
of society, impact bonds also re-image the non-profit sector as based on notions of
performance management. Actors in factivist finance get their hands ‘dirty’; they help
set up complex contractual, project steering and impact measurement structures; they
are involved in designing social interventions and metrics; help write invitations to
tender; attend board meetings to discuss how impact can be improved—and confront
service providers if they fail to perform to profile.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have examined the intervention models and impact metrics in the
context of three different case study projects. Although these projects revealed very
different conditions and structures, I delineated a specific mode of reasoning that
contextualises them, almost like a ‘net’ that is hung between the different elements.
Through abstraction and simplification, impact bonds bring a range of heterogeneous
problems and objects into a particular frame of calculation which is at once financial
and ethical, and also provides a novel repertoire for action both at the level of policy
making and charitable foundations.
Rather than attributing this mode of reasoning to a defined set of formal features
of impact bonds, various interviewees have emphasised that the impact bonds are
more of a certain ‘mindset’.114 As this chapter illustrates, this mindset revolves
around the creation of social value through ‘program activities that are substantiated
through field experiments, especially randomized controlled trials, which show lower
114Author’s personal interview with Chih Hoong Sin (Director of Innovation and Social Investment
at OPM Group), 6 September 2017 and Nick Henry (Professor of Economic Geography and SIB
Evaluator), 27 September 2017; see also Williams (2019, p. 12).
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cost while producing superior outcomes, over predecessors’ (Stoesz, 2014, p. 181).
Impact bonds’ focus on ‘facts’ and ‘empirical evidence’ reveals a very particular
kind of knowledge about situations characterised by precariousness, or the idea that
the truth can be found in numbers. The idea behind such an aspirational impetus
is to either maximise social outcomes for the homeless or minimise costs for the
public purse. The schemes were seen by many as a testing ground where actors
could ‘try out new approaches and demonstrate the benefits of early and preventative
intervention in complex areas’ (Ronicle, 2015, para. 5). Rather than just creating
another instance of ‘doing well while doing good’ (cf. Hamilton, Jo, & Statman,
1993), social actors foreground a capitalism that can work in the ‘goldilocks zone’ of
normative and practical appeal and improve ways of social service provision.
As my case studies show, this affects the operation of social interventions at the level
of welfare workers and volunteers who have to spend more time on data collection
and reporting, meetings with investors to discuss results etc. To continuously
generate numerical output, the schemes rely on sophisticated IT systems to track,
manage, and report data. Moreover, the schemes reveal a very particular kind of
investor involvement. Investors are not just seen as a passive source of money; their
role also consists of supporting, challenging, and even replacing, service provider
organisations to deliver better outcomes. Thus, ethical investors in this space not
simply choose certain investment opportunities and compile an ethical investment
portfolio. Impact bonds assume a rather active role of financial actors to attend
project board meetings, discuss complex social problems, and also provide advice in
response to problems that occur on the projects.
Having outlined the mode of reasoning observed in relation to these different impact
bond projects, the subsequent chapter will cover various conceptual and political
ambiguities of factivist finance, illustrating the peculiarities of transforming complex
social issues into stable metrics.
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6. The Perpetuation of Testing
In Chapter 5, I analysed how impact bonds are emblematic of the rise of a seemingly
scientific approach to ‘do-gooding’. I argued that this version of ethical finance
seeks to bring a greater measure of objectivity to the operation of social services.
Having outlined how the call for rigorous evidence mobilises financial actors, welfare
workers, and commissioners, I make a number of interventions in this chapter to
emphasise the conceptual and political ambiguity of impact bonds. In brief, I
illustrate that the ‘cold hard facts’, based on which actors seek to maximise blended
value, is much more complex and provisional than suggested. It incites efforts to
protect the interventions from too much external scrutiny, and too much politicisation,
on various levels. Moreover, I problematise the experimental nature of impact bonds
by arguing that they are ultimately not geared towards finding out ‘what works’ in
addressing complex social issues: ‘successful’ interventions are never integrated into
public provision (or traditional charitable funding), although it was demonstrated that
the tested approaches ‘work’. Instead, the approaches are again contracted as impact
bonds and ‘testing’, and the financial risk-taking associated with it, is perpetuated.
As the case study projects demonstrate, the data on which the schemes rely is much
more complex and provisional than suggested. In the run-up to an impact bond
project, there is always a negotiation process between commissioners, investors,
service providers, and intermediaries about the outcome metrics to be used. As a
result of such negotiations, impact bond metrics often come in the form of data that is
easy to collect and stands as ‘proxy’ for genuine social outcomes. The negotiation
154
processes need to be showcased and problematised, as they lay the foundation for the
ensuing data collection activities which are later used to judge ‘success’ and, in turn,
trigger payments.
Moreover, measuring changes in the behaviour and circumstances of service users
entails an array of practical implementation problems. For instance, sometimes
the ‘evidences’ (e.g. in the form of patient data sets) are not made available to the
projects or sometimes service users just discontinue participation in a programme
(and it cannot be verified what effects the programme had on them). In addition,
measurement bears the risk of statistically demonstrating that an impact bond-financed
intervention is not improving people’s lives. Due to the numerical output created,
such demonstrated failure is difficult to explain away—which puts public sector
commissioners in a bad light and potentially discourages future investors. The
transformation of social outcomes into ‘stable’ numbers and charts is thus manifestly
vulnerable and can, in itself, often not cope with critical interrogation. I argue that
the schemes therefore incite strategies to protect impact bonds from external scrutiny,
or to carefully manage any such scrutiny. Such strategies, for instance, consist in
lowering the evidencing requirements during service provision, awarding contracts to
service provider organisations that had already been part of the consultation prior to
the tendering process, or carefully orchestrating the production and circulation of
evaluation reports, made available at the right time to the appropriate audiences. I
argue that more data and reporting mechanisms do not necessarily, and certainly not
automatically, lead to greater (external) transparency. Rather, a great amount of work
goes into preserving the idea that the truth about precarious situations can be found
in numbers, and into demonstrating ‘improvement’ thus conceived.
The second issue that I highlight in this chapter, is the experimental nature
of these programmes. The prioritisation of measurable outcomes (rather than
prescribed processes) is said to allow third-sector providers the flexibility to work
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in non-prescribed, innovative ways that would otherwise not be eligible for direct
public funding, which tends to be risk-averse. Thus, ‘social investors are supposed
to take on some, or all, of the performance risk associated with experimental
service interventions’ (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018, p. 60; cf. Fraser et al., 2018,
p. 10). By taking over that role, financial actors are believed to open a space for
innovation and service experimentation as public institutions allegedly ‘struggled
to support or encourage innovation in the social arena’ (Dear et al., 2016, p. 12;
cf. Cooper et al., 2016). But my case studies suggest that even if impact bonds
manage to demonstrate success (according to the outcome metrics used), they are
terminated and not integrated into public provision (or traditional charity). Rather,
the projects are succeeded by a new impact bond-financed ‘experiment’ that tests
a practically identical intervention. Overall, I would argue this refutes the ‘testing
ground argument’, in other words, the idea that one needs private financing to
try out and experiment with new preventative approaches that entail considerable
non-performance risks (cf. Ronicle, 2015).
Impact bonds are performative of a new mode of subjectivity that is not so much
predicated on finding out ‘what works’ (Deering, 2014) through experimentation.
Rather, factivist investors, and accompanying advisory organisations, are authorised
by virtue of their practices of due diligence, data-driven project management and
disciplining of service providers—as this is taken to be to the greatest benefit of
underserved populations. It is the ultimate realisation of blended value: themore profit,
the more health, education, and basic welfare improvements. Only a complex interplay
between investors, social service providers, civil servants (and oftentimes advisors) is
believed to bring about the degree of rigour and focus needed to effectively tackle social
issues (rather than just alleviate suffering). The perpetuation of testing is not geared
towards finding out what works, but to how the good can be, demonstrably, maximised.
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I make this argument in two steps. In the first section I evince the instability of
impact bonds’ frames of calculation. I argue that measuring outcomes is much
more complex and provisional than suggested and incites ‘anti-political’ efforts to
suppress external scrutiny and contestation. So in many respects, the claim of greater
transparency and the pursuit of blended value are becoming increasingly symbolic.
In the second section I problematise the experimental nature of impact bonds by
arguing that successfully completed experiments do not lead to public provision (or
traditional charitable funding), but to the implementation of additional impact bonds.
So, rather than being a testing ground for novel intervention approaches, impact bonds
re-imagine the commissioning of social and development interventions as based on
‘evidence’ and outsourced financial risk (although it is known that approaches are
successful according to outcomes measurement). In the concluding section I restate
the argument and raise more fundamental questions about de-politicisation and ethical
agency, which I will turn to in the next chapter.
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6.1 The Politics of Outcome Targets
According to the project information released, the projects were all overtly successful.
At the end of the London Homelessness SIB, half of the service users were in
accommodation and 22% had sustained a tenancy for at least 18 months (Mason et al.,
2017b, pp. 26–28). Although both sub-programs failed to meet all the agreed-upon
outcome targets, the SIB achieved 79% of the amount that would have been paid had
all the targets been achieved.(Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 26–37). Staff from service
providers and investors put on record that they were satisfied with the overall social
and financial overall performance (Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 14–15). As a navigator
who had worked on one of the projects pointed out, ‘I think it has had a really positive
effect on the clients. It gave them options that they wouldn’t have had, and choice’.115
The DCLG published a final impact evaluation which emphasised that ‘a significant
positive impact is still possible even when targets are not met’ (DCLG, 2017, p. 34).116
The Educate Girls DIB surpassed both of its outcome targets. Instead of the targeted
662 out-of-school girls, the programme managed to enrol 768 girls in school, which
amounts to an achievement rate of 116%. The learning targets were (over)achieved
by 160%, with learning levels growing 79% more than those of peers in other schools
in the final year. As Saldinger (2018) notes, the ‘Educate Girls DIB had not been on
track to meet the bond’s goals, but made such progress in year three that it managed
to significantly exceed them’ (para. 3). These results triggered a three-year 15%
internal rate of return (IRR) payout for UBS Optimus, which amounts to a striking
52% return on the investment overall. Specifically, UBS Optimus invested $270,000
upfront. Children’s Investment Fund Foundation paid UBS Optimus $420,000. From
the resulting $150,000, UBS Optimus gave the NGO $50,000 which was agreed as
an incentive for the NGO from the start. Obviously this figure does not include the
115Author’s interview with Michael Buckley (Manager at Thames Reach and former Navigator),
October 10, 2017.
116As elucidated in Section 5.3, this final evaluation used PSM to compare the target group to another
group of rough sleepers who did not benefit from the intervention.
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setup costs of the DIB, which would normally be borne by investors, and which were
about three times as high as the amount Educate Girls spent on the implementation of
the programme. These figures are meant to look good, as a showcase project in the
development space.
The jury is still out on the Ways to Wellness project, but the interim results are
promising. According to these results, the programme supported 3,400 patients (out
of 4,500 referrals) between April 2015 and April 2018 (Government Outcomes Lab,
2018c). Of those 3,400 persons, almost 2,000 had been in the programme for six
months or longer and had an average improvement on the Wellbeing Star assessment
of 3.3 points. The target was 1.5 points and the score thus points to overtly positive
interim results. The three top areas of improvement were: (i) ‘lifestyle’, (ii) ‘work,
volunteering and other activities’, and (iii) ‘feeling positive’. With regard to the
reduction of secondary care costs (for which payments only started to become effective
as of autumn 2017), the data indicated an 11% reduction of secondary care costs
relative to the comparison group in April 2018 (which is well below the target of 22%).
However, according to the organisation’s 2018 annual report, it was ‘above target in
achievement of both outcomes in 2017/18’ (Ways ToWellness Foundation, 2018, p. 3).
In all of the three case study projects, there was a rather long development phase during
which the different stakeholder groups debated various approaches tomeasurement and
had toreach an agreement on projects goals that are socially and economically desirable,
measurable, and also attainable for service providers. The London Homelessness SIB
went through a stage of preliminary analysis during which the DCLG discussed the
proposed intervention and possible metrics with different stakeholder groups in the
homelessness sector. Informal consultations with a range of stakeholders working
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on homelessness and rough sleeping were held to conceptualise the SIB. As Jeremy
Swain, Chief Executive at Thames Reach, explained:117
We’ve been talking with them and helping to shape the SIB for rough
sleepers probably 18 months before it was actually released as an
opportunity. That was good for us, because we were able to shape
it. And then there came the time when it was getting too close to
the commencement when, for reasons to do with procurement and
commissioning, we could no longer be involved, otherwise it would have
been seen to be giving us an unfair advantage. And it wasn’t just Thames
Reach involved in developing it, there were a number of homelessness
organisations, probably eight or nine. So this was way back, probably
2010.
However, other stakeholders consulted ‘did not support the commissioning of a SIB
for homelessness and felt that the consultation presented “a fait accompli” rather than
an opportunity to meaningfully shape the scheme’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 19).
The various outcome targets that resulted from this consultation process put the
emphasis on getting rough sleepers off the streets. This raises a fundamental question
related to impact bonds’ measurement activities. Actors often make sacrifices on the
(scientific) ‘rigour’ of measurement practices. In-depth research into changes in the
wellbeing, knowledge, behaviour, and circumstances of service users is complex,
intricate, and very expensive. For this reason, the actors agreed on targets that allow
for ‘streamlined’ data collection and that stand as ‘proxy’ for genuine, and long-term
social outcomes (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 29; Albertson & Fox, 2018, p.
80; Lowe & Wilson, 2017, p. 988).
117Author’s personal interview with Jeremy Swain (Chief Executive at Thames Reach), 2 October
2017.
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For instance, actors agreed that it was important for rough sleepers to reduce their
substance abuse as about a third of the target group had a substance misuse support
need according to the CHAIN database (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 8). It is, however,
very difficult to measure whether someone reduces substance abuse; therefore, the
group went for outcomes around sustained accommodation as this signals that people
are capable of successfully managing their issues.118 But if a service user manages
not to sleep rough, the effects of the impact bond on his or her substance abuse
or mental health are very difficult to ascertain. The ‘results’ of such interventions
can only be an approximation as there might be a gap between achieving the pre-
defined goals and improving thewellbeing and personal circumstances of an individual.
Moreover, there are not-so-social elements that enter impact bonds’ frame of
calculation. A striking example is the ‘reconnections’ target, which was a very delicate
metric. While such reconnections mainly comprised ‘assisted voluntary repatriation’
(DCLG, 2014, p. 1), they also included cases of administrative removal and deportation.
According to the feasibility study conducted prior to the implementation, ‘[a]lthough
not specified as project outcome, of critical importance for the SIB to be successful
is the qualitative and quantitative improvements in reconnection and removal work
of illegal immigrants’ (p. 51). This recommendation was later transformed into an
outcome target of the project, seeking to repatriate non-UK nationals without a right
to reside in the UK, as well as individuals who had a right to remain but who agreed
to return. As an investor put on record: 119
We, the investors, always had a very uneasy relationship with one of the
outcomes which is around the one which is coyly termed ‘reconnections’.
(...) And for obvious reasons people were rather uncomfortable with that,
you know, conceptually uncomfortable. But the charity and the investors
118Author’s personal interview with Tim Gray (former advisor to the DCLG on homelessness), 14
September 2017.
119Author’s phone interview with Russ Bubley (founder of ‘i for change’; investor) 20 November,
2017.
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were aligned on the belief that this was not some outcome that should be
striven to be achieved unless it was in the best interests of the person and
you know that was agreed before we even invested, to be honest, that was
something the GLA or the DCLG wanted, but it was not something that
we wanted.
This illustrates how, albeit in consultation with various homelessness stakeholders,
it was ultimately the DCLG and the GLA that defined the outcome targets, put a
maximum price on them, and subsequently let the bidders compete to try and deliver
the pre-defined outcomes as effectively as possible. Rather than being a result of
investor interests, the ‘reconnections’ reflect the ‘aim (. . . ) to create (. . . ) a really
hostile environment for illegal migration’ (Kirkup, 2012, para. 7), which the then
Home Secretary Theresa May called for in May 2012 (the SIB was launched in
November 2012).
In the case of Ways to Wellness, many different outcome metrics had been discussed
but ‘discounted for either being unmeasurable or not a direct or reliable proxy for the
outcome sought’ (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 9). One of the key difficulties was
to come up with metrics that reflect both, individual health improvements for patients
and savings from reduced secondary care costs. As Ronicle and Stanworth (2015)
note, ‘[t]he fragmentation of health commissioning means that some of the outcomes
and benefits of the SIB (e.g. to primary care) are not being measured and paid for’ (p.
1). As many interviewees stated, the schemes ‘prioritised the metrics relevant to the
system, not for the service users and professionals’.120 In the run-up to the SIB, it
was very difficult for the steering group to get the CCG on board. The main ‘impact’
from an NHS perspective could be seen in primary care cost savings (e.g. fewer GP
appointments). However, as Bridges Ventures (2016, p. 4) note:
120Author’s personal interview with Chih Hoong Sin (Director of Innovation and Social Investment at
OPMGroup), 6 September 2017, Ways to Wellness staff member, 1 August 2017, and Chris Drinkwater
(Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness), 20 September 2017.
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The NHS cannot easily fund this kind of community-based social care,
which comes under the remit of local authorities; while local authorities
have little incentive to invest in preventative health services when the
financial benefits accrue elsewhere.
At the time the metrics were negotiated, GP contracts were the responsibility of
NHS England and not the CCGs, so the latter could not benefit financially from a
reduction in GP appointments, but could benefit from savings in secondary care
costs.121 Although the number of GP appointments would be an evident metric to
understand the health effects of the service, the commissioning body in this case
just did not have a financial incentive to look at GP appointments. The outcome
target the group eventually agreed on was ‘secondary care acute usage’, which is
obviously less directly related to the social prescribing activities of the programme.
As an interviewee put it, ‘in health, you’re often trying to change (. . . ) how patients
are going to age and it might be decades from there that you’re saving hospital costs;
it may not be quite the right measurement’.122
The metrics of the Educate Girls DIB were less contested in the design phase
(as they resulted from the proposal the NGO had already put together for the
competition). However, the measurement method was subject to difficult discussions.
The intermediary, Instiglio, had proposed outcomes and how they ought to be
measured and evaluated. While the outcome payer, CIFF, and the investor, UBS
Optimus, pushed for the rigorous ‘gold standard’, that is, an RCT, the service provider,
Educate Girls, wanted to employ a more scalable measurement method. As Avnish
Gungadurdoss, cofounder and managing director at Instiglio said, ‘I thought it might
not happen at that point’ (cited in Saldinger, 2016, para. 18). Eventually, the
stakeholders agreed to use an RCT with a large sample size ‘given the scrutiny the
bond would be under’ (Saldinger, 2016, para. 19). While the intervention employed
121This division of responsibility has changed in the meantime (Welikala, 2015).
122Author’s personal interview with Tara Case (Chief Executive at Ways to Wellness), 1 August 2017.
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such a rigorous approach to measure school enrolment and learning outcomes, the
children’s wellbeing had not been assessed in the context of intervention. Given the
caste and gender hierarchies that surround these children, it would have been important
for the intervention to do so. As Emily Gustafsson-Wright critically remarked:
I would like to have seen (. . . ) some outcomes related to social-emotional
development, so not just the Hindi and math and English. It would have
been nice to see something about, sort of considering the whole child
and social-emotional development (. . . ). There are various kinds of
assessments, that are either self-, or observational-, or teacher-based,
and there are challenges with those, but I think (. . . ) that’s a more
comprehensive view of child development, I think.
What I have been trying to evince with the examples above is that impact bonds’
metrics are the consequence of negotiations, struggles, and certain contingent turns,
and encompass different normative assumptions and priorities. My point is, simply,
that the claim that impact bonds are only committed to cold hard facts is problematic
as their ‘research focus’ is always the result of a negotiation process. This process is
constituted by scientific knowledges, economic conditions, and actors with different
social positions, material interests, and moral values. With reference to Collier (2009)
I would argue that different forms of power operate simultaneously, reconfiguring
existing mentalities and practices of government. The resulting outcome targets
cannot be straightforwardly attributed to the knowledge of applied research in
social work, social pedagogy, psychology or medicine. Rather, the metrics devised
encompass a host of different rationalities and techniques.
Beyond the contingency of such goal-setting processes, outcomes measurement
always entails practical implementation problems, for example, in the form-flawed
baseline data to begin with, the non-availability of data, cohort members that simply
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‘disappear’, or metrics that turn out to measure ‘the wrong thing’. In the next section,
I take a closer look at the instability of outcomes measurement.
6.2 Fragile Measurement and Anti-Political
Strategies
Beyond questions of how outcomes are defined, the case study projects also revealed
an array of practical problems related to data collection and reporting. In the case of
the London Homelessness SIB, some service users occasionally slept rough whilst in
accommodation. Some of them met friends on the other side of London and just
slept rough for one night when it seemed too much effort to go home late at night.123
Others slept rough because they were looking after a friend on the streets who was
ill. Again others would just spend a night outside on a summer night. This posed
a problem to actors, since the achievement of outcomes was measured based on
the ‘bedded down street contacts’ in each quarter recorded in the CHAIN database.
Agencies would register rough sleepers in the system if they had been seen sleeping
rough. For some of those individuals the provider could not claim payments although
they were, technically, housed. (Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 38, 42).
Navigators also struggled to collect the necessary information to evidence the
‘reconnections’. They gave mobile phones to clients and had to contact authorities
and the clients’ relatives, so that they could confirm a successful return. But as
the DCLG (2014) states in the first interim report about the London Homelessness
SIB, ‘telephone calls can be expensive, as can text messages, and those reconnected
rarely have access to email’ (p. 76). So in many cases, the providers could not
claim payments because the evidence was missing. Eventually, the project board
agreed to pay providers where there were problems to provide evidence of successful
123Author’s phone interview with Russ Bubley (founder of ‘i for change’; investor) 20 November,
2017.
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reconnection: ‘the evidencing requirements were changed during year one to enable
providers to claim both outcomes, and receive payments, when sustained reconnection
was evidenced via CHAIN’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 59). Thus, the project ceased to
have proof of a successful return to the home countries and connection with friends
and families. It was sufficient for non-UK nationals just to disappear from the streets
of London and not come back.
Another measurement-related issue for the London Homelessness SIB was that the
NHS retracted a previous data-sharing agreement. The achievements for the ‘better
health management’ target could therefore not be assessed at all. The proportion of
A&E episodes was planned to be compared against a baseline, but since the NHS
retracted a previous data-sharing agreement and withheld the respective data, the
achievements of this outcome target could not be verified. As the DCLG (2015)
emphasised, this posed ‘a quandary to the Project Board and GLA and DCLG as
commissioners’ (p. 53). Eventually, the service providers were paid as if they had
achieved the targets (based on their original projections), and in lieu of the data being
available (Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 14, 29, 73).
Ways to Wellness had issues with the cohort size on which the metrics were based.
It turned out there were not enough LTC patients living in the West of Newcastle
to meet the targets over seven years. Although the patient population diagnosed
with LTC is growing incrementally in the area, the SIB will not get access to
all patients because, on the one hand, not all GP practices refer their patients to
Ways to Wellness and, on the other hand, not all patients are willing to use the
service.124 This poses a problem for the service providers, who get paid based on the
number of patients they support, and also for the investor (Bridges FundManagement).
124uthor’s personal interview with Tara Case (Chief Executive at Ways to Wellness), 1 August 2017.
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Moreover, some of the service provider organisations working for Ways to Wellness
did not record the meetings and Wellbeing Star assessments in the MIS the project
had implemented for this purpose. As Jo Curry, the Chief Executive of Changing
Lives explained, many link workers did not follow up with patients in due course, log
all the information etc., which resulted in a reduction of payments.125 One of the
reasons for this might have been the MIS which has been reported to be error-prone
by link workers—in contrast to the investor Bridges Fund Management who speaks
of a ‘[r]obust MIS system from Day 1’ (Bridges Ventures, 2015, p. 8). In any case,
failure to collect and enter Wellbeing Star-related data into the system was reported to
have been an issue ‘on the ground’.126
In the case of the Educate Girls DIB, there were also various measurement-related
problems. As Saldinger (2018) points out, actors ‘relied on problematic secondary
data for the baseline surveys’ (para. 38). The DIB started off with a target beneficiary
number of 18,000, but then realised ‘statistics were off by approximately 10 percent’
(Gungadurdoss, 2016, para. 17) and the learning targets thus overly ambitious. The
outcome targets and the pricing had to be renegotiated when actors discovered that
the baseline data were unreliable. Moreover, as Emily Gustafsson-Wright, who
has authored several analyses of the DIB, emphasises ‘enrolment doesn’t measure
attendance (. . . ) and if [service users] are not attending, they aren’t learning, and
to some extent the learning outcomes try to capture that’.127 This is interesting,
especially as certain students just disappeared, for instance because they moved away
or declined participation later on. Although those individuals were recorded as part
of the group, they had no final score. The students who had ‘disappeared’ were
125Author’s personal interview with Jo Curry (Executive Director at Changing Lives), 21 September
2017.
126Author’s personal interview with Matilda Harrison (Link Worker at Mental Health Concern), 21
September 2017 and Jo Curry (Executive Director at Changing Lives), 21 September 2017).
127Author’s personal interview with Emily Gustafsson-Wright (Fellow at the Center for Universal
Education, Brookings Institution), 13 October 2017.
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simply excluded from the result analysis; the DIB simply excluded 4% of the enrolled
students from the analysis. As Saldinger (2018, p. 30) explains:
Students who could not be found, and therefore had no final or endline
scores, were not included in the analysis, which raises some concerns
about overestimating the impact. IDinsight acknowledged the risk and
did the repeated home visits in an effort to mitigate that risk. The result
was that 4 percent of students had no endline score, due largely to students
moving or declining to participate.
I have argued that impact metrics are somewhat unstable, ambiguous even, and their
performative lists of actions and expected outcomes is necessarily, and manifestly,
vulnerable: baseline data is flawed, cohort members simply ‘walk away’, metrics turn
out to measure ‘the wrong thing’ or even demonstrate that an intervention approach is
‘not’ working, etc. Thus, impact bonds’ frameworks for attributing worth to ‘the
social’ cannot, in themselves, cope with critical interrogation, which poses a problem
to all the actors involved.
The preservation of the frames of impact measurement and performance reporting
therefore incites what Andrew Barry (2002) refers to as ‘anti-political work’ (p.
280). When particular issues—for instance the gender gap in Indian education—are
translated into domains of practices that are mediated by socio-technologically
infrastructures (what Barry terms metrological regimes), actors always need to
protect these domains from too much scrutiny. Barry (2002) argues that actors either
need to make sure that the action does not provoke too much scrutiny in the first place
or, if scrutiny occurs, it needs to be managed, channeled etc.
I would extend this notion and argue that it is not just metrics and measurement
practices that need to be protected against too much scrutiny, it is factivist finance’s
mode of reasoning that is at stake. Although impact bonds emerge as a ‘heterogeneous
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space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 100), constituted through different forms of power, this
space cannot defend itself against the interferences of political confrontation—it
needs protection.
For instance, the London Homelessness SIB under-performed in various areas and
struggled to meet respective pre-defined outcome targets. Its claims did not play out
as predicted. This might be by virtue of the intransigent nature of social problems
such as homelessness. The outcome targets for the reduction of unsheltered sleeping
were largely not met. This points to the intransigent nature of entrenched rough
sleeping and the fact that it may take more than three years to help people get off the
streets—or to acknowledge that it might be virtually impossible for some of them to
maintain an accommodation.
Many individuals in the cohort had comparatively high alcohol, drug and mental
health needs, and sometimes made over £200 a day from street begging. As a
navigator emphasised, ‘it’s very hard to stop someone’.128 The bevy of final reports
on the SIB included the DCLG’s own ‘impact evaluation’, which departs from the
outcome targets and instead focuses on the difference between the intervention and
two ‘well-matched’ comparison groups from 2010 and 2011 which did not benefit
from the SIB. The emphasis of the report lies on demonstrating that ‘a significant
positive impact is still possible even when targets are not met’ (DCLG, 2017, p. 34).
Thus, a positive message was sent—although the comparison groups were taken from
2010–2012 rather than from the same time period (2012–2014), which critically
limits the conclusiveness of the evaluation.
128Author’s personal interview with Michael Buckley (Manager and former Navigator at Thames
Reach), 10 October 2017. While both service providers managed to reduce rough sleeping among the
cohort, they missed the overall targets of the main outcome targets (which accounted for 90% of the
funding allocated): reduction of rough sleeping, putting service users into stable accommodation129,
and the contested ‘reconnection’ target (Mason et al., 2017b).130
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Instances of anti-political work can also be delineated in the case of Ways to
Wellness. As the numbers for the savings in secondary care costs did not indicate
a significant difference to the control group in summer 2017, investors sought to
obtain more data from the NHS to identify other ways of demonstrating a positive
impact.131 Although the scheme was over-performing with regard to the Wellbeing
Star targets, the care costs are the more relevant metric, as they account for 70%
of the outcome payments (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015, p. 4). As the Chair and
Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness confirmed, ‘we are discussing it with the CCG
in terms of adding savings in GP time, so it is certainly under discussion’.132 This
illustrates how actors—if the numbers reported do not meet the outcome targets
despite all the performance management activities—can also try to ‘jump’ at a
different metric to still arrive at positive numbers. Rather than being a testing ground
for determining the causal effects of a social intervention, impact bonds seem to be
about demonstrating ‘some form of impact’ if the numbers do not improve over time.
Although factivist finance recombines heterogeneous elements and logics (i.e. it
is not a structural logic of policy innovation), once it is ‘made up’ in this way, it
needs to be protected in order for it to behave like the places, outcomes, and subjects
described in policy. It is, quite simply, very complicated to measure social outcomes,
and impact bonds’ performative lists of interventions and expected social outcomes
cannot, in themselves, cope with critical interrogation.
This point is further illustrated by the aspect that the impact bonds contracts were
typically awarded to service provider organisations that had already been part of the
consultation prior to the tendering process (cf. Section 6.3). They were organisations
that already hat a seat at the top-table discussions about outcome-based commissioning
and that commissioners and investors could trust. Moreover, much effort was put into
131Author’s personal interview with Tara Case (Chief Executive at Ways to Wellness), 1 August
2017; see also Government Outcomes Lab (2018c).
132Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017.
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the careful orchestration of the production and circulation of project information in
the context of all three projects. Reports were made available at the right time to the
appropriate audiences. The emphasis on scientific rigour is very pronounced in all of
these documents.
6.3 Performing Uncertainty: The Normalisation of
Testing
The prioritisation of measurable outcomes (rather than prescribed processes) is said
to allow third-sector providers the flexibility to work in innovative ways that would
otherwise not be eligible for direct public funding, which tends to be risk-averse
(Fraser et al., 2018). As Toby Eccles, one of Social Finance’s founders emphasises in
a blog post (Eccles, 2016, para. 3):
The supposed profits that investors make, are compensation for the risk
they take in paying for untested interventions and providing upfront
capital to voluntary organisations. It is not about making money out of
misery or commoditising individual distress.
The claim about pre-financing untested approaches has been made repeatedly in the
context of the case study projects that I analyse. The navigator model employed by
the London Homelessness SIB was said to be an innovative approach and a ‘contrast
to the way services would usually be organized with a range of different providers and
staff’ (Farr, 2016, p. 2016; DCLG, 2015). The same applies to the Ways to Wellness
intervention which is portrayed as a ‘truly innovative approach which would have been
too risky without seed funding from social investment’ (Ronicle & Stanworth, 2015,
p. 1; Bridges Fund Management, 2015; Government Outcomes Lab, 2018c). The
same argument has beenmadewith regard to Educate Girls’ approach (cf. Section 4.4).
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The three intervention approaches, however, were by no means uncharted territory.
When the Educate Girls DIB was launched, the service provider had already existed
for seven years, enrolled over 100,000 out-of-school girls and improved educational
outcomes for more than 390,000 children in India with similar approaches that were
based on volunteers at the village level. For this work, the NGO already received the
2015 Award for Social Entrepreneurship from the Skoll Foundation (Educate Girls,
2015; Gustafsson-Wright & Gardiner, 2016, p. 19).133 As Loraque (2018) clarifies,
‘[t]hey had run some randomized control trials and knew it was working, but not
necessarily in all places or as best possible’ (p. 68).
In the case of Ways to Wellness, there had also been forerunner interventions. For
instance, theWest End Health Resource Centre had already supported people with
activities outside the GP surgery, ‘to live healthier lives in terms of getting more
exercise, eating better, drinking less alcohol, smoking less cigarettes’.134 Reflecting
such efforts to improve people’s self-care and wellbeing through sustained lifestyle
changes, proponents in the Northeast had also published a guide for commissioners,
primary health care teams, and health/wellbeing boards in 2011. This guide contained
a model to improve outcomes for people with long-term conditions ‘by engaging with
local non-traditional providers (e.g. charities, community organisations and social
enterprises) to meet their needs’ (NHS, 2011, p. 5). Thus, there had been a great
deal of preliminary work and analysis that underpinned Ways to Wellness’ social
prescribing approach.
The London Homelessness SIB was designed to address a gap between the two
existing initiatives No Second Night Out (which aimed to ensure new homeless
individuals receive and immediate intervention) and RS205 (which targeted long-term
133The Skoll Foundation is a leading organisation for social entrepreneurship founded by eBay’s first
president Jeffrey Skoll
134Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017.
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entrenched rough sleepers) (Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 3, 9). Thus, while the navigator
model (and the freedoms around the usage of funds) was new, there had been similar
forerunner interventions and the service providers already knew the prospective
service users. As a Service Development Manager at St Mungo’s pointed out, ‘out of
the list of 415 names I personally knew at least 200 of these people; so we weren’t
here to sort of parachute in.’.135
It is not clear how ‘untested’ the intervention models of the three impact bonds
were A similar observation is made by Gardiner and Gustafsson-Wright (2015) who
argues, based on a systematic literature review and over 70 interviews, ‘that very few
of the programs financed by SIBs were truly innovative in that they had never been
tested before, but that many were innovative in that they applied interventions in new
settings or in new combinations’ (para. 12). Beyond questions about their capacity to
enhance innovation, it is interesting to see what happens once an impact bond is
successfully completed. The notion of the ‘testing ground’ suggests that once actors
understand how effective a given intervention is, this models could be integrated
into public provision and scaled up. Again quoting Gustafsson-Wright, Atinc, and
Gardiner (2016) the findings of such field experiments could ‘help effective social
services reach scale by encouraging government to fund programs at scale after
the impact bond is over or by improving data use and performance management in
government-funded services broadly’ (para. 5).
As the case study projects demonstrate, this is not necessarily the case. On the
one hand, the interventions just ‘stop’ after the predefined term and such abrupt
terminations can threaten the sustainability of particular outcomes. Former service
users often feel ‘abandoned’ when an impact bond abruptly ends and would favour
‘more of a transition period’ (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018, p. 72). In the case of
135Author’s personal interview with Kathleen Sims (Service Development Manager at St Mungo’s),
5 September 2017.
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the London Homelessness SIB, some service users in the private rented sector were
moved to hostels again (Mason et al., 2017b, pp. 82–83)—which was the exact
opposite of what the impact bond sought to do (hostels are typically a first step
from the street). Service users were also handed over to other existing homelessness
services. As a Thames Reach navigator commented (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 56):
Before the service has ended we have given clients back to other
mainstream services and they haven’t always been pleased about that.
They don’t want the load.
In the case of Educate Girls, it is not entirely clear what happened to the girls after
the completion of the project. An Educate Girls representative put on record that
the organisation is ‘likely to continue working in Bhilwara doing “monitoring and
troubleshooting”’ (Chandrasekhar, n.d., para. 45). In the case of Ways to Wellness,
the jury is still out as the completion year of the project is 2022. As Eccles (2018)
emphasises, to date, none of the successfully tested and completed impact bonds
have been directly continued—be it through private funding or an integration into
statutory provision.136 This is where the venture capital analogy arguably falls short.
In contrast to successful private sector startup companies, which enter a growth stage
and eventually a buyout/initial public offering, impact bonds are just discontinued, to
the detriment of service users.
As my case studies revealed, however, programmes are often followed by a
successor impact bond (at a later point in time) which essentially replicates the
same intervention (with minor modification), targeting a different group. By way of
136As Eccles (2018) mentions, and as discussed in Section 4.2, this statement is at least contested
with regard to the Peterborough SIB case. This programme was originally structured to have a duration
of eight years, but was reduced to five years because the MoJ privatised the probation service through
the ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ programme which led to the ‘disappearance’ of both the third cohort
and the control group (Deering & Feilzer, 2015; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2015). According to some
commentators, this proves the success of the programme (since it was mainstream before it even
ended), yet for others, it means that the effects of the programme were just unknown (due to the early
completion). While billed as the successor to the Peterborough SIB, ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’
actually shares rather few features with the SIB (Government Outcomes Lab, 2019c).
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illustration, the London Homelessness SIB was followed by a project called ‘Rough
Sleeping Social Impact Bond’ in late 2017, again delivered by Thames Reach and St
Mungos over a period of 42 months (Government Outcomes Lab, 2018a; Thames
Reach, 2018, p. 8).137 As Thames Reach’s Chief Executive pointed out, ‘the second
SIB is very similar to the first, but the metrics are slightly different, so there’s a
health metric and a wellbeing metric which is different to the one we had before,
and it’s a cohort of 175 different individuals, again long-term rough sleepers’138
Moreover, the new SIB no longer included the highly controversial reconnection target.
The actors involved in Educate Girls had received positive feedback from the
government of Rajasthan and hope that the scheme might be something that the
government will consider as part of their education budget going forward (World
Bank Group, 2017). Interestingly, these efforts were not geared towards providing the
government with a model that can be integrated into a statutory provision, but to turn
the DIB into a SIB (i.e. with the government acting as outcome funder). As Jared
Lee, Principal at the Education Outcomes Fund emphasised (quoted in UBS Optimus
Foundation, 2018b, p. 11):
The DIB structure should facilitate government buy-in early on to ensure
long term sustainability of interventions (DIBs transitioning to SIBs).
According to this logic, the ultimate goal of DIBs is for public institutions in
low-income countries also to start commissioning SIBs (cf. Government Outcomes
Lab, 2019b). A transition from financialised development aid to financialised social
policy, so to speak. But although there seems to have been talks with the state
137Moreover, ThamesReach successfully bid for another SIB contract in London, along an organisation
called ‘Crisis’, the so-called ‘Single Homeless Prevention Service (SHPS)’ in Brent. This scheme aims
to provide support to adults who are at risk of becoming homeless by preventing them from being
evicted and supporting them to find an apartment if they are not in stable accommodation (Government
Outcomes Lab, 2018b).
138Author’s personal interview with Jeremy Swain (Chief Executive at Thames Reach), 2 October
2017. Interestingly, the wellbeing metric mentioned is based on self-reported wellbeing according
to the Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS)—a tool that appears to be very
similar to the Wellbeing Star assessment (cf. Tennant et al., 2007). Thus there is a certain degree of
cross-fertilisation with regard to measurement techniques employed in the context of impact bonds.
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government of Rajasthan after the remarkably successful completion of the first
project, this transition could not (yet) be contrived.
Instead of a handing-over of the DIB model to Indian public institutions as a SIB, the
Educate Girls DIB was followed by yet another DIB, the so-called ‘Quality Education
India DIB’, which ‘is building on the success of the first DIB in education, the
Educate Girls DIB’ (Government Outcomes Lab, 2019b, para. 14). This projects
funds improved learning outcomes over four years for more than 300,000 primary
school children in Delhi and Gujarat (Gustafsson-Wright & Boggild-Jones, 2018a).
This programmes is supported by prominent development actors that ‘are increasingly
entering this space’ (OECD, 2019, p. 182). The stakeholders in this new project, in
addition to UBS Optimus Foundation, are the Michael & Susan Dell Foundation,
Tata Trusts, Comic Relief, DFID, Prince Charles’s British Asian Trust and British
Telecom (Fahad, 2018).
The testing ground argument lends itself to the idea that impact bonds are about some
form of research that requires financial risk-taking to identify new and innovative
approaches that lead to better results. But while this argument still is a central
narrative thread of impact bonds, the fact that successfully tested interventions just get
recommissioned as impact bonds (or DIBs are transformed into SIBs) is somewhat
obfuscated in the discourse. As Griffiths and Meinicke (2014, p. 38) point out:
If the commissioner is very certain about the success of the programme,
then the additional costs associated with the risk transfer may be hard to
justify and the case for using a SIB may not be strong.
In a similar vein, one of the investors in the London Homelessness SIB pointed out:139
Why would anyone ever re-commission a SIB? If it’s worked why would
you re-commission it on a results-basis? You know it works. It would be
139Author’s phone interview with Russ Bubley (founder of i for change; investor) 20 November, 2017.
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cheaper for you to have a straight commission. If it hasn’t worked—why
bother? It’s only for those few in the middle, that end up in that grey area
(. . . ) only there might it make sense to re-commission as a SIB. So they
kind of contain the seeds of their own destruction.
The political problem seems to be that impact bonds do not contain the seeds of
their own destruction—quite to the contrary. An important direct consequence of
the London Homelessness SIB was the creation of the Fair Chances Fund (£15
million), a public funding initiative to support the scoping, design, and the operation
of impact bonds ‘so that these may be taken up more widely by central and local
government’ (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018, p. 62). As a former DCLG Commissioner
elucidated, ‘the Fair Chances Fund we’d never have done if we hadn’t done the
London Homelessness SIB’.140
To my mind, this refutes the ‘testing ground argument’, i.e. that private financing
is needed to try out and experiment with new preventative approaches that entail
considerable performance risks that cannot be borne by the public purse. Rather
than ‘testing’ new interventions, ‘testing’ arguably takes on a life of its own and gets
perpetuated. It seems as if impact bonds are here to stay: a configuration of disparate
practices, agents, calculative devices and subjects that informs the re-imagination
of the social and development sector as based on notions of empirical evidence and
‘cold hard facts’. Interestingly, in Bridges Ventures’ public announcement of their
second Social Outcomes Fund (which amounts to up to £35 million), Mila Lukic,
Head of Social Outcomes Contracts, is quoted as follows (Bridges Fund Management,
2019, para. 7):
The early ‘social impact bonds’ were used to test experimental new
services on a relatively small scale. The new generation of social
outcomes contracts are more about promoting greater flexibility and
140Author’s personal interview with Tim Gray (former advisor to the DCLG on homelessness), 14
September 2017.
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innovation in the delivery of existing services, using a data-driven
approach that helps us better understand how to improve outcomes at
scale for some of the most vulnerable people in the country.
The focus of impact bonds is increasingly on ‘large-scale system change’ (Dear
et al., 2016, p. 63)—understood as the provision of larger impact bonds
that reach more service users. This also implies that the substantial design,
measurement and governance costs of impact bonds can be better justified
(as the interventions reach more people), and that the programmes thus become
more profitable for investors (Fraser et al., 2018; Impact BondsWorking Group, 2019).
Rather than finding out ‘what works’ (Deering, 2014), the impact bond concept is
shifting towards state-endorsed blended value creation. In view of the multiplicity
of social needs, governments and charitable foundations seek to deal ‘economically’
with limited resources, i.e. maximise the social impact (with a given quantity of input
resources) or minimise the cots for the public purse (so that governments can spend
the money on interventions that effectively help people in need) (Kohli, Besharov, &
Costa, 2012, p. 5). A former advisor to the DCLG explained:141
A lot of public sector money is given to various groups who take the
money and employ staff, but it doesn’t necessarily achieve very good
outcomes (. . . ), and nobody measures it properly. If we do something
like the SIB then we know we’re only going to pay for achieved outcomes.
The role of investors in this setup does not so much consists in facilitating experiments
and enhancing innovation, but in driving the maximisation of social outcomes (even
if approaches are known to function). The impetus of such programmes is on ‘doing
good better’ (cf. MacAskill, 2015). On behalf of public institutions and charitable
foundations, factivist investors support, but also challenge and discipline nonprofit
141Author’s personal interview with Tim Gray (former advisor to the DCLG on homelessness), 14
September 2017.
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and voluntary organisations to improve the lives and destinies of existences who have
been relegated to the fringes of society. Overall, I would argue that it is this labour
that factivist investors are compensated for: they drive the maximisation of social
impact through practices of due diligence and data-driven performance management;
state-endorsed blended value maximisation.
While the macroeconomic significance of impact bonds is (still) relatively small (cf.
Section 4.2), the projects of factivist finance have significant discursive, political, and
economic dimensions. Impact bonds open a new field for public action that combines
the outsourcing of financial risks (cf. Burand, 2012, p. 467; Griffiths&Meinicke, 2014,
p. 6) with (quasi-)experimental methods and performance management practices to
improvement the lives of vulnerable populations. This calculative mode of reasoning
is not divorced from ethics, but it circumscribes the ‘place’ of ethics, and what ethics
requires, in a very particular way, changing the ways in which human agents conceive
of what is a problem and what is feasible for them in finance as well as social and
development policy. For instance, actors accept that it is essential to come up with a
‘counterfactual’ to justify public spending for social interventions. This is politically
troubling as a counterfactual as it entails a particular (narrow) conception of a public
that happily compensates investors as long as they can demonstrate that, compared
to the status quo, interventions significantly improve the lives of people in need.
Moreover, as Section 6.1 and Section 6.3 made plain, the reliance on numerical output
might be a shortcut to judgment as the agreed-upon metrics are always the result of
political negotiation processes, and the ‘facts’ thus measured are more provisional
and fragile than commonly suggested. In Chapter 7 I will focus on ‘counterfactuals’,
which always imply to exclude existences from the services to form a control group
for demonstrating causal effects.
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6.4 Concluding Remarks
According to Social Finance’s board member David Robinson, “[c]hange happens
in the collation and examination of hard facts” (cited in Social Finance, 2018, p.
49). In this chapter, I have mapped out various inconsistencies of the impact bond
model. With reference to the three case study projects, I argued that measurement
relies on proxies that stand for—but often fall short of—genuine social outcomes.
Moreover, the socio-technical infrastructures of impact bonds might prioritise metrics
that are relevant to the outcome funder rather than the service user. Beyond the
definition of metrics, it is quite simply, complicated to measure changes in the lives
and circumstances of service users. Against this backdrop, I have argued that in order
for impact bonds to ‘function’ they not only need to meticulously measure social
outcomes, they also need to be protected from too much external scrutiny. I have
suggested that the operation of impact bonds thus goes against the claim for greater
transparency (which was their point of departure).
In a second step, I have discussed the experimental nature of impact bonds and found
that interventions that obtain impact bond funding are not integrated into public
provision. What I have termed factivist investing in the previous chapter is thus not
so much geared to experiments and testing, but to the perpetuation of an aspirational
logic, according to which the right act in any given situation is the one that maximises
social outcomes (however defined). In this arrangement, the factivist investor drives
the maximisation of social impact through practices of due diligence and data-driven
performance management.
Beyond the mobilisation of empirical facts and notions of ‘pay-for-success’, I now
turn to the ‘scope’ of such programmes, that is, the idea that micro interventions at
the local level can be effective responses to issues such as homelessness, LTCs or low
levels of educational attainment. This aspect is closely connected to the framing of
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impact bonds as an objective funding instrument that is based on fact-based solutions
to complex social issues.
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7. The Politics of Life
I have argued that impact bonds are a topological space where an ethical approach
to human life is combined with managerial and seemingly scientific practices.
In the previous chapter, I foregrounded how the mechanism has shifted from an
experimental to an aspirational logic that relies on the performance of objectivity. In
this chapter, I take insights from the work of Didier Fassin, who problematises the
politics of giving specific value and meaning to human life, to suggest that impact
bonds are a topological space in one further respect: despite the focus on complex
systems of impact measurement and ‘facts’, impact bonds’ response to suffering is,
ultimately, an affective one. By this I mean that the schemes all make a selection of
(highly) vulnerable existences that are to be supported through an intervention, and
existences that are excluded from it. Fassin explains that such politics does not only
govern the life of populations (according to outcome targets in the case of impact
bonds), but more importantly also involves ‘making a selection of which existences it
is possible or legitimate to save [as well as] producing public representations of the
human beings to be defended’ (Fassin, 2007, p. 501). By focusing on individuals
and, say, their mental and/or physical illness or educational attainment, impact bonds
direct attention to the trope of suffering, and away from the structural conditions that
perpetuate inequality and poverty.
Despite the emphasis on scientific methods and objectivity, impact bonds thus reify
the situations and needs of service users in terms of a condition of victimhood. They
do not do so by means of emotionally compelling stories and images of socially
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distant others—the common discourse of humanitarian ethics (cf. Chouliaraki, 2013;
Richey, 2018)—but by both a seemingly scientific definition of a vulnerable group
and a focus on experimental methods to help the group. Despite impact bonds’
rationalist and aspirational ethics of ‘solving problems’ (rather than just alleviating
suffering), I argue that they ultimately combine a rational outcomes culture with an
emotional response to things that are ‘intolerable’ in this world. As I show in this
chapter, they also make one further distinction between the most destitute existences
and the ones that can still be ‘rescued’ by welfare workers. Ultimately, impact
bonds articulate an emotional response. So, evidence-based techniques and the
performance of objectivity may well be a technology of power with an orienting telos,
but they do not achieve complete determination. Given factivist finance’s focus on
sufferers, in combination with its performance of objectivity, does it simply stop the
articulation of political solutions (and thereby paradoxically enhance political control)?
In the second part of this chapter, I will argue, again building from the notion of
topological spaces, that impact bonds can simultaneously be both depoliticising and
deeply political. Of course, actors might do certain things, without even realising it:
investors might egotistically pursue ‘good’ impact investing, service providers might
be mechanically guided by prescribed outcome targets etc. However, based on the
case study projects I claim that the actors involved do not necessarily fail to reason
about their broader circumstances (as profiteering or non-reflective instruments
of capitalist interests). Throughout the interviews conducted, they seemed to
recognise that the gender gap in Indian education, LTCs in England’s most deprived
wards and homelessness in London are not (primarily) technical or financial but
political problems. Rather than engaging in debates about ‘the welfare state’, desert,
entitlement, fairness, dignity etc. they take up existing elements—philanthropic funds,
outsourced social service provision, (quasi-)experimental methods—and recombine
them. Quoting Collier (2009), these are acts of ‘thinking as an active response to
historically situated problems’ (p. 93). The actions of impact bonds undermine social
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inequities on the very grounds on which they are cast, articulating an immediate (if
imperfect) response. I argue that instead of only reproducing the structural conditions
that perpetuate inequality, impact bonds to some degree also use them to articulate
alternative (if imperfect) responses. Impact bonds recalibrate the organisation of
power relations by enabling ‘the commissioning of services that would otherwise not
be commissioned’ (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018, p. 72; cf. Ronicle et al., 2014, p.
35) with governments and foundations making subsidies available for the new and
miraculous ‘factivism’ projects. As I have outlined in Chapter 5, impact bonds are
framed as a ‘unideological and technical response’ (Sinclair et al., 2014, p. 122).
Overall, I would argue that this might not only be a limitation but also a potential
for bypassing an austere, dysfunctional state. Instead of addressing the structural
conditions of poverty and inequality, what I termed factivist finance pragmatically
undermines social inequities on the grounds on which they are cast, articulating an
alternative (if imperfect) response. As Chapter 6 and Section 7.1 made plain, there
are important limitations to the actions of impact bonds. Yet, the specificity within
and through which such ethical finance unfolds need to be made visible.
I will make this argument over two sections. The first section argues that by focusing
on highly vulnerable individuals, the schemes direct attention to the trope of suffering,
away from the structural conditions that perpetuate the broader socio-economic
causes of the problems they endeavour to address. Thus, despite their financialised
problem-solving appeal, such programmes ultimately combine a rational outcomes
culture with an affective response to social ills. Therefore, they reify the particularistic
boundaries between benefactors and victims which considerably reduces the scope to
help people who have been relegated to the fringes of society on the grounds of a
shared humanity. The second section raises the question whether impact bonds are
thus futile. Based on the case study interviews conducted, I will argue that the actors
involved do not necessarily fail to reason about their broader circumstances; they
realise that complex social ills are not (primarily) technical or financial problems, but
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political ones. Yet, instead of political (capital P) activism they look into action and
work through ethical suggestions in a pragmatic way. In doing so, they are bound
to run into difficulties as ethics (necessarily) relies on the aporias and dilemmas of
everyday life, and is thus always at risk of failing. Yet, the schemes may rework
exclusionary constellations ‘from within’ and thus simultaneously perform both a
relation of inequality and a relation of assistance. The section makes the case for an
ongoing engagement with both dynamics. The concluding section ties these lines of
argument together and restates that the actions of impact bonds thus conceived go
beyond a binary of welfare state expansion/retrenchment.
7.1 The Focus on Suffering
As Cooper et al. (2016) argue with regard to the London Homelessness SIB,
there is a biopolitical element to the operation of impact bonds. Beyond the
collection of data and the monitoring of the service users’ lives, there is an element
of governing/altering the lives of service users—and to some degree also other
programmes in the field—according to very particular ideas of a worthwhile life, that
is, maintaining an apartment, abstaining from drinking alcohol and taking drugs,
managing one’s health, attending school etc., what Cooper et al. (2016) refer to as ‘a
neoliberal version of what is considered “correct”’ (p. 71).
Building from this appraisal, I want to raise a fundamental point in this section, taking
insights from the work of Didier Fassin. I argue that impact bonds can be conceived
of in terms of what Fassin (2007) calls a ‘politics of life’ (p. 500) in that they make a
selection of poor existences that are to be supported through an intervention, and
existences that are excluded from it. While this has lines of affinity with the notion of
Foucauldian biopolitics (cf. Foucault, 2003, pp. 245–246; Foucault, 2010), Fassin
emphasises that a politics of life is not limited to governing the life of populations,
but it also involves ‘making a selection of which existences it is possible or legitimate
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to save [as well as] producing public representations of the human beings to be
defended’ (Fassin, 2007, p. 501).
In the case of the London Homelessness SIB, for instance, the CHAIN database was
used to define a group of vulnerable existences that were to be supported through the
scheme.142 It was found that a sixth of the homeless persons in London accounted for
almost half of all recorded unsheltered sleeping occasions. Despite a range of already
existing welfare services, the outcomes for these individuals had remained poor over
the years. Many of them suffered from complex issues around drug and alcohol use,
and mental and/or physical illness (Mason et al., 2014, pp. 8–9). So, the idea arose to
improve outcomes for this group with a dedicated SIB project. This particular form
of compassion feeds on the reification of the service users’ (partial capacity to leave
their) condition of victimhood. They are defined in terms of suffering—the victims
of homelessness.
Ways to Wellness focuses on individuals who experience ‘multi-morbidity, and
challenging social and economic circumstances’ (p. 38), for example, mental health
problems, social isolation and/or low confidence (pp. iii; 12). Individuals from
lower socio-economic groups typically experience higher levels of LTCs; they also
tend to have poorer health condition management, therefore worse health outcomes,
and higher mortality (Barnett et al., 2012, cf.). As I have elucidated earlier, West
Newcastle upon Tyne which ‘has some of the most deprived wards in England’ (NHS
Clinical Commissioners, 2015, p. 1) was a particular outlier—even amongst areas
of deprivation for particular long-term conditions. So here again, a target group is
defined based on a situation characterised by precariousness.
142As I have elucidated in sections 4.4 and 5.1, the CHAIN database contains names of individuals
with a history of rough sleeping in London (along with data on their support needs, nationality, and
age) and is constantly updated by various agencies.
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In the case of Educate Girls, the focus was on children, especially girls, in India. As
Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2017) specify, ‘3.7 million girls are out of school in India.
Rajasthan has 9 of the 26 districts with the worst gender indicators and 40% of girls
drop out before reaching fifth grade’ (p. 80). Uneducated girls in India marry three
years earlier than educated ones, are three times more likely to contract HIV, and
also earn less income. They are framed as the victims of the caste-ridden, feudal
structures of the villages who ‘go without schooling, resulting in poor literacy and
grim economic outcomes’ (Crabtree, 2013, p. para. 3).
While all these projects foreground the suffering of individuals who live under
very difficult social and economic conditions, these conditions are accepted as they
are—appear unchangeable—and the actions of the impact bonds only seek to change
individuals’ knowledge and behaviour while distracting from the ‘broader societal
and economic reasons why the problems occurred in the first place’ (Joy & Shields,
2013, p. 49). One can take homelessness: the UK’s Department for Work and
Pensions’ pursued a series of welfare reforms which, amongst other things, capped
and froze Local Housing Allowance, while the cost for private rented accommodation
in London had increased eight times as fast as average earnings between 2010 and
2017 (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2017, p. 7).
Moreover, the Tory Government that came to power in 2010 slashed funding for
social and affordable housing across Britain, and Boris Johnson drastically reduced
the number of social homes he funded as Mayor of London (McAllister, Shepherd, &
Wyatt, 2018). The suffering of rough sleepers is not simply the result of ‘misfortune’
or so, it is also a product of injustice. The UK ratified the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1976, according to which it
is obliged to ‘respect, protect and fulfil the right to housing’ (Hohmann, 2015, p.
8). Moreover, homelessness typically results in a violation of various human rights,
‘from privacy to health, and in the inability to exercise civic human rights such as the
187
right to vote’ (Hohmann, 2015, p. 20). The SIB placed these aspects of homelessness
beyond its considerations. Its moral imagination somehow favours both historical and
empirical amnesia.
Likewise, Ways to Wellness remains silent on the societal and economic causes of
LTCs. While health outcomes are of course affected by different health determinants
(UCL Institute of Health Equity, 2014), the behavioural risk factors for developing
LTCs are believed to be socioeconomically patterned (Wardle & Steptoe, 2003).
Poverty makes people sick; this is not a platitude, many studies have indicated
the connection between income and increased disease burden (Braveman, Cubbin,
Egerter, Williams, & Pamuk, 2010; Franzese, 2015; A. M. Jones & Wildman,
2008; Ketteler, 2018). Yet, as Lynch, Kaplan, and Salonen (1997) have argued,
based on a population-based study of 2,674 middle-aged Finnish men, ‘poor adult
health behaviour and psychosocial characteristics are importantly related to a poor
socioeconomic start in life, low levels of education and blue-collar employment’ (pp.
817–818), and in consequence, ‘efforts to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in
health must recognize that economic policy is public health policy’ (p. 818).
In the case of Educate Girls, in 2009 India signed the Right to Education Act, which
commits the country to providing both free and compulsory education for all children
from age six to 14 (Chandran, 2016). The government has also sought to universalise
access to education over the past 15 years through the District Primary Education
Program which was followed by the ‘Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan’, the ‘Education for All
Movement’ (World Bank Group, 2017, p. 6; Instiglio, 2015a, p. 11). But despite
such efforts, the education of girls has remained a challenge, particularly in rural
areas. The DIB focused on counselling sessions to explain ‘the value of schooling
to their parents and to the community’ (Kitzmüller et al., 2018, p. 24) to improve
school attendance and prevent drop-outs. The DIB’s focus on parent counselling, a
supplementary curriculum for the target group, and the management of the schools
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sidelined the thought that the basic structures of society might systemically work to
the disadvantage of specific social groups (cf. Sasmal & Guillen, 2015). The root
causes of gender inequality in Indian education are manifold and contested—and
a detailed discussion of those aspects would go beyond the scope of my thesis.
However, is it advisable to tackle the widely prevalent institutional discrimination in
the Indian education system through such a micro-intervention at a local level?
Recently, 15 prominent academics143 signed a letter in The Guardian stating that
micro-interventions at a local level might yield satisfying results ‘but they generally
do little to change the systems that produce the problems in the first place’. They
emphasise that ‘[w]hat we need instead is to tackle the real root causes of poverty,
inequality and climate change’ (The Guardian, 2018, para. 7). As ‘[t]he worse-off are
not merely poor and often starving, but are being impoverished and starved under our
shared institutional arrangements, which inescapably shape their lives’ (Pogge, 2008,
p. 207), action should be focused on macro-level changes instead (see also Pritchett,
2014). My point here is not to present a detailed appraisal of the root causes of, or
solutions to, homelessness, LTCs, and the gender gap in Indian education. What I
seek to highlight is simply the point that impact bonds place beyond consideration
the deeper societal and economic causes of the problems they seek to address (cf.
Giridharadas, 2019).
Through their focus on individuals and their issues around drug and alcohol use,
mental and physical illness or educational attainment, impact bonds ultimately direct
attention to the trope of suffering. Despite impact bonds’ rationalist and aspirational
ethics of ‘solving problems’ (rather than just alleviating suffering) they ultimately
combine a rational outcomes culture with an affective response to things that are
‘intolerable’ in this world (cf. Jeffery, 2014, Ch. 7). These responses may be less
overtly emotionally manipulative than other ‘spectacles of suffering’ (Chouliaraki,
143Among themNobel prize winning economists Joseph Stiglitz, Angus Deaton, and James Heckman.
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2013, p. 26) that can be observed in the realm of global charities (Kapoor, 2013)
or microfinance (Schwittay, 2014), but they nonetheless direct attention to the
condition of victimhood, depriving the needs and situations of the people in need of a
vocabulary of justice and social change. While the aspirational ethics of impact bonds
seeks to circumvent/counteract the ‘warm glow effect’, their actions still foreground a
self-oriented morality at the expense of an other-oriented humanity because they
are incapable of operating beyond the artificial, particularistic boundaries between
benefactors and sufferers (Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 179; see also Rieff, 2002).
Despite its problem-solving appeal, the model ultimately directs attention to the
‘victims’ who have fallen through the cracks of existing social and health services,
but who are not ‘lost’ yet, and away from structural violence and communal issues.
In a way, this agent-centred focus ties in with the discourse around the proactive
self-governance of the resilient subject, sidelining the thought that the basic structures
of society could be in any way unjust (Brassett, 2018; Dagdeviren, Donoghue, &
Promberger, 2016; Joseph, 2013). Not only does this limit the purview of impact
bonds’ proposed solutions but it also fails to affirm that precariousness is, almost
by definition, a shared human condition. Impact bonds’ focus on supporting
and somehow nudging individuals in proper directions obfuscates the political
contestability of the fact that ‘some life is (made) more vulnerable than other life’
(Stierl, 2014, p. 164).
Impact bonds also represent a ‘politics of life’ in two further respects. First, while all
three case study projects selected groups that have been relegated to the fringes of
society, they also did not focus on the most destitute individuals, but sought to identify
a suitable target group that could still be ‘saved’ by welfare workers. The target
group of the London Homelessness SIB consisted of so-called ‘inbetweeners’, that is,
homeless persons ‘who have had multiple separate episodes of rough sleeping related
to various underlying “problems”, but who have not yet been labelled as chronic’
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(Cooper et al., 2016, p. 70). Ways to Wellness did not focus on the ‘frequent flyers’,
that is, patients with three or more A&E consultations a year, but on cases where
people first develop an LTC. As the Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness
specified:144
Our argument was: there’s no point in focussing on the end stage because
it’s too late, you are less likely to have an impact. If you are really going
to change behaviour you need to start early.
The Educate Girls project worked with two different target groups: a group of girls
for the enrolment outcomes and a group for the learning outcomes. For the enrolment
outcomes, the organisation carried out a census-like door-to-door survey in 34,000
households and created a list of 837 out-of-school girls thus identified (Saldinger,
2018). ‘Eligible’ for this list were girls aged six to 14 years who were mandated
under the Right to Education Act to be in schools, but who either had no access to a
school in their community, did not enrol despite an available school, enrolled but
did not attend, or enrolled and dropped out of the education system (UBS Optimus
Foundation, 2018a, p. 4). For the leaning outcomes, the target group included
both girls and boys in schools selected by the programme. Among other criteria,
these schools had to be under the management of the Department of Education or
Local Bodies—which excluded private schools, madrasas (Islam-centred schools),
Sanskrit schools, and Shiksha Karmi schools, which work with local individuals as
teachers (Instiglio, 2015b, pp. 26–27). Although less pronounced, a diligent selection
of existences can also be observed in this case—not a focus on a wider group of
individuals who are entitled to education.
Second, the projects made a differentiation between cohort members who were
supported to progress towards housing, social prescribing or education and a
supplementary curriculum, and existences who met the same criteria but who were
144Author’s personal interview with Chris Drinkwater (Chair and Trustee Chair of Ways to Wellness),
20 September 2017
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purposefully excluded from support (as part of a control group) in order to prove
that the financed intervention makes a difference in people’s lives. The London
Homelessness SIB even made an internal differentiation between British cohort
members and those who were subject to repatriation. The so-called ‘reconnection’
outcome target created a representation of the unwanted, illegal immigrant (Kish
& Leroy, 2015). While the reconnections mainly comprised ‘assisted voluntary
repatriation’ (DCLG, 2014, p. 1), they also included cases of administrative removal
and deportation and were heavily criticised by activist groups (Corporate Watch,
2017) as well as different articles in The Guardian (Picton, 2018; D. Taylor, 2017).
In summary, it can be said that the analysed impact bonds all made a selection of
poor, ‘highly vulnerable’ (Mason et al., 2017b, p. 23) existences that were supported
through the schemes. At the same time, they excluded other existences from the
service that were not suffering ‘enough’ to incite action or too destitute for the
project to have an impact on their behaviour, as well as existences that met the
criteria but who were purposefully excluded to produce a counterfactual to claim
impact and, in turn, payments. Such politics of life simultaneously governs the lives
of populations according to outcome targets and produces cohorts and statistical
representations of existences that can and should be saved. I have argued that
ultimately, this outcomes-oriented and technocratic culture is an affective response to
social ills, which foregrounds suffering and the rescue of precarious lives within a
faulty system—rather than addressing the faults. A vocabulary of justice and social
change is absent. As Fassin (2012, p. 4) emphasises,
The concept of precarious lives therefore needs to be taken in the strongest
sense of its Latin etymology: lives that are (. . . ) defined not in the
absolute of a condition, but in the relation to those who have power over
them.
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Against this backdrop, I argue that the capacity of the projects to help the
service users on the grounds of a shared humanity (that is, beyond the artificial,
particularistic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’) is limited, the schemes deprive
the needs and situations of ‘beneficiaries’ of a vocabulary of justice and social
change. The projects even place such considerations beyond debate because
their actions on human suffering are automatically believed to be good; as
Didier Fassin puts it, ‘humanitarian reason is morally untouchable’ (Fassin, 2012,
p. 244), and political confrontation therefore struggles to interfere with its transactions.
Although proponents of the SIB defended a rationalist and aspirational ethics of
‘solving problems’, rather than just alleviating suffering, the schemes ultimately
combine rational arguments with an emotional response incited by the concern
for ‘victims’. Yet, they do not, as they claim, try to fundamentally solve social
problems. Rather, they seek to improve individual lives and seem to envision service
users to be(come) some sort of bottom-up drivers of change that will act as role
models for, and enablers of, other individuals in their families and communities.
As Kramer (2018) has it, ‘[i]t is always the victims who are told by the winners
that they must change, never the other way around’ (p. 69). The ways in which
impact investors conceive of themselves in relation to the ‘poor and vulnerable
people’ (O’Donohoe et al., 2010, p. 7) who purportedly benefit from the social value
created is highly problematic. The moral imagination of impact bonds builds on
apolitical activism, keeping actors from even thinking that the structure of society is
in any way unjust and might systematically disadvantage certain groups. Thus, the
schemes do not only perform a relation of assistance but also a relation of inequality.
Some commentators thus suggest that impact investing just seeks to improve
‘lives within the faulty system rather than tackling the faults’ (Giridharadas, 2019, p. 6).
Impact bonds circumscribe the ‘place’ of ethics and what ethics requires in a
particular way and considerably reduce the scope for articulating different visions
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that displace financial logics from social service provision and instead foreground
local knowledge and practical judgment. As Connolly (2002) succinctly puts it, ‘to
act ethically is often to call some comforts of identity into question’, and that would
imply to politically challenge the need for investment (cf. Langley, 2010a, p. 134).
If reflexive thought—understood as questioning the meaning, conditions and goals
of our own conduct—is at the heart of ethics, impact investing is a limited ethical
practice. The services financed through impact bonds leave untouched the broader
socio-economic causes of the problems they endeavour to solve. Instead, they try to
act on the behaviour and destinies of socially and geographically distant others whose
existence is consistently defined in terms of suffering.
Having elucidated how factivist finance focuses on sufferers, in a next step, I ask if
impact bonds just stop the articulation of political solutions and thereby paradoxically
enhance political control (cf. De Waal, 1997; Ferguson, 1990).
7.2 Transformation Through Recombination
The previous section demonstrated that impact bond projects do not challenge the
societal and economic contexts in which they are set. But does it follow from
the failure of their actions to achieve complete determination that actors also
failed to reason about their broader circumstances? Throughout the interviews
conducted, actors emphasised that the social ills that they seek to address with
these projects are not (primarily) technical or financial problems, but political
ones. In the context of the UK SIBs analysed, various interviewees put on record
that it is obvious that austerity has had a huge impact on people’s lives. As one
of the navigators from the London Homelessness SIB put it: ‘welfare reform,
universal credit; no one can turn away from the fact that people are becoming
destitute because of that’.145 Only because impact investors do not profoundly
145Author’s personal interview with Kathleen Sims (Service Development Manager at St Mungo’s),
5 September 2017.
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transform the social and political ‘order’—do they automatically fail to reason
about their broader circumstances (as non-reflective instruments of capitalist interests)?
I would suggest that, rather than directly problematising broader societal and
economic reasons of social ills, the focus of the interventions is on acting within
and through the existing system. Building upon Collier (2009), I argue that the
actions of investors and service providers can be understood as a practice of how
‘existing techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in
diverse assemblies of biopolitical government’ (p. 79). While actions are enfolded
into financial power, the focus on ‘what works’ and ‘empirical facts’ can also
interrupt the effects of exclusionary constellations from within. Rather than directly
challenging structural violence and communal issues, impact bonds recalibrate the
organisation of power relations and redistribute available resources to individuals
whose needs are no met by existing services. Actors enabled ‘the commissioning of
services that would otherwise not be commissioned’ (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2018,
p. 72; cf. Ronicle et al., 2014, p. 35), which is not automatically tantamount to
uncritically affirming efforts to move toward a quantitatively smaller welfare state.
Pitched through networks of private investors, NGOs, think tanks, charismatic and
influential ‘compassionate capitalists’ such as Ronald Cohen (cf. The Economist,
2005), both governments and foundations now make subsidies available for new and
miraculous ‘factivism’ projects. If we follow this train of thought, impact bonds
do not only reproduce the structural conditions that perpetuate inequality but also
use these structures to produce ‘something new’, to create things that would not
happen otherwise (Ronicle et al., 2014, p. 35). Actors mobilise the discourse around
impact bonds and financialised metrics/logics to interrupt the effects of exclusionary
constellations from within.
As Section 5.1 indicated, the service providers were given a high degree of freedom
as to how they strive for impact. While the data collection regimes are quite strict, the
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outcomes-oriented structure also enabled service providers to work more flexibly:
they were given a high degree of freedom as to how they worked together with service
users individually. The Ways to Wellness programme, for instance, cannot impose
areas of health improvement upon patients in some form of top-down will-to-care
that silences dissent. On the one hand, participation in the programme is voluntary
and, on the other hand, the areas where patients want to improve as well as respective
goals are identified together with them. These face-to-face interactions are not free
from power relations and the metrics of the SIB may well influence the ways in which
link workers go about setting such goals and even affect the relationship between
them and the service users. But it is not as if the impact bond mechanism and its
metrics dominate everything ‘from above’. Rather, actors need to engage with service
users and help them find individual ways of getting more exercise, eating better,
drinking less alcohol, smoking fewer cigarettes, etc. Moreover, within agreed-upon
constraints, service provider staff could spend budgets as they thought appropriate to
help service users—without consulting the outcome funder all the time. As I outlined,
they could for instance pay for the renewal of birth certificates for rough sleepers
(Swain, 2015) or provide additional training for teachers in Rajasthan when it became
clear that the teachers struggled to teach math at higher levels (Gungadurdoss, 2016).
We might dismiss the benevolent actions of investors and service providers since they
do not challenge structural violence and communal issues, and even exacerbate them
by earning financial returns from the interventions which are funded by the public
purse. Impact bonds’ capacity to ‘further the goals of “social justice” for “vulnerable”
populations’ (Tan et al., 2015, p. 17; Cabinet Office, 2011; HM Government, 2013)
is decidedly limited; impact bonds have crucial ethico-political limitations. As
many critical commentators have suggested, impact bonds can be seen as a form
of neoliberal foster care which seeks to change the lives and destinies of certain
vulnerable groups without problematising structural injustice and violence (Harvie &
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Ogman, 2019; cf. McGoey, 2014, pp. 116–118).146 However, critical studies should
retain analytical sensitivity to the heterogeneity and specificity within and through
which such factivist finance unfolds. As Thames Reach’s Senior Executive explained
his inducement to act on homelessness with the SIB project, ‘I think it’s hard to justify
not doing that because we see people die on the street all the time, every year we are
losing dozens of people who die on the street’.147 It is difficult to neglect the moral
imperatives of these programmes. In what follows, I will take some steps towards
showing how certain theoretical orientations towards thinking, research, and politics
in IPE might stand in the way of grasping ethical moments and agency in the context
of factivist finance.
7.3 The Politics of Drawing Lines
While modern (normative) ethics is typically concerned with ground-level questions
about how one ought to live, or how one should act (Kagan, 1998), ‘ethics’ in
IPE commonly refers to an engagement with the unethical dimensions of markets,
globalisation etc. (Andreu & Brassett, forthcoming). In this sense, ethics is often
portrayed as something that confronts or contests power. The tone appears to suggest
that instances of global injustice are all-pervasive and so ethical agendas can be
understood as a straightforward set of attempts to ameliorate global power relations
(Tooze & Murphy, 1996). The goal of critical scholarship, then, is to become
conscious of the systemic basis of global market life and to (re-)introduce ‘real’ (i.e.
other-oriented) ethics. This can be seen as a dilemma because it reifies the very
problematic that it seeks to de-centre. Indeed, the way that critical IPE orders the
world arguably constructs the very image of a totalising capitalist system that one
might imagine is the very problem (Brassett & Holmes, 2010; Gibson-Graham, 2008).
146This appraisal has lines of affinity with the argument made by Alexander De Waal in his seminal
book on famine where he argues that ‘a humanitarianism that sets itself against or above politics is
futile’ (De Waal, 1997, p. 6).
147Author’s personal interview with Jeremy Swain (Chief Executive at Thames Reach), 2 October
2017.
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In this reading, the actions of impact bonds always need to be dismissed since they
not only re-affirm the structural conditions that reproduce inequality and poverty, but
even exacerbate them by paying investors financial returns with tax money. Freedom
is framed as an antagonism of domination, an antagonism of something that alienates,
conceals, or simply represses people’s ‘authentic’ subjectivity.
In view of my analysis in the previous section, I propose to move beyond an
assumption of (and therefore a critique according to) a binary between ethics and
markets—a binary of welfare state expansion/retrenchment—for investigating how
certain iterations may belie a novel form of political agency that entertains the
possibility of proliferating ‘something new’. As Amoore (2006) argues, many critical
IPE approaches have ‘significantly and problematically underplay[ed] the ambiguities
and contradictions of subject positions within the interplay of power and resistance’
(Amoore, 2006, p. 160). I would suggest that there is no Archimedean point in this
struggle; being subject to power relations and being a subject, one of self-knowledge,
should be seen as two aspects of the same process (de Goede, 2006, p. 12). The
logic inherent in regimes of practices such as impact investing ‘is irreducible to
the explicit intentions of any one actor but yet evinces an orientation toward a
particular matrix of ends and purposes’ (Dean, 2010, p. 32). It is precisely the notion
of such a matrix that allows us to understand the contradictory subject positions
delineated: the resulting subjectivities, judgments and actions are complex, and
continuously (re)negotiated (Peterson, 2006, p. 120). On one hand, this constrains
individuals as they may affirm ‘finance’ as a solution to societal problems and its
violent effects (without even realising it), but on the other hand, such a matrix may
provide actors with diverse resources for recognising problematic conditions and for
offering ‘focused, often pragmatic, responses to them’ (Katz, 2004, p. 247). Rather
than confronting other forms of power, such responses seek to recalibrate them, and
redistribute available resources. For instance, impact bonds help people with mental
health issues that would otherwise not get support from the NHS or by overcoming
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the organisational and budgetary silos of different London boroughs when it comes
to helping rough sleepers who are mobile and move between different boroughs.
Rather than understanding impact bonds as ‘nothing but’ the liberal economism of
recent years, I would suggest that they can foster a novel form of political agency
that goes beyond a binary of welfare state expansion/retrenchment to imagine
alternative (if imperfect) forms of assistance. Impact bonds can simultaneously be
both depoliticising, by virtue of the ‘cold hard facts’ they seek to perform, and deeply
political, as ethics ‘in one way or another, always involves politics’ (Hutchings, 2010,
p. 8). The logics of these programmes do not unfold in a successive or linear manner;
they are indeed a ‘topological space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 96) in which individuals are
not fully determined by structural power, they also possess the possibility of creative
development according to self-chosen goals—‘a “concrete liberty” that can only react
against its context of the moment’ (Veyne, 2010, p. 109). This takes into account
more productive visions of power, whereby market agents might be conceived as
subjects that are both produced by market rationalities and yet, in turn, are able to
speak and act politically.
Ethics is not something that easily lends itself to categorical definitions. So, it is
maybe a question of doing both, in other words, to coordinate provision around
specific needs through impact bonds and to simultaneously challenge the broader
socio-political causes of homelessness, low educational attainment, or LCTs. As
Kahn (2016) succinctly puts it, ‘there is no reason why we cannot recognize duties
to promote and support just institutions that reliably avoid poverty in addition to
duties of aid that require us to act effectively to rescue those in extreme difficulties’
(p. 223). The point of this more integrative perspective is not to naively celebrate
impact investing and to abandon the study of material structures and questions of
power. But while impact bonds are blunt weapons to alter existing polarisation
of power, they have the potential to change the organisation of power relations by
redirecting available resources and by developing new social and health programmes.
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Social-scientific research needs to make visible the heterogeneity within and through
which social finance unfolds. More critically, arguing that a market logic saturates all
power relations in this space ultimately means to buy into a ‘politics of drawing lines’
(Edkins, 2003, p. 257), that is, a politics of categorically defining what ethics is, and
what it is not (Foucault, 1990, p. 9).
7.4 Concluding Remarks
Having discussed the inconsistencies that arise with regard to the testing ground
argument, the normalisation of testing, and the novel subject positions that thus
emerge in Chapter 6, this chapter argued that factivist finance is a shortcut to
judgment in one further respect. Impact bonds’ focus on the victims who have fallen
through the cracks of existing social and health services leaves the socio-economic
causes of social ills untouched. I suggested that impact bonds can be conceived of
in terms of a ‘politics of life’ (Fassin, 2007). Rather than effectively addressing
social problems, the interventions only act on the behaviour and destinies of socially
and geographically distant others whose existence is defined in terms of suffering.
These programmes do therefore not only perform a relation of assistance, they also
perform a relation of inequality, re-instantiating exclusionary constellations. Such
financialised do-gooding can be seen as ‘a form of market foster care in the context of
a liberal, post-nation-state milieu’ (Mitchell, 2017a, p. 113; cf. McGoey, 2014, pp.
116–118) that reproduces or even exacerbates the structural violence and communal
issues that give rise to poverty.
In the second part of this chapter, I have argued that the analysis of ethical agency in
IPE is contested terrain and might limit an engagement with the normative aspects
and the sub-institutional power-relationships that can be observed in the context
of impact bonds. While modern (normative) ethics is typically concerned with
ground-level questions about how one ought to live, or how one should act, ‘ethics’
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in IPE commonly refers to an engagement with the unethical dimensions of global
production, trade, and finance. In this sense, it is assumed (rather than empirically
studied) that ethics is something that needs to confront or contest power (where
power is always understood as power-over). Critical scholars have seen their role as
one of engaging, ameliorating or otherwise countering the unethical dimensions of
globalisation (Tooze & Murphy, 1996). Correspondingly, as Brassett (2016) has
argued, studies of resistance typically focus ‘on the practices of positive agents (i.e.
the ones that we like)—the marginal, the disenfranchised and so on’ (p. 12). But
rather than understanding impact bonds as ‘nothing but’ the liberal economism of
recent years, I suggested that impact bonds can also foster a novel form of political
agency that goes beyond a binary of welfare state expansion/retrenchment to imagine
alternative (if imperfect) forms of assistance. While the scope of such interventions
is limited, social actors do not necessarily fail to recognise that issues such as
homelessness or LTCs are, first and foremost, political problems. But instead of
directly challenging structural violence and communal issues, the actors of factivist
finance seek to interrupt the effects of exclusionary constellations ‘from within’.
Impact bonds do thus not only reproduce structural conditions that perpetuate poverty
but they also employ them to articulate alternative (if imperfect) responses. Rather
than adhering to abstract principles of desert, entitlement, fairness, etc., actors try
to work through ethical suggestions in a pragmatic way and manage to enact new
interventions that would otherwise not be created. I emphasised the importance
of foregrounding these conceptual and political dynamics and ambiguities in IPE
analyses—instead of buying into a politics of constructing the very image of a
totalising capitalist system that saturates all power relations and crowds out ethical
agency. Factivist finance is indeed a ‘topological space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 96) in this
wider sense, its logic of government does not unfold in a linear manner.
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8. Conclusion
This thesis offered an in-depth examination of the politics of the emergence and
the operation of impact bonds. Based on three case studies, it demonstrated that
rather than simply implementing a financial ‘script’ to which social purposes are
unproblematically added on, impact bond programmes configure heterogeneous
rationalities (i.e. scientific, ethical, managerial, financial, and socio-political) into a
programmatic form that employs a fact-based approach to tackling complex social
problems. I termed this configuration ‘factivist finance’ and illustrated how it is
mobilised on behalf of public institutions and charitable foundations. By mapping
out a distinct logic of impact investing and discussing how this logic drives the
financialisation of social welfare and development aid programmes, this thesis
extends the existing IPE literature on social finance.
My analysis was based on actually existing subjects’ reflections. In a way, I
suppose I provided an oral history of impact bonds, but rendered it as a site
of politics and ethics. I invoked the notion of an ‘aspirational ethics’ of at
once maximising social outcomes and financial gain through a results-oriented
mechanism. In this mechanism, the focus on evidenced results reassures actors
that monetary returns are not produced by a financial instrument in the abstract,
but by positive effects on service users’ wellbeing, knowledge, behaviour or
circumstances. Governments and donor agencies, in turn, can claim that they
either fund interventions that generate evidenced social impact, and compensate
investors for creating this impact, or minimise the cots (as investors otherwise pay the
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bill). In this thesis, I mapped out various inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps
of this logic of government and discussed both its political limitations and possibilities.
This concluding chapter summarises what has been revealed by the analysis and
how it is relevant to the research questions and themes outlined at the beginning of
this thesis. The chapter is split into three parts. The first section recapitulates the
argument and the findings of this thesis. The second section reflects upon the central
contributions and the implications for IPE scholarship and wider interdisciplinary
debates. The third section maps out how the arguments and findings of this study will
guide and inform my future research. The concluding section briefly recapitulates
these points and formulates closing comments on ‘this thing called impact bond’.
8.1 Findings and Main Argument
The impact bond mechanism is a striking case of both the post-crisis ‘social turn’
of finance and the financialisation of social policy. Instead of an abdication of
responsibilities by the collective, we witness an increased hardwiring of finance
directly into the management of social issues; not a handing-over of social issues
to financial markets actors and logics, but an integration of finance into social
policy; not a retreat of public institutions, but their financialised reconfiguration. As
Chapter 2 elucidated, the existing critical IPE literature on impact bonds explains the
emergence of impact bonds in terms of a logic of expansion of financial markets
that subordinates social and moral values to market rationality (e.g. Dowling, 2017;
Eikenberry & Mirabella, 2018; Ogman, 2019).
A burgeoning body of scholarship challenges this reading by arguing that this
instance of financialisation advances precisely through a de-differentiation of social
and market domains (Chiapello, forthcoming; Guter-Sandu, 2018; Langley, 2018).
Building from this understanding, Chapter 3 made the case for a ‘topological analysis’
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(Collier, 2009) that allows for making visible in empirically situated terms how
different political rationalities and techniques are configured in the particular context
of impact bonds. It proposed to direct analytical focus to the ways in which subjects
think about and alter ‘problematisations’ that their society and culture presents to
them (May, 2014b). Specifically, I built from the work of Didier Fassin (2007,
2009) to put an emphasis on how, in the context of impact bonds, social issues and
‘vulnerable populations’ (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015, p. 14) are constituted as
a certain ‘problem space’ (Collier, 2009, p. 80) in which impact bonds emerge as
fact-based solutions. Based on these understandings, I proposed an ‘experimental
investigation’ of three specific impact bond case studies through document analysis
and fieldwork.
Equipped with these theoretical understandings, Chapter 4 shone a light on the roles
of the different social actors engaged in the impact bond industry. In particular,
it briefly discussed the events and practices that led to the formation of the first
impact bond, and how this particular programme was annexed by a more global
discourse around the question of ‘how the rich can save the world’ (Bishop & Green,
2008). In a second step, the chapter segued into a discussion of the formation of the
three impact bond case study projects, the actors involved and their different social
positions, material interests, and world views.
In Chapter 5, I outlined the main argument, emphasising that the conflation
of evidence-based practices and benevolent finance gives rise to a distinct
mode of reasoning—what I termed ‘factivist finance’. This mode of reasoning
was shown to recombine philanthropic, financial, ethical, and managerial
rationalities into a programmatic form that employs a fact-based approach to
poverty alleviation, selecting and governing target populations in a particular way.
Based on these case studies, I illustrated how complex experiments are enacted
that use RCTs and other (quasi-)experimental methods to test if interventions
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lead to positive social effects for a target group, always relying on a specific
set of social outcome targets. Through continuous data-collection activities the
actors involved try to ascertain whether projects make progress vis-à-vis the status quo.
I argued that in the context of impact bonds, investors are not merely passive sources
of money, but devote time and expertise to dealing with complex social issues.
They regularly meet with other stakeholders to discuss results and support as well
as challenge service providers to improve outcomes for target populations. The
‘everydayness’ of factivist finance was a direct concern of Chapter 5 reflecting how
impact bonds construct a logic of the everyday through the result-oriented structure
that determines the operation of such interventions. An emphasis on ‘what works in a
particular social issue area or context’ (Center for Global Development & Social
Finance, 2013b, p. 105) was shown to constantly reassure actors (not only investors)
that they are not mistaken about what it means to do good, that they can simultaneously
improve the lives of people who have been relegated to the fringes of society and
earn financial returns. In this problem-space (Collier, 2009, p. 90) it is not only
permissible to gain financially—there is almost a ‘responsibility to profit’ (Andreu,
2018, p. 720) as service users would be worse off otherwise. I emphasised that beyond
the utilisation of financial tools and logic, factivist finance is thus connected to wider
discourses of finding evidence of ‘what works’ in tackling poverty-related social issues.
Against this backdrop, I made a number of interventions to emphasise the conceptual
and political ambiguity of impact bonds. In Chapter 6, I mapped out various
inconsistencies of the pay-for-success model. I suggested that the measurement of
changes in the lives of service users is much more complex and provisional than
typically assumed in this discourse. Thus, for impact bonds to function, actors not
only need to meticulously measure outcomes, they also need to protect factivist
finance from too much external scrutiny; ‘objectivity’ thus becomes a performative
practice and the claim of greater transparency becomes more and more symbolic.
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Moreover, pay-for-success contracts are not only used to finance untested, innovative
approaches but become normalised as commissioning logic. Investors are thus
not necessarily compensated for pre-financing trials of approaches with uncertain
outcomes, but for ensuring that social impact is always maximised (however defined)
through due diligence and managerial practices.
Beyond the emphasis on scientific methods and near real-time data, I argued in
Chapter 7 that impact bonds ultimately articulate an affective response to situations
characterised by precariousness—rather than acknowledging that precariousness
is, almost by definition, a shared human condition. The impact bond-financed
interventions are contingent upon a typical humanitarian trope of Fassin’s ‘politics of
life’ of the suffering ‘other’, predicated on the artificial, particularistic boundaries
between benefactors and specific victims. In doing so, these vehicles distract from
or otherwise obscure broader socio-economic causes of the social problems they
endeavour to ‘tackle’. I also emphasised in Chapter 7 that these inconsistencies and
contradictions do not necessarily erase the projects’ social purposes; monetary returns
do not saturate all power relations. In articulating a concern for others—bringing
about ‘services that would otherwise not be commissioned’ (Edmiston & Nicholls,
2018, p. 72)—and in proliferating local negotiations and everyday face-to-face
interactions, impact bonds are deeply ethical and political. But rather than engaging in
debates about ‘the welfare state’, factivist finance reworks exclusionary constellations
‘from within’ and redirects available resources to the provision of individualised
support for marginalised and vulnerable groups. The subjectivities that emerge in this
context are multiple and complex—impact bonds simultaneously perform a relation
of assistance and a relation of inequality. Therefore, paraphrasing Foucault (1982b), I
propose to conceive of the ethics of impact bonds as something that is ‘dangerous,
which is not exactly the same as bad’ (p. 231; cf. Zehfuss, 2018, p. 207). In the
next section, I discuss how this analysis contributed to the social-scientific literature
through the ways in which it approached, and made visible, such heterogeneity.
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8.2 Central Contributions and Wider Implications
Impact bonds mark a shift from finance as welfare/development to financialised
social and international development policy. Finance is increasingly hardwired
into the management of social issues. The existing IPE literature emphasises that,
rather than reflecting and altering the direction of policy, impact bonds advance ‘the
orthodox neoliberal hegemony project’ (Ogman, 2018, p. 237) through selective
integration of ideas from social and labour movements (Dowling, 2017; Schram,
2015; cf. Peck, 2010, p. 112).148 Market rationality is assumed to pervade public
institutions as well as voluntary and non-profit organisations, crowding out social and
political values (Harvie & Ogman, 2019). This is a view that is often brought up in
critical analyses of impact investing in IPE and beyond (e.g. Cooper et al., 2016; Lake,
2015; Rosenman, 2019; Sinclair et al., 2019). In this literature, I argued, there is a
tendency of framing the integration of finance into the social as a rationalised, linear
process to which social purposes are (simply) being ‘added-on’, and ultimately erased.
Following Guter-Sandu (2018) and Langley (2018), I made the case for an in-depth
empirical study of how exactly such financialisation advances and what it does to
‘the social’—rather than assuming that the social is automatically subordinated or
crowded out.
In the following subsections, I discuss how the arguments and findings that emerged
from this study extend the existing IPE literature. First, I explain how the specific
pattern of impact investing that I observed can move academic discussion on
financialisation along. Second, I reflect on the theoretical framework employed
in the thesis and how it can contribute to wider literatures on facilitating social
purposes through market means. Third, I discuss how my analysis of ‘factivist
finance’ has wider implications for interdisciplinary debates about contemporary
forms of development aid, humanitarianism, and philanthropy and its growing
148As I elucidated in Section 2.3, this is also referred to as ‘passive revolution’—an expression coined
by Gramsci (1971) (cf. Ogman, 2019, p. 18).
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orientation towards measurement, metrics, calculation, quantification, and valuation—
in conjunction with financialisation.
A Critical Intervention in the Study of Impact Investing
Recent years have seen the rise of novel private equity and debt investments that
seek to produce blended value through the work of private-sector entities that apply
business approaches to achieving social goals (Barman, 2016; Golka, 2019; Kish &
Fairbairn, 2018). As Chapter 2 made plain, there is a burgeoning critical literature
on vehicles of impact investing and this thesis made a contribution to this literature
by providing an empirically-oriented and nuanced account of the emergence and
operation of SIBs and DIBs. I argued that impact bonds adopt a specific logic of
government that cannot be straightforwardly attributed to market rationality or a
single neoliberal apparatus ‘as a more or less constant master category that can
be used both to understand and to explain all manner of political programs’ (Rose
et al., 2006, p. 97). Rather, this study explained the ways in which impact bonds
constitute specific social issues as policy problems that can be solved through a
configuration of financial techniques (such as due diligence procedures and financial
risk-taking), scientific methods (such as RCTs) and management practices (such as
performance management). I typified this specific mode of reasoning under the
rubric of ‘factivist finance’ and argued that it is not simply a profiteering calculus that
builds upon emotionally compelling stories and images of suffering others. Rather,
this logic of government revolves around the idea of objectively determining the
causal effects of financed interventions through scientific methods and the collection
of near real-time data—to then claim financial returns if the funded programmes
have solved complex social problems (rather than merely alleviating suffering). This
separates impact bonds from other impact investing vehicles that are predicated
on ‘an ethos about the way money is used’ (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008, p. 2) and
environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria to evaluate corporate behaviour
for investment decisions. In contrast to such vehicles, impact bonds build upon
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experimental methods to measure social outcomes and make payments contingent
upon the programme outcomes thus measured.
This thesis reflected how this outcome-orientated structure relies on sophisticated IT
systems to track, manage, and report data, and how it enacts a particular logic of the
everyday infiltrating social work at the level of subjects. In this setup, the investor
subject does not only invest money in response to things that are ‘intolerable’ in this
world but also becomes actively involved in the design and management of such
programmes as well as an array of matters of social work, healthcare or education.
The subjects of factivist finance seek to avoid the risk of ‘warm glow’ or ‘feel-good’
investing by relying on meticulous and continuous measurement of non-financial
outcomes and by making financial returns dependent on the outcomes thus measured.
My research project thus showed how subjects reflect on existing problematisations
in impact investing and how they alter these problematisations. By mapping out such
processes of subjectivity formation, this thesis made a contribution to the literature
on ethical investments, which I reviewed in Section 2.3 (Aitken, 2007; Langley,
2010a; Langley & Leyshon, 2012). Moreover, this thesis also made plain how impact
bonds’ logic of government acts as a ‘major strength in policy terms’ (Tan et al.,
2015, p. 19) resulting in the endorsement and commissioning of impact bonds by
local authorities or donor agencies. Put another way, this study showcased both how
a particular vehicle of impact investing is ‘made up’ and how it comes to form part of
the contemporary transformation of social welfare and development aid programmes.
The contribution of this thesis to the critical literature on impact investing does not
only consist in an explanation of a particular logic of government, the study also made
a number of interventions to emphasise the conceptual and political ambiguities of
this logic in Chapters 6 and 7. The analysis thus moved beyond an assumption of (and
therefore a critique according to) a binary of market logic expansion and retrenchment
and offered a more situated critique that is based on the wider rationalities through
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which actors entangle ethical discourses with experimental methods and knowledges
from venture capital and private equity investing. The critique articulated in this
thesis built from the inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps identified within impact
bonds’ logic of government.
Methodological Contribution: Governmentality Revisited
The advantage of the type of ‘topological analysis’ (Collier, 2009) I adopted is that it
allows for making visible the heterogeneity and specificity within and through which
vehicles such as impact bonds are mobilised, reproduced, and altered. It allows for
advancing a critical understanding of how novel financial (self-)understandings are
produced and how they come to govern the lives of populations.
Critical IPE has typically combined Foucauldian notions of governmentality and
political rationalities/technologies with critical historical materialism analyses,
invoking some sort of ‘global panopticon’ (Gill, 1995; Morton, 2007). A reciprocal
relationship between economic relations and the ethico-political sphere is assumed
to exist in this literature, but the logic of government is assumed to ultimately
follow/reproduce a hegemonic culture, shaped by and woven into material relations
and patterns of accumulation (Gill, 2008). In this view, facilitating ‘social purposes’
through market means can therefore only be decoded as a strategic rationality that
uses social purposes as a ‘lubricant’ to extend the market even further. The goal
of critical scholarship, then, is to become conscious of the systemic basis of global
market life and ‘to escape from the reifications of capitalist ideology’ (B. G. Jones,
2008, p. 212).
The investigation in this thesis was developed from a different point of departure. It
did not start with ideology to analyse what instruments ideology uses, but offered
a framework for a bottom-up analysis of power which began with instruments—
heterogeneous practices and mechanisms—to explore how they are assembled into a
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contemporary formation of government (cf. Neal, 2009a, p. 168). More specifically, it
sought to analyse the ways in which impact bonds are made up to address social issues.
In that sense, this thesis provided a comprehensive response to the call for ‘unpacking
(. . . ) what these conceptions reveal about a potential new form of managing
populations’ (Guter-Sandu, 2018, p. 249). This form of governmentality analysis
is well suited for addressing questions of politics and the political. Beyond impact
bonds, this theoretical framework could also be used to study other ‘problem-spaces’
(Collier, 2009, p. 90) that reveal more complicated and disparate power configurations
than usually associated with forms of liberal governance. Topological analysis allows
for studying the ways in which social issues are constituted as ‘problems’ in such
spaces, how solutions are devised to target specific existences (while excluding others).
For some scholars, such a framework might only distract from the study of
material structures, dissolving questions of power into a relativist reductionism and
‘anti-structural particularism’ (Collier, 2012, p. 186) that destroys the ontological
ground on which clear judgments can be made. In response I would emphasise, and
have done so throughout this thesis, that processes of interpretation and knowledge
are always a premise for monetary value and material/institutional possibilities, not
just a by-product of ‘real’ material financial structures (cf. de Goede, 2003, p. 94; de
Goede, 2005, pp. xxii, 7). I proposed to analyse such interpretation processes as
‘a practico-critical activity’ (Collier, 2009, p. 28) whereby people do not simply
reproduce meaning systems that specific social groups or institutions present to them,
but recombine and rework them. This makes it possible, then, to provide a nuanced
account of ‘problem-spaces’ where multiple forms of power operate simultaneously.
This theoretical approach made possible a critique of impact bonds that goes beyond
a reification of the very image of the principles assumed to propel financial markets
(profit maximisation, self-interest, etc.). While ‘traditional’ governmentality studies
are interested in the reorganisation of governmental techniques in response to practical
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failures of social liberalism (Larner, 2000), this thesis offered a study of the emergence
of novel political rationalities that develop—to some degree—out of the practical
failures and critiques of the liberal economism of recent years and the ‘loss of faith’
(Riles, 2013, p. 556) cited at the beginning of this thesis; it explained how impact
bonds are constituted as an object of thought and thus become knowable, and in turn
available for action to govern existences.
New Repertoires for Benevolent Action
The key arguments of the thesis and the associated development of the notion
of ‘factivist finance’ have wider implications for ongoing research into the role
in contemporary governmental regimes of measurement, metrics, calculation,
quantification or valuation. In particular, this applies to current research on
the ‘growing instrumental orientation’ (Calhoun, 2008, p. 97) of humanitarian
interventions (Mitchell, 2017a; Reid-Henry, 2014; Richey, 2018), the social sector
(Eikenberry, 2009; Lewis, 2005; Morley, 2016), philanthropy (Eikenberry &
Mirabella, 2018; McGoey, 2016; McGoey & Thiel, 2018; Villadsen, 2007), and
international development (Best, 2014; Merry, 2016). These literature strands all
discuss the increasing focus on measurement and statistical methods. As Best
(2014) puts it, ‘accurate measurement has become something of a holy grail (. . . ),
viewed as a mythical key to figuring out what works and what does not—and why’
(p. 164).149 In this context, scholars often invoke the notions of ‘benchmarking’
(Broome & Quirk, 2015), ‘metric power’ (Beer, 2016) or even the ‘tyranny of metrics’
(Muller, 2018). Aspects of the quantification of social welfare and development aid
programmes have been meticulously analysed by different scholars who emphasise
that it is (virtually) impossible to measure social outcomes and, in consequence, to
unequivocally attribute changes in the behaviour and circumstances of individuals to
such micro-interventions (Mitchell, 2017a, 2017c; Sinclair et al., 2019). While such
149This broad tendency is further illustrated by contemporary debates around evidence-based effective
altruism (Gabriel, 2017; Gabriel & McElwee, 2019; MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015).
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regimes of measurement appear as a technical response to a given problem, they
typically create a new kind of knowledge through ‘a set of highly symbolic practices
that make the links between action and outcome visible’ (Best, 2014, p. 180). At the
same time, the focus on statistics and measurement depreciates the practical judgment
and local knowledge of social workers and NGOs ‘on the ground’ (Eikenberry &
Mirabella, 2018; Merry, 2016; Morley, 2016).
While this literature does an excellent job of opening up questions of the quantification
of social programmes and the issue(s) of measurement, the explicit turn of such
discourses and practices to finance and the utilisation of interest-bearing capital,
however, has been less well covered—or simply been assumed to be just another
instance of privatisation and neoliberal market rule. This thesis moved beyond a
‘critique of numbers’ and an explicit focus on socio-technical devices that govern
at a distance. It offered an in-depth analysis of how social outcome measurement,
performance measurement, and financial logics are recombined in the context of
impact bond programmes—an explicitly financialised solution to poverty alleviation.
I argued that the shift from evidence-based ‘gift giving’ to the creation (and indeed
maximisation) of blended value is politically significant and goes beyond the adoption
of measurement or performance metrics. While the literature mentioned above
does discuss techniques of results-based management in charities and NGOs or
(quasi-)experimental methods for evaluating micro-interventions, my thesis extends
the literature by illustrating how such elements get reconfigured and combined with
knowledges of equity and venture capital investment to form a logic of blended value
maximisation. Overall, I suggest this marks a novel repertoire for benevolent action—
factivist finance—that calls for further social-scientific research. The key arguments
of this thesis and the associated development of the notion of factivist finance thus
have wider implications for ongoing research into the role in contemporary regimes
of measurement as the ‘broader discursive field of humanitarian reason is shifting’
(Mitchell, 2017a, p. 124; cf. Richey, 2018).
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8.3 Future Research Agenda
There is a burgeoning literature on the ways in which public institutions increasingly
use financial tools—and work with financial actors—in the realm of social welfare
and development aid programmes (Chapter 2; see also Dowling, 2017; Karwowski,
2019; Mawdsley, 2018a; Wainwright & Manville, 2017). While the financial
volumes of impact bonds and the number of projects are (still) small (Section 1.1;
cf. Chiapello, forthcoming; Williams, 2019), actors emphasise that the ‘[p]otential
market size is significant enough to stimulate more R&D’ (USAID and Palladium,
2018, p. 29) and consequentially, impact bonds and similar models are increasingly
being explored by donor agencies, international organisations, private foundations,
and NGOs (Boggild-Jones et al., 2019; Ecorys, 2018). My findings may serve as a
starting point for further case studies of SIBs and DIBs in other countries and other
issue areas. An analysis of how the impact bond model is adopted in the context of
other programmes could add interesting dimensions to the rubric of factivist finance.
Such analyses would allow for contextualising and cross-checking the qualitative
findings that my study has provided in terms of the logics enacted, subjectivity
formation, and the political consequences of the forms of government adopted. The
notion individuals construct of impact bonds in different contexts may well vary. Not
only might the concept itself be altered as it is adopted in different contexts and by
different actors, but it may also give rise to different kinds of investor subjects and
advisory organisations.
As section 2.3 made plain, IPE has typically approached impact bonds as the
financialisation of welfare, particularly in the context of the first SIB project at
Peterborough prison and the Goldman Sachs-financed New York City Rikers SIB
(cf. Harvie & Ogman, 2019; Ogman, 2016, 2019). My case study on the Educate
Girls programme was the first IPE analysis of a DIB. Further IPE research on DIBs
appears to be a promising endeavour as DIBs currently are an under-researched
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field. Further analysis of the usage of impact bonds in international development
could move academic discussion on development finance and financialisation along
as these ostensibly ‘local’ interventions entail a host of spatial connections and
entanglements, bringing together, for example, official donors and private foundations,
policy instruments, professional investors, local NGOs, intermediary institutions, and
external evaluators in service of delivering the SDGs (Boggild-Jones et al., 2019;
Mawdsley, 2018b; OECD, 2019).
Related, in future research I endeavour to shift analytical attention from single impact
bonds to so-called outcomes funds, which are geared towards funding a broader series
of interventions and services (in parallel or consecutively) through outcome-based
finance. As I discussed in Chapter 4.2, several outcomes funds have been deployed
in the UK such as the Innovation Fund, Fair Chance Fund, Commissioning Better
Outcomes Fund, and the Life Chances Fund. I plan to further scrutinise these
funds—and similar vehicles in other countries—as they are both said to be an integral
part of the emerging EU impact investing framework (EVPA, 2018) and a potential
approach for scaling up impact bonds in low-income economies through multi-donor
DIBs outcomes funds (Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013b;
Impact Bonds Working Group, 2019). An in-depth study of such outcomes funds
will allow for fleshing out how such new fiduciary structures pool available funds,
stimulate demand for outcomes across local, national and global scales as well as
manage risks across an array of pay-for-success schemes (cf. Gugelev, Gungadurdoss,
Lee, Sedlmayr, & Stumpf, 2019).
Beyond the provision of social welfare and development aid programmes, factivist
finance now also emerges in other domains—which has implications for the literature
on financialisation. I therefore plan to take up and develop the notion of factivist
finance through research in two specific domains which I outline in the following.
First, as the case study of Ways to Wellness in this thesis made plain, factivist finance
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has wider implications with regard to the financialisation of health. Other examples
include the mobilisation of impact bonds to improve the health of low-income
children with asthma in Fresno, California (Quelch & Rodriguez, 2016), reduce
type 2 diabetes in Israel (Rizzello et al., 2018, Ch. 5.2) or address hypertension
(high blood pressure) among seniors in Canada (Farthing-Nichol & Jagelewski,
2016). As the financialisation of public health remains a central concern of the
field (cf. Bayliss et al., 2017), I will research the ongoing conflation of PbR and
private sector investments as ‘the healthcare sector seems to represent a particularly
promising field for the application of SIBs’ (Rizzello et al., 2018, p. 70). Beyond
the pre-financing of health interventions, private sector investments are now also
being mobilised to finance the development of treatments. The programme Mission:
Cure for instance already combines impact investing and outcome-based financing to
develop treatments for chronic pancreatitis (The Brookings Institution, 2017).
On an international level, this tendency can be delineated in certain programmes of
The Global Fund, the world’s largest financier of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria
prevention, treatment, and care programmes. This organisation has started to
explore outcomes-based financing approaches for malaria elimination and primary
health in different African countries and launched impact bonds addressing HIV
in young women in South Africa and supporting tuberculosis case finding and
community treatment models in Fiji (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria, 2019). In a similar vein, the discourse of factivist finance has also
been extended to humanitarianism. The first HIB, which was launched by the
ICRC, aims to operate physical rehabilitation centres for disabled people in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and Nigeria (cf. Barnaby Willitts-King,
McCartney, Dhami, Llewellyn, & Adamczyk, 2019; The Economist, 2017b). Thus,
the HIB—which became known as the Programme for Humanitarian Impact
Investment (PHII)—also delivers health outcomes, in countries affected by violence
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and conflict.150 In view of the findings of this thesis, I will direct analytical attention
of prospective research projects to this conflation of a technocratic problem-solving
appeal—‘smart humanitarianism’ (Dale & Kyle, 2016, p. 783)—and knowledges
from private sector investing—‘humanitarian finance’ (Andreu, 2018, p. 708) in short.
Second, my thesis has implications for critical analyses of climate finance, as
results-based financing mechanisms are gaining traction in this realm. Recent years
have seen the exploration of ‘environmental impact bonds’ (EIBs) (Balboa, 2016).
The first EIB was issued by the DC Water and Sewer Authority (DC Water) in the US,
geared towards managing storm water through ‘green infrastructure’ (Hall, 2017).
While the adoption of EIBs still is in an early stage, the World Bank Group has
for instance developed the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change
Mitigation (PAF) with support from Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States. PAF seeks to incentivise private investments for projects that reduce methane
emissions in developing countries by providing a guaranteed floor price on emission
reductions in the form of carbon credits (Ipsos MORI and SQ Consult, 2019). Put
another way, PAF is an auction-based pay-for-performance mechanism. This could
be an interesting avenue of research on factivist finance, especially since PAF is
currently also being explored as a potential way for catalysing energy and resource
efficient buildings (World Bank Group, 2018). Another World Bank initiative that
points in this direction is the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF) which
promotes a results-based carbon market mechanism under Article 6 of Paris Climate
Change agreement. Operative from 2016 until 2028, TCAF is designed to support
different types of direct and indirect carbon pricing efforts in low-income economies
by paying for verified carbon assets that result from these actions. The results-based
payments could be used to help governments of developing countries enhance sectoral
150A further example of the mobilisation of factivist finance in humanitarianism is the concept of
‘humanitarian venture capital’, whereby a couple of initiatives such as the UNICEF Innovation Fund
or the Humanitarian Innovation Fund provide seed capital for experimenting with evidence-based
solutions to current challenges of humanitarian assistance provision (Billo & Boyer, 2016).
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planning, strengthen the coordination and implementation of low-carbon policies,
and monitor sector performance on the emission of greenhouse gases. As the Swiss
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs specifies: ‘all these are necessary conditions
to create a conducive environment for increasing private sector investment in low
carbon technologies’ (SECO – Economic Cooperation and Development, 2018b, p. 1).
The wider implications of this thesis for the study of financialisation in these
domains centre on the benefits of a subtle and nuanced analysis of the entanglement
of novel financial logics and techniques with more established governmental and
economic rationalities. As the emerging development finance regime (Liverman,
2018; Mawdsley, 2018b; Niculescu, 2017) and the emerging EU impact investing
framework (EVPA, 2018) seems to increasingly rely on the tools and language of
factivist finance, further analyses of this logic of government and its dynamics in the
context of health and humanitarianism as well as climate finance will illuminate the
study of financialisation processes in those realms. This thesis has offered a suitable
theoretical and methodological framework to explore such processes through future
research.
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8.4 Concluding Remarks
Impact bonds offer investors the possibility to achieve ethically ‘meaningful’
financial outcomes, make new (and much-needed) funds available for social purpose
organisations, and (seemingly) increase accountability for public institutions through
facts; as Schram (2015) remarks, ‘the whole thing seems irresistible’ (p. 162). While
practitioner debates about impact bonds are dominated by technicalities—such as the
uptake of impact bonds, their effectiveness or macro-economic significance—these
debates have recently also sparked discussions about political and normative questions
(cf. Eccles, 2016; Giridharadas, 2019; Hurley, 2017; Kramer, 2018; Ronicle, 2016).
This thesis sought to address such questions and discussed an array of inconsistencies
and gaps in impact bonds’ logic of government, which are politically significant. To
be sure, the findings of this thesis are not just about knowledge claims, the ways
in which factivist finance (re-)constructs the social or financial subjectivities. The
interventions designed and commissioned have very real consequences, they affect
the ways in which social interventions are provided. For service users, such effects
can range from improved health, education and housing situations to administrative
removal and deportation (as shown in Section 5). What I termed ‘factivist finance’ is
not only ‘analytically troubling’ (Langley, 2018, p. 9) but can also have violent effects
on people’s lives. Yet, I demonstrated that factivist finance does not only reproduce
structural conditions that perpetuate poverty, it also employs these conditions to
articulate alternative (if imperfect) responses. This thesis made the case for an
ongoing social-scientific engagement with these dynamics. The argument and the
findings it provided may serve as a starting point for further respective analyses on
pay-for-success contracts and ‘factivist finance’ more broadly conceived.
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Appendix
Table 1: Author’s Interviews in Chronological Order
No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
01 Ways to Wellness Chief Executive Tara Case 1 August 2017 Telephone
02 Triodos Bank
Senior Manager (Corporate
Finance Team)
Jeremy Pannell 17 August 2017 Telephone
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
03 Greater London Authority Senior Project Officer Jonathan Qureshi 4 September 2017 Personal
04 St Mungo’s Executive Director of Services David Fisher 5 September 2017 Personal
05 Social Finance Associate – 5 September 2017 Personal
06 St Mungo’s Service Development Manager Kathleen Sims 5 September 2017 Personal
07 OPM Group
Director of Innovation and
Social Investment
Chih Hoong Sin 6 September 2017 Personal
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
08 Bridges Ventures Investment Manager Mila Lukic 7 September 2017 Personal
09 Tim Gray Consulting Ltd. Founder Tim Gray 14 September 2017 Personal
10 Triodos Bank Corporate Finance Manager Richard O’Brien 14 September 2017 Telephone
11 Social Spider Managing Director David Floyd 15 September 2017 Personal
12 Newcastle Gateshead CCG Chair Dr Guy Pilkington 18 September 2017 Personal
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No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
13 Ways to Wellness Chair and Trustee Chair
Professor Chris Drinkwater
CBE
20 September 2017 Personal
14 Changing Lives Executive Director Jo Curry 21 September 2017 Personal
15 Mental Health Concern
Head of Community and
Wellbeing Services
Julia Perry 21 September 2017 Personal
16 Mental Health Concern Link Worker Matilda Harrison 21 September 2017 Personal
17 – – – 22 September 2017 Personal
Continued on next page
289
Table 1 – Continued from previous page
No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
18 Coventry University
Professor of Economic
Geography; SIB Evaluator
Dr Nick Henry 27 September 2017 Personal
19 – – – 28 September 2017 Telephone
20 – – – 29 September 2017 Personal
21 UBS Optimus Foundation
Head of Social and Financial
Innovation
Maya Ziswiler 29 September 2017 Telephone
22 Thames Reach Chief Executive Jeremy Swain 2 October 2017 Personal
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No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
23 – – – 4 October 2017 Personal
24 Educate Girls Development Director Maharshi Vaishnav
5 October 2017;
6 October 2017
Skype Call
25 Big Lottery Fund Funding Manager (Investment) Philip Messere 6 October 2017 Telephone
26 Thames Reach Manager Michael Buckley 10 October 2017 Telephone
27
Center for Universal Education,
Brookings Institution
Fellow Dr Emily Gustafsson-Wright 13 October 2017 Skype Call
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No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
28 Big Issue Invest Investment Director Katy Pillai 1 November 2017 Personal
29
Centre for Educational
Development, Appraisal and
Research
Senior Research Fellow Mairi Ann Cullen 8 November 2017 Personal
30 i for change Founder Russ Bubley 20 November 2017 Skype Call
31 Instiglio Chief of Staff Julia Loraque 28 November 2017 Skype Call
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No.
Organisation Name
(if anonymity waived)
Function of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Name of Interviewee
(if anonymity waived)
Interview Date(s)
Interview
Mode
32
Centre for Social Impact Bonds
(UK Government Department
for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport)
Senior Policy Advisor Andrew Park 4 January 2018 Telephone
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